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On the Promise of Symbolic Interaction
For Social Welfare
(A comment by the editor of the special issue)
Ralph Segalman
California State University, Northridge
In a previous article ("Theoretical Models of Social Structure and
the Practice of Social Work," Arete Spring 1976, Vol. 4 no. 1) I commented
on the variety of non-interchangable social theory doctrines utilized
by social work, past and present, to explain the relationship between
the client (or client group) and society. In it I indicated the hidden
assumptions of the practitioner as revealed by his social theory of
choice. As therapist he (or she) inferentially laid the onus of adjustment on the client; as advocate--on the society, depending upon the
particular consensus or conflict theory utilized. I pointed out that the
most appropriate theory, however, for analysis of the probable relationship between most individuals and society is symbolic interacticn, iii
that it provides mechanisms for study of the view as seen
by the
client, as seen by the society and as seen in the interaction between the
individual and the society. Aside from social problems deriving from
severe structural faults or from severe individual deficiences, most
situations found in social work settings represent problems of interactive
patterns between social settings and clients which tend to reinforce
problem conditions.
Interaction theory focuses on Communication; a process with which
social work has had long experience. It is communication which is used
by most social work practitioners to resolve problems and it is communication problems which most often underlie social dysfunctionality. Social
Work's task, under interactionist theory is to seek to maximize the
misunderstanding which underlies much of the conflict between people, by
maximizing the skills of knowing what one means, and what one means to
say, by bridging seemingly antagonistic definitions of situations, social
work can provide a service not otherwise generally available in other
professions. In a sense, social work's emphasis on "problem-solving" is
yet another indication of the affinity between social work and symbolic
interaction theory.
In reducing the incongruity of meanings which a person may have
in his own understanding or in his contacts with others, we reduce
communication entropy and promote a more mutually acceptable, civilization for all. The "tower of Babel," built up by the variety of Moninterchangable theories of human behavior which separate practitioners
from one another in and out of social work can also probably be restructured
into a workable bridge of functional and productive interaction, given
the theory and tools of symbolic interaction. A start in this direction
has recently been published by University Press of America (Segalman:
Dynamics of Social Behavior and Development; A Symbolic Interaction

Perspective-)
Symbolic interaction theory, unlike other social theory provides
us with both macro- and micro orientations of analysis. Unlike other

macro-social theory it does not assume that either the system or the
participants have greater or lesser influence on events. Unlike other
micro theories it seeks out the purposes of behavior (and development
as well) motivations rather than assumed instincts or conditioning.
More than other theories it provides promise of the possible development
of a community of interest among scholars, of an accessible, interchangable and derivable assemblage of methods of study and intervention,
and of an objective examination of resources, priorities and facilities
without which rational social policy is impossible. It provides the
means of analysis of the emotional filters which screen out the facts
of social misunderstanding, and in the process makes possible the
achievement of a congruent understanding of the nature of social dysfunctia
Treatment (or social work service) of a client (or client group)
can be counterproductive if the client's meanings, the "social reality"
meanings and the workers meanings are not understood and interrelated
in the treatment process. Individuals or groups can be reinforced in
their unnecessary exclusion (or seclusion) from the mainstream if the
worker's understanding of the situational definitions are clouded.
With exclusion (or seclusion) comes limited benefits and increasingly
limited participation in the mainstream of society. Thus the children of
such populations have even fewer chances to interact with the mainstream
and develop even more separationist coping mechanisms to deal with fears,
stress and feelings of inadequacies. These coping mechanisms make
communication (and participation) even less likely.
Thus it can be seen how symbolic interaction theory is heuristic
in the analysis of intergenerational isolation of deviance. It can be
equally useful in analysis of many other common social welfare problems.
Symbolic interaction theory can be used in explaining status inconsistency,
cognitive dissonance and role confusion. It can be used in explaining
why labelling theory works in some instances and not in others, and it is
helpful in indicating ways in which social work can be helpful in prevention of devaluative labelling.
Thus symbolic interaction provides a model for explaining social and
individual dynamics so that a rational plan rather than a variety of
incongruent assumed constructs can become the basis for appropriate
treatment planning and problem solving. By seeking common, definitions
on the nature of social problems and of treatment goals and methods,
the theory provides increased meaning for the profession as an integration
of knowledge and practice.
The articles in the special edition are only a sample of the variety
of applications of symbolic interaction theory to social welfare,. My
co-editor and I have carefully studied the submissions, and the choices
were not easily made. I herewith express my deep appreciation to Harris
Chaiklin, the co-editor, for his painstaking analysis of the articles
and for his suggestions and recommendations. I also express my thanks
to the authors who have waited so patiently for the production of this
special edition.
Respectfully,
Ralph Segalman
Editor, Special Edition

SYMBOLIC INTERACTION AND SOCIAL PRACTICE
Harris Chaiklin
University of Maryland

ABSTRACT
To make social theory useful for practice its
concepts must be in a form which is compatible
with the ways practitioners relate to people.
Symbolic interaction has a unique contribution
to make to this endeavor.
Its unit of attention
is interaction; what goes on between people.
Facts and ideas at this level of abstraction
can be used in intervention. By contrast
theories of society and theories of system are
descriptive. They provide useful background
information for practice.
Symbolic interaction theory offers the hope that a social perspective can be
effectively integrated into individual and family treatment. It is a hope because
at this point in time the pschological perspective has many well developed diagnostic and treatment paradigms and the social perspective is a loose collection
of practice wisdom.
The advantage of symbolic interaction is that in contrast to other social
theories it does not pose a theory of 1 society but, rather, focuses on individual
acts and what goes on between people.
This limited world view is why it will be
useful to practitioners. It is best exemplified by Manis and Meltzer's listing
of the theory's basic propositions:
1.

Distinctively human behavior and interaction are carried on through
the medium of symbols and their meanings.
2. The individual beccmes humanized through interaction with other
persons.
3. Human society is most usefully conceived as consisting of people
in interaction.
4. Human beings are active in shaping their behavior.
5. Consciousness, or thinking, involves interaction with oneself.
6. Human beings construct their behavior in the course of its
execution.
7. An understanding~of human conduct requires study of the actors
covert behavior.
These propositions direct the practitioner's attention to behavior which can be
seen or elicited in practice. Among the more important concepts in the theory
are those of a social self, roles built out of mutual expectations, attitudes,
the importance of language
human development, looking-glass self, generalized
other and reference groups.
These concepts are at the same level of abstraction
or can be directly connected to concepts used in a psychological practice per-

P

spective. Thus, if adequate diagnostic tools and treatment protocols can be developed fran a symbolic interaction perspective, a practitioner can integrate
psychological and social views into practice without the confusion that comes
from trying to mix theories of difference levels of abstraction.
Beyond the theoretical attractiveness of symbolic interaction there is a
philosophical base which makes it comfortable for those trying to help others in
the struggle to control their lives. Symbolic interaction rests on a pragmatic
philosophy. This is best summed up in the dictionary definition which says it is:
an American movement in philosophy founded by C.S.
Peirce and William James and marked by the doctrines
that the meaning of conceptions is to be sought in
their practical bearings, that the function of
thought is to guide action, and that truth is
preeminently to be4 tested by the practical consequences of belief.
Such a stance is almost unique in the realm of social theory. To be acceptable
as a fruitful alternative for consideration in explaining the world, a theory has
only had to be logical; it has not had to be useful in guiding action. This is
not to say that symbolic interaction theory meets the pragmatic test completely.
It does meet the test more than any other theory. This is best reflected in W.I.
Thomas's famous dictum, "If a man thinks a thing is true it is truce in so far as
it governs his action." This is a truism; it also reflects the essence of pragmatism. To the extent that one controls their actions and acts on their desires the
basis for that action becomes a truth. It is something that works for it provides
at least a necessary explanation of that action. If from the point of view of the
receiver the action is initiated through false premises the difference between the
actor and the receiver is something to be worked out in interaction.
Another aspect of the cultural-value system that surrounds symbolic interaction
is that it is derived fram a liberal view of the world. Its roots are in a belief
in progress and a ccmmitment to freedam. It assumes that man is inherently good;
this assumption is backed up by a commitment to protect political and civil liberties
Freedom is the watchword of symbolic interaction and individual autonomy is its faith
The esphasis on the individual is the key to why symbolic interaction theory is
useful to the practitioner. Pragmatism and liberalism contain the idea that individual freedom and autonomy are only possible when the rights of others are respected.
This orientation is reflected in a methodology which emphasises techniques that
can be considered distinctive to the theory since they are so seldom used in other
theorectical approaches. The unit of analysis is the individual; the focus of concern is explaining the individual in social terms. This social view of personality
draws data from an interactive view of role, operating in the context of social
structure. The research techniques used by symbolic interactionists are exactly
those needed for practice research. Thus, they have pioneered in using personal
documents, case histories, life histories and autobiographies. They have demonstrated that the comparative method is as necessary to advancing knowledge as are
statistical tests of significance based on probability samples.

It seems almost surprising that such a pcerful theory of the social individual
has not resulted in a more useful theory of social practice. One reason may be that
Harry Stack Sullivan, the best known proponent of symbolic interaction in psychiatry,
did not propose or develop a distinctive diagnostic and treatment schema based on
interactional concepts. His numerous mind-bending neologism may constitute the
groundwork for such a development but, unfortunately, many of his conceptual contributions have not received wide currency.
Sullivan worked within a traditional psychoanalytic diagnostic and treatment
structure. This comnitment led him to abandon an interactional approach for transactional ideas which are more compatible with the system orientation of psychoanalysis
Perhaps this is because his focus was on treating severely disturbed people; here the
normal rules of interaction do not pertain and much time must be spent deciphering
the unconscious. Regardless of the reason much of Sullivan's writing goes beyond
the interactional and is concerned with transactions where the emphasis is on the
mutual changes which occur in the participants in a treatment encounter.
Systems theories are good for seeing things whole and describing the world.
They are vital for any complete system of treatment but are more useful in between
practice sessions than in the moment of practice. They provide a structure; a way
to organize and integrate information.
In syst9s theory all the elements are seen as being in constant motion; there
are no facts.
The equilibrium model which is the core of systems theory has been
criticized for its inherent conservation because change is not handled in a positive
way. It is noteworthy that many systems oriented therapists tend not to want 6 to
deal with the issues that people want help with; but only with their precess.
Perhaps it is easier to talk about systems then to deal with real people.
It is paradoxical that so many systems theorists see their approach to therapy as radical.
They talk in glowing terms of "growth" without seeming to realize that with people
this takes a long time; the possibilities for altering or speeding up growth are
limited.
Many people who seek help for problems require a transactional relationship.
This is because their world perceptions are so distorted, and have been for a long
time, that help can only be given at this level of intensity. The majority of
people who seek help for counseling have an essentially intact ego. While mental
illness may not be a myth it is possible that one of the reasons there has been a
controversy about its nature is that a psychological framework has been the only
orientation available to those who help people suffering situational stress. The
same holds for difficulty in handling life problems where neither the major cause
or source of alleviation lies in the psyche of the individual.
In almost every area of our society where there is difficulty making a decision
because there is question about the meaning of a person's behavior the tendency is
to turn to those with a psychological orientation. Thus, the courts will turn to
psychiatrists and psychologists. Physicians will do the same. In their training,
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and other counselors are not exposed
to a systematic and organized practice model based on the assumption of a normal
ego and the need for an interactional as opposed to a transactional approach.
In
an interactional approach the key is to be able to understand the world as the other
does. The task of the counselor is to use his knowledge of where the other is to

work with him to handle the issue in his life.

The counselor is

not concerned

about mutual changes in himself and his client, with a detailed history of the
problemn, with interpreting the current problem in the light of that history, or
with the associations, fantasies, or even the import of the client's feelings.
What he does look at is what the client does about the problem alone or with
others. This approach holds whether the client needs only to change a problen
definition, his own behavior, other people's behavior, or material supports
or alterations in the environment are necessary.
Interaction is a concept that does not require a high level of emotional
involvement or change to use successfully. All that is required is that one be
able to take account of the other. Interaction is complete when each participant
is aware of the others expectations and can, if they choose, take the other into
account. This formulation does not guarantee that the interaction will be happy
or that one participant will not take advantage of another. One is not required
to grow and it is not expected that their character structure will change as a
result of one encounter or a series of encounters. One can engage in interaction
and still
be an individual. In short, interaction implies that social business
can be accomplished without either participant being deeply affected. That is
why another name for symbolic interaction is social behaviorism.
This formulation of an interactional approach depends more on a definition
of the situation than anything inherent in the person or his behavior in any
situation. It is a diagnostic question as to whether behavior is situational or
an example of a personality problem whose manifestation is relatively uninfluenced
by the situation. Based on this diagnosis the counselo5 can determine whether to
intervene on an interactional or a transactional basis.
In sum, symbolic interaction offers a pragmatic and humanitarian basis for
developing ways to integrate the "social" into treatment. 8 Such a system will
facilitate the use of multiple perspectives in treatnent.
This can only benefit
the client. No one theory, psychological or social, explains all of behavior.
While it is true that in order to guide treatment a practitioner must master one
theory; it is also true that he must draw techniques fram all theories to really
help his client. It is time to balance the predcminate psychological approaches
to treatment with those that are socially based. Out of such an endeavor can
come a unified theory of human behavior. Only then will those who try to help
people be able to deliver, with predictable regularity, positive results from what
is often a confusing, painful, demanding, and expensive effort.
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ABSTRACT
Professions historically have been practiced autonomously, but with
the proliferation of professionalism as technology advances professional
practice is being conducted more and more within the confines of "organizational necessities." There is an inherent conflict between professional
autonomy and organizational constraints. This conflict has created a
need for theoretical formulations that mediate this situational relationship. The theoretical formulations of Mead, Cooley, Linton, Thomas,
Kinch, and Blumer are used to identify a system for taking account of
the individual within the organization. Using the concepts of looking
glass self, self-indications, role, status, definition of the situation,
the social self, scripts, and actors, specific areas of concern for
empirical research are identified. An interactionist perspective is
used to demonstrate how the professional self-image is derived from
specific others in each interactive situation, but at the same time
the individual professional practitioner is an active, creative source
of behavior. How the professional defines the situation and reconciles
self-actions and organization expectations depends to a large extent on
how the supervisory process is structured and acted out. Various
theorists, their theoretical formulations and the possible research
apDlications of each in relation to professional activity within organizations are identified.

Introduction
Supervision in social work in its earliest stages was concerned
with indirect regulation of service but not necessarily direct control
of workers (Brackett, 1903). Only with the development of casework as
a method did control become a direct and explicit function of suoervision.
The control element in supervision did not become a critical issue until
professionalization of social work took place. As long as the worker
developed his self-concept on the basis of "'sitting next to Nellie'"
(Pettes, 1967:9), there was little problem, but as professionalization
evolved and the basis of self-concept shifted (self-regulated practice),
control in supervision and autonomy in practice were brought into conflict
as has been demonstrated in recent articles by Mandell (1973) and

Epstein (1973). This conflict quite naturally gets acted out around
professional education, and the role of education in supervision as a
means of control can also be documented in the literature (Wilson and
Ryland, 1949; Feldman, 1950; Berkowitz, 1952).
Theoretical Framework
The conceptions of self as formulated by Mead, Cooley and others
are well-suited to dealing with the supervisory process in social
work as related to worker sense of control. "In very general terms the
basic notions of the theory can be stated in one sentence: The individual's conception of himself emerges from social interaction and, in turn,
guides or influences the behavior of that individual"
(Manis and Meltzer,
1972:246T. The importance of supervision as a source of professional
identification and effectiveness has received much attention in social
work education and is attested to by the heavy emphasis on strongly
supervised field experience in social work education. In spite of this,
little experimentation on the impact of supervision on professional
effectiveness or satisfaction has been attempted (Briar and Miller, 1971:
102). The purpose of this paper is to theoretically conceptualize supervision in a manner that allows for analysis of the day to day supervisory
relationship as well as analysis of the supervisory process through
larger scale empirical research. It has been consistently held that
supervision of workers exists to carry out effectively the purpose for
which the organization exists (Hester, 1951:242) and, "The organizational
structures of social work agencies reflect the dominant ideologies and
structures of the larger society." resulting in the assumption "Supervision was . . . the most efficient way of training and socializing new
personnel and assuring the stable continuation of organizational patterns"
(Mandell, 1973:43). Given this conception of social work supervision,
symbolic interaction theory lends itself to an empirical analysis of
this process because "According to Mead, all group life is essentially
a matter of cooperative behavior.", and . . . . in order for hu,lan
beings to cooperate there must be present some sort of mechanism whereby
each acting individual:
(a) can come to understand the lines of actions
of others, and (b) can guide his own behavior to fit in with those
lines of action" (Meltzer, 1972:5). Symbolic interaction theory helps
in conceptualizing this linkage among society, social institutions (the
organization or agency), supervision and the individual. The basis of
interaction in supervision is derived from society and "Symbolic interactionists stress the primacy of society." (Manis and Meltzer, 1972:2)
in the same sense social work does as a profession. However, symbolic
interaction theory becomes even more helpful at the level of the supervisory relationship because the theory is ". . . inclined to consider
the individual as an active, creative source of behavior" (Manus and
Meltzer, 1972:2). Blumer expands on this by pointing out:
The term 'symbolic inLeraction' refers . . .
to the peculiar and distinctive character of

interaction as it takes place between human
beings. The peculiarity consists in the fact
that human beings interpret or 'define' each
other's actions instead of merely reacting to
each other's actions. Their 'response' is not
made directly to the actions of one another but
instead is based on the meaning which they
attach to such actions (Manis and Meltzer,
1972:145).
W. I. Thomas referred to this as that process in which "Preliminary to
any self-determined act of behavior there is always a stage of examination and deliberation which we may call the definition of the situation"
(Manis and Meltzer, 1972:331). From Thomas we might conclude that this
self-action is spontaneous, but Blumer states that:
[an ]important implication of the fact that
the human being makes indications to himself
is that his action is constructed or built up
instead of being a mere release. Whatever the
action in which he is engaged, the human
individual proceeds by pointing out to himself the divergent things which have to be
taken into account in the course of his action.
He has to note what he wants to do and how he
is to do it; he has to point out to hiijiself
the various conditions which may be instrumental to his action and those which may
obstruct his action; he has to take account
of the demands, the expectations, the prohibitions, and the threats as they may arise
in the situation in which he is acting.
His action is built up step by step through
a process of self-indication (Manis and
Meltzer, 1972:146).
Mead saw this formation of self-indication as taking place in
context. "Each individual aligns his action to the action of
by ascertaining what they are doing or what they intend to do
is, by getting the meaning of their acts" (Manis and Meltzer,

a social
others
- that
1972:143).

In social work supervision the worker is not then a passive receptor
of the attitudes, beliefs and values of the supervisor, but must be
viewed as an active participant through interaction with the supervisor.
Through this interaction the worker not only assigns meaning to the
supervisor's behavior toward him, but assigns meaning to his own behavior
as a result of the supervisor's actions. The worker's perceptions of his
own actions and the supervisor's actions are built up over time in tile
supervision relationship. The worker's self-indications will be based
on the nature, type and extent of the interaction with the agents of the
-I0-

group (the supervisor). The supervisor as the "significant other,"
symbolizing and signifying for the worker the "generalized others,"
permits the worker to take the role of others in order to elicit from
the supervisor definitions that prescribe specific behavior in a given
situation (Knott, 1973:25-26). Cooley's Tormation of the "looking
glass self," and its three main components of: (1) our perception of
how behavior appears to others- (2) our perceptions of their judgments
of this behavior; and (3) our feelings about those judgments (Popenoe,
1971:105), can be very helpful in assessing the worker's professional
self-directions in relation to the worker's perception of the supervisor's
response to the worker's behavior. If workers think supervisors approve
of the things they do, the workers themselves will approve them, and if
workers are treated as autonomous practitioners, they will view themselves
as independent professional workers. The idea of self-indications growing
out of a process of interaction raises the question of how is interaction
varied within supervision to take into account differing levels of worker
self-indications. The assumption is that new workers require a higher
level of direction and control than more experienced workers, but how
and if this occurs remains untested. Do younger workers receive the
level of control and interaction they need from supervisors while more
experienced workers receive the degree of autonomy and independence
expected to promote self-reliance? Research by Wasserman (1970, 1971)
indicates the answer to this question is no. In his study of social
workers employed in the foster care division of a welfare department,
Wasserman found that 50 percent suffered varying degrees of physical
fatigue and emotional upset. The problems were related to an array of
working conditions, but supervision was viewed as the major source of
difficulty. In spite of having to rely on supervisors for decisions,
most of the supervisors were considered not knowledgeable enough to make
decisions, and the workers had little sense of belonging to a professional
collectivity (Wasserman, 1970:96-101). These findings lend support to
the argument that the crucial element in the deprofessionalization of
social work resides in part in the failure to resolve the authority conflicts around supervision rather than in the shift in values in the
larger society and reflected in the profession as argued by Specht (1972)
and others.
In moving on to the organizational aspects of supervisory perceptions,
Kinch, in his formalized theory of the self-concept, identified three
major postulates of the theory:
1. The individual's self-concept is based on his
perception of the way others are responding to
him.
2. The individual's self-concept functions to
direct his behavior.
3. The individual's perception of the responses of
other's toward him reflects the actual responses
of other's toward him (Manis and Meltzer, 1972:246).
One of the chief objectives of supervision has been geared to the
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development of "Professional identification and responsibility (Jones,
1969:15). This relates to the first and second propositions presented
above from Kinch. If we are concerned with the worker's sense of
professional effectiveness and responsibility, then of paramount importance to supervisors should be the question: what behaviors do certain
methods of supervision produce? Related to the third postulate from
Kinch is the idea that in the traditional model of supervision, "The
primary teaching-learning method is the tutorial or individual conference
based on relationship and role identification with the chief mentor the field instructor" (Jones, 1969:22). Here again, the role of the
supervisor is portrayed as crucial to the self-concept of the worker.
These observations all relate to the kind of interaction and the
context of interaction that occurs between the worker and supervisor.
Therefore, if use of authority varies as viewed by the worker being
supervised, then the worker will have different self-indications as a
result of supervision. Symbolic interactionists have evolved much of
their theory around these very ". . . issues of how interaction among
individuals shaped social structure and how social structures as networks
of interaction molded individuals" (Turner, 1974:152). There is much
mention of types and models of social work supervision in the literature
and concern with types and sources of authority with little effort to
empirically identify or test these differing approaches. Mead was
directly interested in these interactive situations:
What Mead sees as significant about this process
is that, as organisms mature, the transitory
'self-images' derived from specific others in
each interactive situation eventually become
crystallized into a more or less stabilized
'self-conception' of oneself as a certain
type of object (Turner, 1974:154).
In relating the "self" to "society," or institutions as he
the situation, Mead held institutions represent ". . . the
patterned interactions among diverse individuals" (Turner,
Mead placed this interaction in the context of role taking
it to control:
The immediate effect of . . . role taking lies
in the control which the individual is able to
exercise over his own responses. The control of
the action of the individual in a co-operative
process can take place in the conduct of the
individual himself if he can take the role of
the other. It is this control of the response
of the individual himself through taking the
role of the other that leads to the value of
this type of communication from the point of
view of the organization of the conduct of the
group (Mead, 1934:254).
-12-
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organized and
1974:154).
and related

This comment can be related directly to the supervisory process in
social work in terms of worker perceptions of how control gets exercised
and how this relates to his own self-indications. In social work we
do not know if perceptions of high control produce weak or negative
self-indications. Mead himself disliked the idea of rigid and
oppressive patterns of social organization. He states directly:
• . . there is no necessary or inevitable reason
why social institutions should be oppressive or
rigidly conservative, or why they should not
rather be, as many are, flexible and progressive,
fostering individuality rather than discouraging
it (Mead, 1974:261-262).
Turner points out that Mead failed to "...
indicate how variable
types of social organization reciprocally interacted with variable
properties of self and mind" (Turner, 1974:156). Linton gave added
meaning to Mead's formulations when he delineated the concepts of role
and status. Linton defines status as "A position in a particular
pattern" (Schuler, 1971:157) representing the individual's "posiLion
with relation to the total society" and "is simply a collection of
rights and duties" while "role represents the dynamic aspect of a
status." Linton relates to Mead's emphasis on co-operation by stating
that ". . . . the more perfectly the members of any society are adjusted
to their statuses and roles the more smoothly the society will function"
(Schuler, 1971:157-158). This is important to social work supervision
in regard to the level of satisfaction of the worker with supervision
because satisfaction plays a large role in the smooth functioning of
the system. Merton (Bell, 1967:201) has pointed out that we have
emphasized positive organizational functioning while neglecting
individual stresses and strains. From this perspective it is possible
to argue that we would rather sacrifice our professionalism than give
up our outdated and tradition-bound views of supervision.
Linton in his discussion of role and status makes three conceptual
distinctions in relation to social structure that are of importance in
analyzing supervision: (1) there exists a network of positions, (2) there
is also a corresponding system of expectation, and (3) there are patterns
of behavior which are enacted with regard to the expectations of particular networks of interrelated positions (Turner, 1974:158). These conceptualizations allow for distinguishing clear cut variables that
crystallize the nature and kind of interrelations among positions and
types of expectations associated with the positions. Social structure
involves positions and expectations while behavior reflects role enactment.
The question that needs to be explored is: do varying structures of
supervision as perceived by the worker produce Ji"j.erences in worker
needs, satisfactions, and self-indications? If there are differences,
then this has important implications for social work practice with respect
-13-

to self-perceptions and cooperation in effective delivery of service.
For example, in much of the recent literature it is argued that group
supervision is better than the traditional form of individual supervision. This remains to be determined empirically. it would seem that
perceptions of authority are more important than how supervision is
structured.
Since Linton, role theory has continued to evolve. More recent
theorists have been concerned more directly with power and authority
in relationships. The terminology has turned to "players" and "actors"
in interaction. It has been pointed out that ". . . just as players
with varying abilities and capacities bring to each role their own
unique interpretation, so actors with varying self-conceptions and roleplaying skills have their own styles of interaction." This gets acted
out within the context of situations and ". . . for groups and classes
of positions, various kinds of expectations about how incumbents are
to behave can be discerned" (Turner, 1974:161-162). As discussed in
the area of supervisory models, there are self-indications growing out
of social structures, but there are also aspects of self-image that
grow out of "expectations" specifically related to the interactive
relationship. For example, the structure of supervision can vary, but
the level of perceived use of authority can remain constant. A supervisor might switch from using individual supervision to using group
supervision and still be perceived as exercising as much authority in
the second style as he did in the first. In this context the nature
and type of authority involved in interaction can be more important
than variation of the structural model of supervision.
Symbolic interactionists view expectations as deriving from three
main sources: (1) expectations from the "script" of the interaction,
(2) expectations from other "players" in the interaction, and (3) expectations from the audience associated with the interaction. The first two
sources are directly related to uses of authority in interaction in supervision. The "scripts" deal with norms specifying behavior and the conditions under which behavior varies in terms of such variables as scope,
power, clarity and degree of conflict, while expectations of other
"players" focus on demands emitted by the "other players" (Turner, 1974:
162).
Turner surnarizes this level of analysis by indicating that role
theory tends ". . . to cluster around an analytical concern for the
impact of self-conceptions on the interpretation of various types of
expectations that guide conduct in a particular status" (Turner, 1974:
163). Symbolic interactionists are concerned with the ways individuals
conform to what is expected of them through occupying a particular
status. Turner sees conformity as growing out of several levels of
internal processes:
The degree and form of conformity are usually
seen as the result of a variety of internal
-14-

processes operating on individuals. . . . these
internal processes are conceptualized in terms
of variables such as (1) the degree to which
expectations have been internalized as a part
of individual's needs structure, (2) the
extent to which negative or positive sanctions
are perceived by individuals to accompany a
particular set of expectations, (3) the degree
to which expectations are used as a yardstick
of self-evaluation, and (4) the extent to which
expectations represent either interpretations
of others' actual responses or merely anticipations of their potential responses. Just which
combination of these internal processes operates
in a particular interaction situation depends
upon the nature of the statuses and attendant
expectations (Turner, 1974:164).
The first of these conceptualizations relates to the differing ways
authority is utilized in supervision, and how they relate to workers'
self-conceptions and satisfaction of their needs. The second and third
conceptualizations offer a basis for analyzing whether different perceptions of authority give rise to differing self-perceptions. The
fourth conceptualization is accepted as a given, but does point to a
criticism of symbolic interaction theory and its inability to demonstrate
that attitudes about behavior and behavior itself are the same. Despite
this inherent weakness of symbolic interaction theory it is held to be
an appropriate basis for analyzing social work supervision.

Conclusion
A great deal of theory has been used to suggest means to analyze and
study social work supervision. To summarize the theory and its applications
to social work supervision, Figure I was developed. The left-hand column
identifies the major theorists, and in the middle column their general
theoretical formulations are briefly stated, while the column at the right
identifies the major propositions that remain unexplored empirically.
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FIGURE I
APPLICATION OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
THEORY TO STUDY OF SOCIAL WORK SUPERVISION

l

Theorist
G. Mead

Theoretical Formulations
Self-image derived from
specific others in each
interactive situation.

James

The social self.

Cooley

Looking glass self.

Thomas

Definition of the situatior.

T. Parsons

Internalization of expectations as part of individual's need structure.

R. Linton
K. Davis

Status as collection of
rights and duties and role
dynamic aspect of status.
Allows conceptualization of
variables on the nature of
interrelations among positions and expectations.

Research
Application

What is the
relationship
between worker's perceptions of their
supervisors
and their selfindications?

Do varying
structures as
perceived by
workers produce differences in worker
needs, satisfactions, and
self-indications?

Classes of positions and
expectations:
Davis
Moreno
Homans
Gerth
W. Mills

1. Expectations froii the
"scripts."
2.

Expectations from
"other players."

3. Expectations from the
"audience."

1

Do differing
worker perceived uses of
authority give
rise to varying
self-evaluations
and varying
feelings of
satisfaction of
needs?
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SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL ASSESSMENT
Bill Horner
Eastern Washington University

ABSTRACT
Social work needs a theoretical perspective that will provide impetus to the
development of its unique function:
social assessment and social intervention.
The images and concepts characterizing symbolic interactionism seem to have the
potential of meeting this need. This paper explores the perspective with the
intent of suggesting its utility for assessing and intervening in interpersonal
and environmental circumstances.

INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the utility of an approach to sociological inquiry
called symbolic interactionism for social work practice. Social work practice is
conceived as an applied social science. Symbolic interactionism is conceived as a
theoretical perspective in social science. Thus, the relationship between symbolic interactionism, conceived as a philosophy, and social work, conceived as an
ideology, will not be discussed. However, it should be noted that the basis for
such a discussion exists in their mutual humanistic orientation. Furthermore,
philosophers like George Herbert Mead and John Dewey worked with, and were close
personal friends with, humanists in social work like Jane Addams. (Lasch, 1965:
175-183)
As an empirical social science, the utility of symbolic interactionism lies
in three areas:
constructive criticism, i.e., symbolic interactionists have
provided social work, and other professions, with provacative and useful criticisms of practices in various social service programs; substantive, i.e., this
approach could be borrowed from sociology to develop the function of social
assessment; and methodological, i.e., symbolic interactionism offers an approach
to data collection for social assessment that is essential. It will be the burden
of this essay to illustrate the utility of symbolic interactionism in each of
these three areas. However, some constraints must be placed on this task.
Symbolic interactionism is a robust approach to the study of
A single essay can do no more than demonstrate some of the ways in
proach can contribute to a particular practice activity. Thus, the
strategy is to describe only some of the basic ideas making up
-19-

human affairs.
which this appresentational
this approach.

Although these ideas were selected because of their relevance to social assessment, it should not be assumed that they are the only, or even the most important
ideas bearing on this practice task.
Although many concepts, propositions, and issues surround the task of social
A brief definition will have
assessment, this is not the place to discuss them.
to suffice for the purposes of this essay. The focus of social assessment is on
interpersonal, interactional, and environmental contingencies in the lives of
people. (Briar, 1976) Social assessment may be contrasted with psychological or,
more bluntly, trait assessment. The tasks are, of course, premised on different
conceptions of behavior; social assessment assigns much more importance to the
Where pyschological assessment is
role of situations and social interaction.
observable properties of individuals,
concerned with the stable,
nontrivial,
social assessment is concerned with such properties in situations and relationships.
Social assessment, as a professional activity, is surrounded with difficulties not
to be found in trait
assessment.
Most of them are best captured in the saying,
"It's
a big world out there." That is, the interacting forces that cohstitute the
focus of social assessment are many, traversing several so-called "systems," with
Decisions on the nature of problematic interpersonal
complex and subtle linkages.
and environmental phenomena are difficult to come by under such circumstances,
(Horner and Morris, 1977)
Symbolic interactionism is useful in ordering and making that world comprehesible. Any theory can make that claim but not with reference to the special and
unique domain that constitutes the focus of social assessment.
CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISMS
The diversification of social welfare programs during the 1960's began a
That search,
search for a new knowledge base within the social work profession.
which continues today, has led social work away from an individual, clinical,
personality, therapeutic orientation and toward an orientation that emphasizes
Unfortunately, the search is
context, situation, interaction and environment.
also characterized by the same tendency toward the uncritical acceptance of
borrowed knowledge that prevailed during the 1950's. Now it seems that an exclusive emphasis on the pathology of situations threatens to replace the professions
Where the individual, or at
earlier emphasis on the pathology of individuals.
most the family, was held solely responsible for such problems as alcoholism or
delinquency, the current tendency is increasingly to hold the economic or politActually, two problems are involved here. Symbolic
ical order solely responsible.
interactionism speaks to both of them.
The tendency to think in terms of "one extreme or the other" is counteracted
"The point of departure for symbolic
by the focus of symbolic interactionism:
interaction theory is the dialectic interdependence between the human organism and
his natural and social environments." (Singlemann 1972: 415) Moreover, the
-20-

basic ideas that make up the perspective of symbolic interactionism are applicable
to the individual and larger entities.
The more fundamental tendency toward the uncritical acceptance social science
empiricism. Here we move closer to the
knowledge requires a healthy dose of
contribution of symbolic interactionism in the area of constructive criticism.
Further, a point of convergence between symbolic interactionist and gadflies
within social work can be observed. Their criticisms center on the concepts used
in their respective fields of interest. Briar, addressing social workers, singles
out such practice concepts as authenticity, ego strength, and more recent social
systems concepts such as homeostasis, pattern variables, general systems. Also
named is a favorite concept of sociologists, anomie. Briar's criticism of these
and other concepts used in practice is ". . .that all these orienting concepts (and
I could give a very long list) have no tangible, observable referents in the real
world."
(1973:
23) Blumer, addressing sociologists, nonetheless singles out
concepts that are frequently employed by social workers: deviance, dysfunction,
pathology, disorganization and structural strain. It seems that these concepts
are as useless to the social scientist interested in the study of social problems
as they are to the social worker. Their lack of utility stems from the same
problem mentioned by Briar. The problem is stated by Blumer as follows:
These concepts are useless as means of identifying social problems.
For one thing, none of them has a set of benchmarks that enable the
scholar to identify in the empirical world the so-called instances
of deviance, dysfunction or structural strain. Lacking such clear
identifying characteristics, the scholar cannot take up each and
every social condition or arrangement in society and establish that
it is or is not an instance of deviance, dysfunction, or structural
strain. (1971: 299-300)
Social work can take a first step toward critical thinking by adopting an
empirical criterion for the selection of concepts for practice. Such a stance
would go a long way toward freeing the profession from the tyranny of conceptual
fads.
As Blumer's remarks illustrate, symbolic interactionists have always done a
very good job as "problem staters."
Their insights and analytical abilities
enable them to identify and describe the central problems within a given field or
area of inquiry.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the social services;
several investigators representing this perspective have made major contributions
to our understanding of matters related to these services (e.g., Piliavin and
Briar, 1964; Goffman, 1961; Gottlieb, 1974; Wiseman, 1970). One illustration will
have to suffice.
Wiseman's study (1970) focused on interactions between skid row alcoholics
and various correctional and social service facilities. Social workers can learn
a lot that is useful from this book about the typical patterns of daily living and
-21-

interpersonal relationships among skid row men. However, perhaps most important
for the development of responsive and effective social services are two conclusions supported by numerous findings throughout the book. First, the images
social workers (and other staff) bring to skid row are vastly different from those
brought by their clients. These images bear on all of the key objects making up
the world of skid row:
procedures for processing alcoholics within and between
services, therapy and other rehabilitation efforts, attributes of skid row men,
attributes of correctional and social service personnel, and so on. Never has the
saying, "they come from different worlds" fit better than when discussing these
clients and their helpers and controllers. Moreover, although social workers and
other helpers pride themselves on their empathetic skills, Wiseman's book leaves
no doubt about their complete failure to "take the role of the other" and view
life as the skid row man views it. The result is often ludicrous as in the case
of the helpers seriously applying a therapeutic technology that was originally
designed with quite different people and problems in mind, never glimpsing the
possibilty that this approach may not be relevant to the situations the skid row
man must handle.
The second major conclusion supported by Wiseman's investigation is that the
behavior of skid row men during their interactions with agency personnel represents
their effort to cope with the situations created by the latter group. Needless to
say, these situations are viewed by skid row men as hostile to their needs (including the need to reduce alcohol consumption) and self-esteem. Nonetheless,
they must deal with them to meet basic needs. Thus, the behavior interpreted by
social workers as the result of various deficits in character, is more accurately
viewed as the result of the client's attempt to cope with a hostile situation
created by people from alien social worlds.
The implication of these and other studies representing the perspective of
symoblic interactionism is that social services should be "grafted" on the lives
of clients as they experience them. To develop such services, social workers must
learn how clients view situations they daily encounter and what interactions
sustain these views.
A final illustration of the gadfly contribution has to do with society's
response to social problems. This illustration is selected because of its timeliness:
schools of social work have been revising their curricula in the hope the
social workers can have more of an impact in the realm of public policy. Courses
in management, social planning, policy analysis, and programming at the federal
and state level are now typical offerings.
Nonetheless, it is likely that recent graduates would be at a loss to explain:
why some problems are noticed by the public and not others; why some problems are
legitimated by significant figures and organizations while others are ignored; how
the definitions of particular interest groups come to prevail in discussions of
social problems; how agencies transform plans (that have been developed) at the
legislative level. Although Blumer (1971) directed such questions to sociologists
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desiring a hand in shaping public policy, they would be equally puzzling to social
work students. The difficulty has to do with a failure to understand the nature
of social problems and thus an inability to understand, much less influence, the
way in which society responds to them.
Blumer argues that social problems are wrongly defined in terms of such
objective features as incidence rates, demographic characteristics of the target
population, and other identifiable conditions in society. These features do not
help one understand the nature of a social problem or provide an efficacious means
of handling it.
These objective statements are important only insofar as they
find a place in the collective process by which a social problem is identified and
acted toward. This collective process stands apart from the objective makeup of a
social problem. It is this process that must be understood if social workers are
to influence public policy. (Blumer, 1971)
The career of a social problem consists of five stages identified by Blumer
as follows:
"the emergence of a social problem, the legitimation of the problem,
the mobilization of action with regard to the problem, the formation of an official
plan of action, and the transformation of the official plan in its empirical
implementation."
(1971:
301) The fate of a social problem is precarious as it
moves into contact with diverse groups representing diverse interests during these
different points in its career. At each point, different interactional strategies
are employed in a multitude of formal and informal gatherings in order to redefine
the problem in a way compatible with one's particular interest group. Most importantly, Blumer argues convincingly that we know very little about what happens
within each stage or the nature of the collective process that moves a social
problem from one stage to another.
This concludes the discussion of the contributions made by symbolic interactionists in the area of constructive criticism. It is hoped that these few
illustrations have also suggested something of the nature of this theoretical
perspective.
If the presentational strategy has been successful, it will have
kindled a desire to learn more about the substance of symbolic interactionism, a
topic addressed in the next section.
SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS
In his introduction to some of the complexities surrounding the study of
stigma, Goffman noted, "...it should be seen that a language of relationships, not
attributes is really needed. (1963: 3)
As the social work profession faces the
challenge of developing social assessment (and social intervention) as its unique
function, Goffman's comment is significant because of what it suggests is not
needed.
The statement implies that a conceptual scheme, if not the words to
convey it parsimoniously or with the desired amount of precision, is available to
the sociologist wishing to investigate the relationship between stereotype and
attribute. This, indeed, is what symbolic interactionism offers.
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Social work is in desperate need of a conceptual scheme that is sufficiently
inclusive to cover the vast domain suggested by the function social assessment as
defined in this essay. The perspective should also be consistent with the hallmark of social work:
a serious concern with the uniqueness of the individual and
family in terms of their reality, aspirations, and potential. Symbolic interactionism fits both requirements. The perspective is sufficiently expansive to
have been labled "grand-theoretical."
(Singlemann, 1972: 415)
It is also consistent with social work's concern with the uniqueness of people: the perspective
"...facilitates
the description and explanation of the variability and flexibility
that characterizes human conduct." (Shibutani, 1961: 70)
This section will outline the conceptual world of symbolic interactionism and
comment on its utility
for the task of social assessment in social work practice,
The perspective,
originally developed by George Herbert Mead, has undergone
several different modifications in the hands of late writers such as Blumer,
Goffman, Berger and Luckmann.
This section and the next will draw most heavily
from the writings of Blumer (1946, 1969, 1971).
Such a decision finally seemed
necessary because of the differences in focus and emphasis among various writers
(e.g., see Blumer on Goffman; Blumer, 1972).
Stated simply, social assessment requires an accurate picture of the environment in relation to the lives of people.
As both symbolic interactionists and
social workers have stressed, a respect for the empirical world requires the
relinquishment of pre-established judgments and beliefs as well as common sense
notions about people and problems.
It also requires empathy or the ability to
"take the role of the other" (Straus, 1956: 212-260).
It is the beginning of wisdom in social assessment, as the symbolic interactionists inadvertently remind us, to note that this is an instance of social
interaction.
Moreover, it is an instance involving the sorts of actors and
relationships extensively studied by Goffman (1959).
The actors are relatively
unfamiliar with one another; unlike, say family relationships, significant aspects
of the private life of both are unknown. Under such circumstances both actors
will feel need to provide and gather information bearing on the identity of the
other or to use the information they already possess. They will want to create a
particular impression and will engage in actions to support this impression and
prevent it from being discredited.
This is one way in which they are able to
control the actions of the other person, a most important aspect of the situation
confronted.
While it is often true that people try to control unfamiliar situations
through strategies aimed at identity management, the more fundamental insight
offered by symbolic interactionism is that this may not be the case in any given
instance of social interaction.
A first
premise of symbolic interactionism is
that people respond to things according to the meaning they have from them.
(Blumer, 1969:
2) Thus, rather than indulge a pre-established belief about what
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determines the exact nature of social interaction, the social worker should
attempt to gain a fresh, empirically valid understanding of these events. However,
this injunction will be taken seriously only to the extent that social workers are
able to formulate a general answer to the question: "What is social interaction?"
Before it can be assessed in the particular instance, it must be understood as a
general category of life.
Social interaction, a central focus of social assessment, is mostly symbolic.
Symbolic interaction occurs whenever one reflects on the meaning of the other's
gesture. This category of interaction thus includes all but reflex actions, e.g.,
jumping at the unexpected sound of a door slamming.
Symbolic interaction is
commonly referred to in everyday discourse as in the statement, "Sure I heard what
he said, but I think he's bluffing, so let's proceed as planned." Here we see
that the meaning attached to a gesture through reflection (interpretation) was
different from the meaning "other," intended "self" to receive. (Blumer, 1969)
Gestures in social interaction are also broadly defined by symbolic interactionists.
They include physical movements and verbal expressions, including
very lengthy expressions such as explanations. Gestures contain three elements,
all dealing with meaning. They indicate: what the actor plans or intends, what
the other should do or understand, and how both can act together. The expression,
"we see eye to eye on this matter," suggests that the hazards surrounding the
presentation and interpretation of gestures covering these domains have been
successfully overcome.
Communicating meanings through gestures and attaching meanings to gestures
requires taking the role of the other. "What does the client expect of me as a
social worker?"
To answer this question one must view the situation from the
vantage point of the other, and in so doing, assign meanings to the other's
gestures.
"How can I convey to the client my understanding of the services
offered through the agency?"
An answer to this question also requires role
taking, in this case to determine what gesture to send.
Social interaction
develops through this process of indicating to others about something and interpreting the indications sent by them.
Beyond such definitional matters, the nature of social interaction is assigned
a unique role in the perspective of symbolic interactionism. It is conceived as a
determinant of individual and collective action. The actor organizes his conduct
in light of the meanings assigned to the other's gestures. Plans are changed,
explanations altered, actions suspended as one notes and handles the gestures of
others.
By implication, individual action is not the result of social roles,
norms, values, and the like; nor is it a medium through which attitudes and
feelings express themselves. These and other concepts treat social interaction as
a passive medium or conduit through which things flow. The determining nature of
social interaction is recognized in everyday discourse as in the statement, "I
was going to tell her, but after she said that, I just couldn't."
It should be
recognized that such shifts in strategy and mission due to social interaction are
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profoundly consequential. The nature of family interaction, corporate relationships, transactions between social service agencies and the like will look very
different because of them.
The importance of social interaction does not end here. Symbolic interactionas the source of meaning. That is, the meanings
ists further conceive of it
things have arise and change as a function of social interaction. They are social
products, influenced by "...the ways in which other persons act toward the person
(Blumer, 1969:
4) By implication, meaning is not
with regard to the thing."
intrinsic to a thing nor to what the person brings to the thing in terms of moods,
attitudes and so on. This is a second major premise of symbolic interactionism.
Since people act on the basis of the meanings things have for them, the question
of how such meanings develop and change becomes important.
It is a mistake, however, to assume that the meanings acquired through social
interaction are applied directly when the person is in the presence of the thing.
Symbolic interactionists are impatient with the limited role assigned to the
Central Nervous System by behaviorists. The CNS does more than merely answer
Rather it engages in a process of selecting objects to handle in the
stimuli.
environment and reorganizing meanings attached to them in view of the particulars
of the situation and purpose of action. This process of interpretation constitutes a third major premise of symbolic interaction.
Actually, symbolic interactionism does not speak of a CNS. The term preferred
It is forever engaged in
is "self" and the self is conceived as a process.
communication about objects in the environment. Thus, the self is social in the
sense that it makes indications to itself and reflects upon what has been indicated.
The self can also be the subject of interaction and this too is a social
process. The individual takes the role of the other and defines himself from that
unique vantage point. More precisely, three types of roles may be taken: that of
another individual, an organized group, and the "generalized other" or community.
The self is given substance as it is viewed from each of these vantage
points. This is an important matter for, as Shibutani has said, "...much of what
men do voluntarily depends upon what they conceive of themselves to be." (1961:
214)
As defined above, the self is one element of the individual's social world.
This world or environment is, fundamentally, a world of objects. An object is
anything that the individual can point to, refer to, or otherwise note. The world
of objects may be conveniently grouped into three categories: physical (trees,
tables, etc.), social objects (fathers, cons, etc.), and abstract objects (symbolic
(Blumer, 1969:
10)
Objects have no intrinsic
interactionism, liberty, etc.).
nature; their nature lies in their meaning for the individual. The common expression, "they live in different worlds" points to the extant diversity in environ-26-

ments.
This should not suggest, however, that understanding between people is
impossible.
For the meanings attached to objects are flexibly held and, as
mentioned, change through social interaction.
Before leaving this brief survey of the conceptual world of symbolic interactionism, mention must be made of joint action. This concept refers to the
fitting together of lines of action of several people. Examples of joint action
include:
a family meeting, labor-management negotiations, and complex processes
of production as in the case of producing automobiles and breakfast cereals.
it may be
These examples suggest some of the main features of joint action:
studied without the need to break it down into the separate actions of each individual; joint action often consists of repetitive patterns, suggesting common
pre-established meanings; and it often involves very different sorts of actions at
different points in time.
It is also important to state what is not meant by joint action. It is not
an automatic process. Every joint action must be formed anew, even those recurrent
patterns of joint action.
Such formation will involve designation and interpretation; even pre-established meanings must be reaffirmed in order to guide the
process of joint action. Thus, repetitive action still demands that each instance
be built anew by the actors.
Furthermore, joint action is not synonomous with repetitive action. Situations are constantly arising for which common meanings are inadequate, if they
exist at all. Areas of unprescribed conduct often take center stage; problems of
living spring up that are without precedent. These innovations are constants in
joint action, an idea captured in the saying, "no two situations are quite the
same."
Under such circumstances, joint action requires the creation of new
meanings (e.g., rules) that may be used to designate to various actors what is
expected of them in the face of the novel situation.
Joint action is not the result of such abstractions as "system maintenance
requirements." Efficacy is no more to be attributed to systemic factors than to
norms, values, and roles. These factors become important only if they are "brought
in" to be acted upon during joint action. That is, joint action persists because
people do different things at different points and times. However, "...the sets
of meanings that lead participants to act as they do at their stationed points in
the network have their own setting in a localized process of social interaction
...and...these meanings are formed, sustained, weakened, strengthened, or transformed, as the case may be. . ." through a process of designation and interpretation.
(Blumer, 1969: 20)
Finally, joint action has a career. Participants bring to joint action sets
of objects and meanings as well as frameworks for interpretation. Joint action
cannot be understood apart from its history.
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This brief survey of major images and concepts in symbolic interactionism
must suffice for the purpose of suggesting its utility for assessment in social
work practice. Because of space limitations, the format adopted for the duration
of this section will be to indicate the major questions this perspective promotes
concerning assessment along with some comments pointing to its utility.
Symbolic interactionism pushes our underWhat is social assessment?
1.
standing of the nature of this task beyond the general conception set forth at the
beginning of this paper. It does so by identifying and developing a conception of
each of the major elements of social assessment; social interaction, individual
In addition, symbolic
conduct, the self, the environment, and joint action.
people engaged in
interaction offers a general focus for social assessment:
action. Whatever concept is employed for the purpose of describing or explaining
behavior, it must remain true to what people do, it must be consistent with how
people act toward one another as they handle various situations.
Social
How is social assessment different from a value judgment?
2.
workers are constantly accused, and accusing each other, of imposing middle class
values on unwilling clients. Symbolic interactionism possesses several constraints
against this tendency but mention here will be made only of the concepts employed.
"inability to delay gratification," "inappropriate
First consider such concepts:
affect," and "weak ego."
Two problems with these and other concepts used by
social workers are that they are overly evocative and have distinct mental health
connotation. They not only arouse strong reactions in others, but also subtly
shift attention away from social matters to those pertaining to the individual and
his mental and emotional functioning. Within this focus, nearly every concept
suggests some sort of value judgment to someone. The concepts employed in symbolic interactionism, on the other hand, appear not to suffer from these shortcomings. Thus, they are relatively objective, they refer to actions not traits,
and they do not detract from a social focus in assessment.
This major and constant question in
3.
Why has this problem occurred?
social assessment is dealt with in a unique way by symbolic interactionism,
Depending on the rudimentary particulars of the problem, answers to this question
(a) the stages and processes of group development;
may be found in several areas:
(b) the effect of group activities, i.e., joint action, formal and informal
groups, institutions; (c) interactional strategies of the key participants, e.g.,
falsification, silence, diversionary tactics; (d) self-interaction, e.g., the
individual guided himself badly in the situation, or misinterpreted the gestures
of other, or misinformed them as to his plans; and (e) the meanings assigned to
objects, e.g., the expectations assigned to particular roles, the norms assigned
to particular situations, the values attached to particular behaviors. Within
these areas, some of which differ only in emphasis, explanations may be found for
the origin and maintenance of most problems of living.
4.
defined?

What objects make up the individual's
1eanings imputed to these objects by
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social world and how are they
the individual actor, not the

outside observer, must be understood. People act in terms of their definition of
Thus, social assessment must
the situation not the definition held by others.
reflect an understanding of how key objects are viewed by those who must deal with
them.
This question is
What factors and processes impinge upon meanings?
5.
especially relevant to the meanings that underlie joint action. Concern is with
the processes that reinforce meanings, erode meanings, or ignore meanings.
The fate of definitions that govern actions constitutes a
18)
(Blumer, 1969:
rich source of material for social assessment. Indeed, in view of the frequently
heard refrain concerning the "loss of meaning" in this or that sphere of human
endeavor, it is surprising that so little attention is given to the processes
promoting atrophy.
6.
What is the nature of the actor's social self? This is undoubtedly the
most important single object in the individual's social world. Thus, it should
receive independent attention during assessment. Concern here is with how the
actor thinks he is being regarded by other individuals, groups, and large entities.
How much time does the actor spend ruminating about, and devising ways to influence
the impressions he is making on other people?
This section
ism promotes an
people engaged in
them. In short,
worlds of people.
assessment.

may be concluded by simply reiterating that symbolic interactionGroup life consists of
understanding of ongoing group life.
joint and individual actions to handle the situations confronting
this perspective promotes a serious concern with the social
Therein lies the utility of symbolic interactionism for social

The overriding concern of social assessment--an understanding of social
problems, their determinants and their modifiability--requires an understanding of
The social worker must recognize the
the separate social worlds of clients.
tendency of people to develop different social worlds and must strive to understand
these worlds. More particularly, social assessment must focus on "...the parade
of situations..." the actors must handle, the views, beliefs and conceptions they
construct to handle them, the nature of their interactions and relationships, and
their institutions and organizations. (Blumer, 1969: 39)
METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The social worker needs to acquire a method of data collection that supports
a preoccupation with social assessment. Such a method is naturalistic observation
of the client's social world. It is the purpose of this section to briefly depict
this method as viewed by Herbert Blumer (1969).
Both could be
Two modes of inquiry characterize naturalistic observation.
adapted to the task of data collection for social assessment. They are labeled
"exploration" and "inspection" by Blumer.
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to become better acquainted with the
The purpose of exploration is twofold:
in
client's social world, and to develop a better understanding of how to proceed
of
understanding
an
be
would
objective
latter
the
in
Included
inquiry.
further
what questions to ask and how to ask them. A cue that the social worker had begun
to sharpen a line of inquiry would be the feeling of being at home in discussions
the "real world"
of the client's social world. Social workers talk a lot about
that are
discussions
but one wonders about their ability to engage clients in
meaningful and relevant to their different social worlds.
Obstacles to the realization of these objectives are several and significant.
First, social workers are victims of fads in theory and ideology. Fads constitute
effective blinders, screening out and distorting aspects of the client's social
world. Pre-established beliefs, biases, values, and normative theories tell the
social worker what is "really important" and obviate the need to pay more than lip
service to the injunction to take the role of the other. Second, agency protocols
interfere with an approach to data collection that strives to understand and
remain faithful to the client's social world. Mention here should be made of the
current tendency to develop standardized data collection forms and checklists,
Whether the items contained in such standardized formats reflect an understanding
of the client's social world is open to question. At any rate, any agency procedure that interferes with efforts to develop a full and accurate understanding
of the client's world should be resisted. A third obstacle is an unwillingness to
flexibly employ the full array of data collection techniques available. Virtually
all of the procedures named in Blumer's discussion of exploration, and more, are
available to the social worker:
".direct observation, interviewing of people, listening to their
conversations, securing life history accounts, using letters and
diaries, consulting public records, arranging for group discussions,
and making counts of an item.. ."(1969: 41)
The hallmark of the procedure of exploration is disciplined flexibility. The
social worker would shift among techniques of inquiry, conceptual tools, beliefs
about relevant concerns and so on as appears necessary in light of the developing
portrait of the client's social world. However, three guidelines may be offered
for exploration. First, observant, informed and articulate participants in the
client's social world should be utilized. The client may or may not be a capable
informant; a small discussion group is often the best resource. Second, in light
of the possible limitations of even the best informants for the purposes of social
assessment, direct observation of the client's social world is essential. Such a
first-hand examination will provide the information necessary for the refinement
Third, to prevent the development of a fixed set of
and testing of images.
beliefs, the social worker should: (a) constantly ask questions about the client's
record all observations that challenge one's working
social world and (b) "...
conceptions as any observation that is odd and interesting even though its
relevance is not immediately clear." (Blumer, 1969: 42)
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Exploration will result in full and accurate descriptive accounts of the
client's social world. This may be sufficient for the purpose of social intervention and the social worker need not be concerned with invoking conceptual schemes
or theories. The social assessment is completed with a description of the client's
social world. However, the theoretically minded social worker will often want to
push beyond exploration to inspection.
The purpose of inspection would be to develop general statements about the
nature of the client's social problem including statements about determinants and
consequences.
Inspection involves the careful examination of the empirical
instances (discovered during exploration) covered by the social worker's concepts.
As an example of inspection, consider the case of a recently retired worker
referred to a mental health facility because of excessive depression. How would
the social worker proceed to analyze the descriptive accounts, gained through
discussions with a small resource group of men and women who had undergone the
same experience? First, concepts such as role loss, disengagement or whatever
would be defined in empirical terms tested for validity, and discriminated from
other analytical elements.
This would be done by examining the empirical instances of the concepts:
The prototype of inspection is represented by our handling of
a strange object; we pick it up, look at it closely, turn it
over as we view it, look at it from this or that angle, raise
questions as to what it might be, go back and handle it again
in the light of our questions, try it out, and test it in one
way or another. (Blumer, 1969: 44)
In this way, the social worker would seek to tease out the generic nature of
concepts like role loss as well as determine whether they were relevant and valid
in terms of the social worlds of recently retired persons.
The second step in social analysis would be to search for relationships
between concepts that have now been clearly discriminated at the empirical level.
Thus after pinpointing the empirical referents of such concepts as role loss and
depression, the social worker needs to examine empirical instances of their
relationship. Here the validity of a relationship rather than a concept is at
issue.
Naturalistic observation is prescribed by Blumer to the social scientist
seeking to understand some aspect of the social life of people. However, it would
seem that this mode of inquiry has considerable utility for data collection for
the purpose of social assessment. The social worker needs an approach to data
collection that respects the empirical character of the client's social world and
this is the hallmark of naturalistic observation.
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CONCLUSION
Symbolic interactionism has proven itself in the area of constructive criti.
cism. This perspective has supplied social work with many trenchant insights into
problems of the social services.
This essay suggests its utility
does not end
there. Symbolic interactionism can also furnish social work with a conception of
the social world and a procedure for gathering information relevant to the social
realities of client groups. These substantive and methodological contributions
should be most welcome at a time when social work is reaffirming its
historical
commitment to social assessment and social intervention.
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"WOMAN" AS SYMBOL AND SOCIAL WELFAREs AN INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVE*
Raymond L. Schmitt and Stanley E. Grupp
Illinois State University

ABSTRACT
Symbolic interactionism is used to examine the variable and complex definitions now linked to the symbol "woman" in contemporary society. The implications
of symbolic interactionism and the view of "woman" as symbol for social welfare
are discussed in terms of knowledge, morality, and implementation.

Although there certainly have been some important exceptions (e.g., Thomas,
1923; Pollak, 1950; Komarovsky, 1967), viewed in a historical perspective, sociologists, for whatever reasons, have failed to give sufficient attention to "woman."
As recent as 1973 Bernard (1973:782) concluded "Practically all sociology to date
Many of those who accept this point of
has been a sociology of the male world."
view have emphasized the impact of this deficiency upon our understanding of
broader societal processes outside the family. This is understandable because "As
measured by sheer volume, most of the traditional research on women has been in
the sociology of the family (Bart 1971). and most of that concerns middle-class
white women as housewives, college students, and professional workers" (Hochschild,
Huber (1973at764) concludes, for instance, that "Women are discussed
1973all011).
as part of family and almost never as part of market institutions." Acker (19731
936) observes that "The inclusion of the female half of humanity and of sex as a
central dimension in the study of society would lead to a more accurate picture of
social structure and to a better understanding of process." The reverse, however,
Knowledge of the "woman's" role within the family and of the family,
is also true.
must be reevaluated as insights into the effects of the female status upon
itself,
In other words, attention must be given to "woman"
the broader society increase.
for the understanding of familial as well as extrafamilial processes.
While recognizing that there are various perspectives and data-gathering
strategies for enhancing our knowledge about "woman," we believe that basic to all
of these is a need for a more explicit and systematic recognition of the symbolic
status of "woman" and of the methodologies required for the implementation of such
Some have questioned the merit of the survey emphasis in sex-role research
a view.
(Hochschild, 1973ati011-1012) and the male science view of society dominant within
sociology, with its stress on quantitative or agentic techniques (Bernard, 1973,
There is clearly a need for a different and systematic approach to the study
787).
While this approach must allow for a scientific view of "woman," it
of "woman."
Denzin (19709-10) has emphamust also consider the everyday world of "woman."
sized the need for this dual perspective for the study of all social phenomena.
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"Women" are involved in ongoing interactions and are defined, and define themselves, in relation to those with whom they interact. These are matters that
cannot be taken for granted.
This paper presents a rationale for explicitly recognizing the symbolic character of "woman" and argues that there is a need to determine both the consistency
as well as the variation in the individual and common meanings that are associated
with the symbol "woman." Unless this is done, the development of theoretical insights as well as principles of human interaction involving women will likely be
improbable. Without this kind of theoretical sustenance, methodological stance
and the valuable information this overall strategy can produce, efforts to understand the changing role of women and efforts to change the status of women in our
society are doomed to flounder and to be a hit and miss proposition.
We contend that there are at least five positive consequences that flow from
the recognition of the symbolic character of "woman." Recognition of this symbolic
character brings into focus the following areasa (1) meaning of "woman," (2) "woman" as a complex symbol, (3)an interactionist theoretical perspective of "woman,"
(4) methodological strategies in the study of female socialization, and (5)the
character of female socialization. In the final section we consider the implications of the view of "woman" as symbol for the field of social welfare.
MEANING OF "WOMAN"
Human beings live in a symbolic universe and do not confront reality directly
(Cassirer, 1944t25). "Woman" is part of that symbolic universe. "Woman" is a symbol. But since a symbol stands for something else (Vernon, 1972:62),l what in fact
does "woman" stand for in twentieth century America? This question is easily
posed; due however, to the arbitrary nature of symbols (Warriner, 1970:61), and the
dramatic changes and conflicts in the interpretation of the meaning of "woman," it
is not easily answered. Clearly, the meaning of "woman" is problematic.
The meaning of "woman" in America today, however, is resolvable. The formation of the question and the explicit and systematic recognition of the symbolic
character of "woman" are vital first steps. Beyond this, there is a need to understand the symbolic complexity of "woman" and to this end, to develop the appropriate perspectives and methodologies. A more fundamental point, one that flows directly from the recognition of the variable meaning of "woman" is now considered.
To say that the meaning of "woman" varies among individuals and groups is tantamount to saying that "woman" is a "sensitizing concept" (Blumer, 1954, 1969).
Blumer (19 5 Lt8) contends that there are no strict generic concepts in the social
sciences since their expression in the "real world" is always dependent upon the
situation. The fact that "woman" is a "sensitizing concept" has extensive implications. Investigators can no longer routinely assign a common meaning to "woman."
It means that investigators must explore and inspect the empirical world before
operationalizing "woman" (Blumer, 1969:42-47; Denzin, 1970j14). Suspicion is unquestionably cast upon any studies that routinely assume that a sexual classifi-35-

cation actually means something. While it can be argued that sexual classifications reflect only gender distinctions and no more, or that they are valuable in
making population projections, it is clear that gender distinctions do not themselves tap the symbolic meanings attached to "woman." In a time when the symbol
"woman" conjures up such variable meaning, any neglect of this feature cannot be
taken lightly.
SYMBOLIC COMPLEXITY OF "WOMAN"
"Symbols - and the meanings and values to which they refer - do not occur in
isolated bits, but often in clusters, sometimes large and complex." (Roe_,1972:
10) Symbols are complex in that they involve multiple meanings and have a relational quality. The relational quality of "marihuana," for example, has been
shown to involve peddlers, morality, friends, and numerous other symbols (Schmitt
and Grupp, 1973).
Regarding multiple meanings, each symbol is characterized by
both common and unique meanings.
The former are patterned by the symbolic heritage of a society, while the latter develop as the result of the individual's personal experience with these common meanings within his own symbolic world, the
world of his experience.
Societies' symbolic heritage is not, of course, characterized by complete symbolic uniformity through the society.
Shibutani (1955)
stresses that mass societies are characterized by many "social worlds," that is,
by categories of persons with shared perspectives.
Although these variable "social worlds" may concern the "same" symbol, a symbol does not necessarily conjure
up the same meaning.
The symbol, God, has quite a different meaning for atheists,
agnostics and Christians.
"Woman" is indeed a complex symbol.
Compared to earlier days when the symbol
"woman" was complex though probably less so than today, now there are a multitude
of meanings pertaining to "woman," and "social worlds" holding these meanings are
marked by diversity and volatility.
Paralleling this there has been an increase
in the relational quality of the symbol, "woman."
The concept "woman" is now associated in a variety of ways with such diverse areas and issues as equality, sports,
freedom in sex, the changing rules of beauty contests, abortion, minority groups
and with an increasing number of occupations. In sum, today "Woman" means many
different things to different people and even within the same person there is commonly, considerable variation regarding the meaning of "woman."
While the degree of complexity of "woman" has been intensified today, the
exact make-up of the common and unique meanings associated with "woman" is not
known. Systematic research is needed to directly address these questions. The
specific content of the common and unique meanings associated with "woman," the
interplay between these meanings, their contradictory and evaluative components,
the identity of the groups and individuals that hold particular meanings, the relation between situational factors and selected meanings about "woman," are yet to
be identified. The relational quality of "woman," of course, also needs to be
studied.
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The preceding questions will most likely be answered by examining the conscious meanings associated with the symbol "woman." It should, however, be recognized that man does relate to symbols in ways other than a cognitive manner.
Emotions, for example, are a part of both cognitive and noncognitive processes.
Given the feeling generated in some quarters today by the question, "what is a
woman?" the emotional dimension of symbols in this area must be acknowledged.
"WOMAN" IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
How should the social scientist study "woman?" Since "woman" is a symbol,
the approach chosen should take special cognizance of this fact. There are several
areas that do this, including symbolic interactionism (SI), ethnoscience, phenomenology, and ethnomethodology. The study of "woman" could profit from the insights
of all these perspectives. We believe, however, that the SI perspective, as a
sociologically oriented social psychology, is especially meritorious for the study
of "woman" as symbol. (1) SI has traditionally been concerned with the dimensional
aspects of symbols (see Lindesmith et al., 1975). (2) SI is a perspective and as
such has the potential for both innovation and broad utilization (Schmitt, 1974).
(3)The SI's have related their methods to their theory (see below). (4) SI has
proved useful in the study of the family (e.g., Stryker, 1972). (5)SI is the most
sociological of all social psychologies (Manis and Meltzer, 1972:577).
An incontestable inheritance of the Meadian legacy is that human beings and
"society" are interdependent, they are two sides of the same coin. SI's are, of
course, keenly sensitized to the significance of language, the emergent and situational aspects of interaction, and the self (see Rose, 1962; Blumer, 19691 Denzin,
1970; Schmitt, 1972).2 In other words, SI recognizes the importance of (1) the
reality of the external symbolic world - those common meanings that protrude upon
ongoing interactions, (2) the reality of the individual's experiences and interpretative capacities, and (3) the reality of the symbolic worlds that emerge from the
experiences of individuals. Although it has been alleged that some symbolic interactionists have emphasized the phenomenological side of human behavior (see Douglas,
197017-18), SI's have been largely concerned with explaining the interconnections
between these three realities.
Given these characteristics, it is apparent that the SI perspective, is of inestimable value in the study of "woman." "Woman" - or any other symbol, cannot be
understood unless systematic attention is given to our symbolic heritage, that is,
the diversity of common meanings or "social worlds," to the experiences of individuals with these common meanings, and to the involvement of man's symbolic heritage
in the personal symbolic worlds of individuals. Only when these areas are attended
to, can the nature, dynamics, and complexities of the symbol "woman" be explained.
RESEARCH STRATEGIES AND "WOMAN"
SI's have directed attention to various aspects of the research process that
should prove beneficial to the study of "woman." Using Blumer's notion of the
"sensitizing concept" we have argued that the concept "woman" has a symbolic
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character and have indicated the implications of this recognition. The symbolic
interactionist has, of course, always stressed the importance of the "actor's per.
spective" and has recommended the use of data gathering techniques that maximize
this dictum. These and other methodological implications of SI have been synthesized into seven interactionist-methodological principles (Denzin, 1970) and a
Denzin emphasizes that investigators should
naturalistic strategy (Denzin, 1971).
strive for formal theory and use research methods that combine symbols and inter.
actions, the actor's and the scientist's perspective, and include the situational
and the relational aspects of social behavior. We believe that these methodologi.
cal directives can be more effectively used if the symbolic nature of "woman" is
underscored.
The make-up of the actor's perspective - his symbolic world, and the basic
In our view the
strategy necessary to tap this world are primary considerations.
actor's symbolic world represents the most fundamental sociological datum that mut
be considered. Unfortunately, SI has not fully capitalized on its distinctive insights regarding the significance and make-up of the actor's symbolic world. Our
view of the actor's symbolic world has immediate implications for the study of
"woman."

The actor's symbolic world is the individual's experientially-based view of
his own person and of other social objects. This conceptualization relates the in.
dividual's symbolic world to his personal experiences with external symbolic reality. It is necessary to do this if "woman" is to be understood. SI's have frequently emphasized the processual aspects of the self, particularly the view that
the self is internal conversation, emergent, presented, and situational, but have
not sufficiently emphasized its content. In other words, they have failed to relate the self to man's symbolic heritage.
Since it holds the key to the actor's three realities, the actor's symbolic
world is a pivotal variable. The content of the actor's symbolic world must be
circumscribed if the make-up of his symbolic world is to be understood, if the
actor's ongoing experiences are to be grasped, and if the consensual aspects of
man's symbolic heritage are to be outlined. Although it is a complex issue, it
appears that a determination of consensually based-meanings requires a delineation
Douglas (1967e253-4) has taken this position with respect
of individual meanings.
to suicide.
How can the symbolic world best be tapped? We recommend an open-end strategy,
The individual must be given an opportunity to fully and openly describe his salient experiences with the external world. The specific nature of the open-end
question(s) is not fixed. Our preference, however, is the Twenty Statements Test
This instm.
Format, or as we prefer to label it, the Social Object Protocol (SOP).
ment can be used in interview or questionnaire type studies and in more naturalisThe SOP has been examined exhaustively elsesettings (see Denzin, 1971).
tic tye
where.4 The SOP format has a theoretical basis (Kuhn and McPartland, 1954), has
benefited from review and criticism (Spitzer et al., 1971), and has recently been
successfully used in studies of reference others (Moore et al., 1973), marihuana
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(Schmitt and Grupp, 1973), death (Bakshis et al., 1974) and has recently been suggested as a useful instrument for measuring alleged changes in the self that are
An
primarily grounded in the biological-emotional aspects of man (Turner, 1976).
application of the Social Object Protocol to the study of "woman" could simply involve asking the question, "What is a Woman?"
It should be emphasized that the open-end strategy being discussed here can be
employed in studies that are, as Denzin (1971) depicts them, truly naturalistic.
The form of the "woman" question might vary somewhat, however, depending on circumstances, or a series of open-end questions and responses might emerge in the dialogue. There is evidence that the imaginative use of the open-end strategy in naturalistic contexts can be effectively used to "open up" aspects of symbolic worlds
that might otherwise have been missed (see Schmitt et al., in press).
In further defense of our position on the SOP, it should also be noted that
1) the merits of the open-end strategy in interviewing has been acknowledged
Young, 1966,191), (2) these merits have been comparatively argued by impeccable
methodologists (Campbell, 1957), (3) some ground-breaking studies have used the
open-end approach (e.g., Simmons, 1965), (4) the advantage of volunteered over directed responses have been argued in other contexts, such as participant observation (see Becker et al., 1961,43-45), and (5) that forced-choice questions, while
useful for many purposes, are too restrictive to tap the actor's symbolic world.
It is precisely the voluntary, direct, and free-response characteristics (see
Campbell, 1957) of the open-end format that enables it to identify the actor's
5
symbolic world.
The SOP should be of particular value in the study of "woman."
The more complex the symbol - the more necessary and valuable the open-end strategy. Our recommendation that the SOP take the "What is a Woman?" form is only one possibility.
The "woman" is also a female, and may be a housewife, a teacher, and many other
things.
But this, of course, is precisely the point of this paper: Until "woman"
is studied by an "open-end" strategy, the manner in which "woman" is perceived in
relation to the external symbolic world will remain an enigma.
The failure to recognize the symbolic character of "woman" is particularly
evident in the stereotype literature on "woman" as a minority group and in the
adjective-check lists that characterize this literature. These lists are the
"anti-Christ" of the open-end strategy. The respondent is given a massive stimulus
(studies frequently involve 100's of adjectives) and is denied the opportunity to
be innovative in his response.
Although this literature has been criticized (e.g.,
Triandis, 1971), the adjective-check list has never really been challenged. We do
s now. If our recommendations are followed, we believe they will bear fruit.
GENERIC CHARACTER OF FEMALE SOCIALIZATION
The symbolic character of "woman" draws attention to the facts that female socialization is not a distinctive type of socialization and that it must be studied
within the context of general socialization theory. Scholars must be careful not
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to allow the dramatic increase of interest in "women" among lay persons and scien.
tists to generate a situation where female socialization is regarded as singular
and unique. Female critics of the sociology literature have, in fact, alerted sociologists to aspects of female socialization previously overlooked "highlighting
especially the processes by which women are socialized for weakness, dependency,
fear of success . . . , and even mild mental illness. ... ." (Bernard, 1973779)
But principles of female socialization must always be regarded as subservient to
general socialization principles. Millman (1971). for instance, concludes from a
literature review of some recent research on sex roles that most of it is limited
to women's roles. In this regard, Hochschild (1973as1022) has argued that research
in this area needs to be explained.
We emphasize that female socialization should be studied from a theoretical
and a comparative perspective. Hochschild (1973a:I022) is correct in her assertion
that the increased interest in women "may make sociologists trim their generalizations to size; thus studies of social mobility will have to specify that they concern male social mobility, alienation, man's alienation." The ultimate objective,
however, is to determine the factors underlying male and female socialization. The
work of Gagnon and Simon (1973) in the area of sexual behavior illustrates the importance of a theoretical and comparative perspective. The inroads made by these
writers into the understanding of sexual behavior have been largely due to their
extrapolation of the study of sexual behavior from its limiting boundaries.
Reviewers of Gagnon and Simon's work, both those who applaud it and those who
have found deficiencies in it, have centered attention on the success of these authors in lifting sexuality from a limiting framework. Schwartz (19751135) was impressed with their ability to "bring a social psychological analysis to bear where
previously only biological explanations had been given." Laws (1975e227), on the
other hand, faults Simon and Gagnon for not moving far enough in integrating the
subject of sexuality within a broader theoretical framework.
Our consideration of the symbolic quality of "woman" is now complete. This
discussion brings into focus the implications of symbolic interactionism and its
view of symbols for those having a theoretical or a pragmatic concern for women.
An area that has historically shown such a concern is social welfare. The social
welfarist has need for both theoretical and pragmatic insights. It is to a more
explicit discussion of the potential of symbolic interactionism and its view of
"woman" for the social welfarist that we now turn.
SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Women are significant helping targets for welfarists. There are various ways
in which interactionism has relevance for those who wish to help others. Interactionism, however, is an intellectual perspective.
It will not resolve value issues.
But application does presuppose knowledge. In other words, while one may understand but not act, one may not act without understanding. Unfortunately, application is not only a function of knowledge; a morality dimension is also involved.
Values permeate welfare activities. Should welfare workers act as advocates of

women's rights? Should battered wives be helped against their will? Paradoxically, the objective of the "helping profession" is to help others, but its very
end is unclear. It is not easy to help others.
Knowledge and the Social Welfarist
Desirability of a Social
Psychological Image
The social welfarist necessarily functions on the basis of an image encompassing the individual and society. While these images vary and are more explicit in
some periods than others (see Mencher, 1967), they are always present. Romanyshyn
(1971:308) has recognized this and concluded that welfarists "require a more explicit model of man." Symbolic interactionism provides such a model. Women and
men are seen as social as well as biological beings; interactionism has broad
applicability, and it is a sociological social psychological perspective-interrelationships between the individual, his social interactions, and the shared meanings in the society are emphasized. The latter are the most lacking ingredients
in the welfarist's images.
Although psychoanalytic "theory" is being joined by other approaches, in the
social welfare field including learning theory, group theory, crisis theory, shortterm theory, and others, these approaches suffer from the aforementioned deficiencies. Psychoanalytical theory is based on faulty assumptions and is an individualistic approach (see Lindesmith et al., 19751275-279, 319-320). Approaches such as
crisis theory (see Selby, 1969) may be effective for understanding and dealing with
crisis situations, but they simply are not sufficiently generic or broad to deal
with the issues that face the social welfarist in an increasingly complex society.
Learning theories are too individualistic in that little attention is given to the
context in which the individual emerges. For instance, although Saleebey (1976,
396) applauds Skinnerian psychology, he criticizes the behaviorists for their neglect of "many of the realities of social life," their neglect of the importance of
power, institutional structures, and the "web of role networks in which we are all
embedded." We would make a similar observation regarding Maslow's psychology even
though Romanyshyn (19711308-309) finds this to be the more explicit image of man
needed by social welfarists.
The employment of a social psychological model in the study of society will
enable the welfarist (1) to better understand the men and women that are being
served by his profession and (2) to pinpoint problem areas. It is, for example,
now clear that internal family changes as well as industrialization and urbanization accounted for increases in womens' power in this country (Lantz et al., 1977).
And, Oppenheimer (1977) has shown that a high and a low socioeconomic status for
the wife can be a source of conflict within contemporary American family units.
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Retention of
"Root Images"
The relationship between the individual and society is characterized by certain fundamentals or "root images" of which the social welfarist should not lose
sight. For instance, although the power of women has increased in America, both
previous generations and contemporary women occupied a power position relative to
men. In other words, the "root image" of women at any time must include power. At
a time when social welfare programs in the United States are becoming comparable to
those in other countries, when social welfare has become a multidisciplinary concern (Diner, 1977:55-59), and when the federal government is continuing to increase
its funds for policy research on human resources (Horowitz and Katz, 1975), it is
inevitable that the welfarist will move toward more specialized knowledge, become
increasingly involved with bureaucratic programs, and be bombarded by a myriad of
increasing problems and obligations. While it is necessary for the responsibilities, skills, and horizons of the welfarist to increase as his discipline grows,
there is danger that the fundamentals of human behavior will be slighted. Gyarfas
(1969), in fact, has expressed concern that social work is losing its commitment to
the individual's well-being and is becoming a managerial discipline. In view of the
fact that man's "root images" are only now becoming clear, any movement away from
them on the part of the welfarist would not only be sadly ironic, but it would be
counterproductive for the objectives of a helping profession. "Root images" seem
to characterize societies irrespective of time, place, and complexity. It is not
at all surprising that Diner (1977:59) found in his historical analysis of the Social Service Review that "Perhaps the most striking feature of the history of the
"Root
Review is the extent to which so many past problems remain with us today."
images" are intrinsic to symbolic interactionism.
Mechanisms for Disseminating
Basic Knowledge
As the social welfarist requires a basic understanding of the social psychological make-up of the society and the "root images" that characterize human behavior,
there must be patterned ways in which this knowledge can be obtained. The aspiring
welfarist should be trained at the beginning of his career in the social sciences,
especially interactionism. Not only is this knowledge fundamental to the welfarist's role, but it would serve as a "unifying link" between welfarists with different tasks after they move into their respective positions. In this regard, Gilbert
and Specht (1974) believe that social welfare practitioners are hampered in their
work because of a lack of understanding of the over-riding welfare policies that
determine their approaches to meeting the needs of individuals. The fact that
women in the social work profession have to face sexism in their own field (see
Zietz and Erlich, 1976) also suggests that welfarists would profit from an early
exposure to an area that clearly delineates the subtleties of social interaction.
Interactionism developed within sociology. Welfarists must be trained in
interactionism and sociology. There are, of course, numerous other skills necessary for the welfarist to master in light of the increasing complexity of his field

and his particular objectives. The morality and application aspects of the welfare
role also necessitate exposure to areas such as philosophy and economics. We believe, however, that all of these requirements will "fall into place" more easily
if the welfarist has a social psychological framework in which to categorize them.
Morality and the Social Welfarist
Social Welfare As An
Existential Institution
Coughlin put it supremely in the forward to McCormick's (1975,ix) book, "although values have to do with the ought of human conduct, they ultimately are
existentially grounded." While academically oriented welfarists are keenly aware
of this fact (see Howard, 1969; Warham, 1970:115-130), existential issues will continue to haunt the proponents of social welfare. The welfarist could deal with
these issues by limiting them to "social needs that are related to the basic components of living and judged to be a matter of national and interactional concern"
(see Pusic, 1972,116). Madison (1970t436), however, has shown that even in these
basic areas the issue is, "What should be the boundaries of collective action for
social welfare?" Should abortions, for instance, be financed by the federal government? In fact, as the welfarist moves from a residual to an institutional view
of social welfare (see Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965t138-140), morality issues may
come to supercede those in the knowledge and implementation areas. This is one
reason why the social welfarist must view social behavior from the symbolic interactional perspective, a perspective that underscores the constructed nature of
reality. The social welfarist occupies an awkward position. Both a value commitment and a value neutrality characterize his role. The welfarist must then be
committed to helping his fellows but yet remain circumspect regarding the parameters of this help in any given historical context.
Employing An Existential
Perspective
Interactionism has an existential quality because it recognizes that "reality
has no intrinsic meaning." Without adopting a solipsistic position (Blumer, 19691
22), interactionism stresses that the significant symbols or social objects of individuals, groups, communities, and societies primarily emerge, and are sustained
and modified, through social interaction. This emphasis serves as a constant reminder to the social welfarist that the needs of the individuals and groups that
he serves within a pluralistic society will not be the same, will often vary over
time, and will be related to situational and historical contexts. Welfarists have
long debated the merits of individualism versus collectivism. Without denouncing
the latter, individuals do, however, inevitably come to relate to social objects in
terms of their own unique experiences, and it is a mistake to assume that individuals in the same category of some demographic variable are identical, or even similar, in any given respect. We have shown, for example, that the same characteristics cannot be attributed to "women" just because they happened to have been assigned this common label by society.
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The core morality issue for the social welfarist is the designation of helpir
objectives in the specific instance. What relevance does symbolic interactioniss
have in this regard? Interactionism or any other intellectual perspective does not
contain an answer to this question! This is fundamentally a moral, not an Intellectual issue. Interactionism does, however, direct attention to the fact that
values or social object preferences do not exist in the abstract. They are anchored in the lives of individuals and in the ongoing interactions of groups. The
social welfarist should (1) fully appreciate that values are an audience-based
phenomenon, (2) use empirically based data to determine the audiences that influence, and will be influenced by proposed welfare changes, and (3) obtain as true a
"reading" as possible of the views of these audiences. We have already pointed
out that the latter can best be accomplished by going directly to the actor in an
open-end manner. Hochschild (1973b), for instance, found that the women in one old
folks home were quite content with their lives even though, to Hochschild, their
situations initially appeared quite dismal.
The gathering of information regarding the audiences connected with proposed
welfare changes is not the final step in the welfare decision-making process. The
actors' perspectives have to be digested. Decisions still have to be made. These
perspectives will often be discordant, inconsistent with other information or requirements, and, in some instances, reflect vested interests on the part of certain
groups. The views of some minority women in regard to possible financial aid may
indeed be suspect. The welfarist should also recognize that he too is an "interPerhaps other audiences will
ested and fallible audience" in these deliberations.
Just as welfare decisions may reflect the
need to be taken into consideration.
role of the federal government and powerful groups within the community (see Magill
and Clark, 1975), so too will such factors as the career pattern of the welfarist
in the welfare institution (see Epstein, 1970) have an impact. As McCormick (19751
84-90) has emphasized, integrity is an indispensable quality for those in professional roles. Such integrity is not easy to achieve or maintain.
Implementation and the Social Welfarist
Focus on Relative Deprivation
and Communication of Rationales
The welfarist has assigned considerable attention to the audiences that are
the targets of welfare. Should welfare be residual or institutional? Should welfare be limited to financial assistance or be extended to include the broader needs
of, for example, women? While a helping profession must necessarily consider its
target audiences, such concerns may have lessened interest in the nonrecipients of
particular welfare benefits. When help is extended to an audience, that help will
frequently have an influence on other audiences-irrespective of their welfare
statuses. The welfarist should give more systematic attention to these nontarget
audiences.
While there are many ways the nonrecipients of welfare benefits could be influenced by the benefits extended to others, interactionism has historically
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focused on the symbolic linkage between the self and its audiences. There is much
in these discussions of interest and importance to the welfarist. While some welfarists have emphasized the significance of relative deprivation (e.g., geinberger,
1969), this is an aspect of the self-other linkage that merits much more attention.
The welfarist should, for example, show more concern for the communication of the
rationales behind his decisions to nonrecipient audiences. It has been indicated
that resource deprivation is sometimes a result of misperception (Schmitt and Grupp,
1976). Clear, direct, and immediate communication might entirely negate this type
of deprivation. The more effective communication of rationales would also help to
reduce the stigma associated with welfare recipients, such as "welfare mothers."
Communication, of course, is not a panacea. Many issues are complex and emotional,
and, there are injustices. We feel, however, that the communication of rationales
is always a necessary step. If the welfarist cannot defend his decisions, they
should not have been made.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
"What does 'woman' stand for in twentieth century America?" This question reflects the motivation for, and the end of, our views. "Woman" has always been a
symbol to Americans. However, as woman's role has changed the "meaning" of 'woman'
has become increasingly complex and can no longer be taken for granted. The danger
remains great. Even feminists have fallen victim to it.
Stated differently, this multiplicity of uniqueness in persons
and their roles constitutes what elsewhere has been called the
principle of multiple realities, those combinations constituting different orders of beigness or "reality" for the individuals to whom they accrue and for others with whom that
individual is in interaction. These realities, however, are
obscured by generalizations, such as the assumption of equality in feminist thought (Nelson and Olesen, 1977:20-21, our
italics).
Symbolic interactionism enhances the symbolic aspects of "woman" and is capable of
providing the social welfarist, and others, with a knowledge view that validly depicts social interaction, of underscoring the existential nature of social welfare,
and of facilitating implementation within the welfare field. The welfarist is encouraged to pursue these capabilities.
Notes
Appreciation is expressed to Mildred S. Pratt, Professor of Social Work at
Illinois State University, for providing us with useful information and to Professors Harris Chaiklin and Ralph Segalman for their helpful and detailed observations.
1

Those pursuing the study of "woman" within a symbolic context must, of course,

give additional attention to the nature of symbols. We have found the leads of
Warner (1959) particularly helpful in this regard. Warner defines symbols as
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consisting of both signs and meanings.

Also, see Vernon (1972).

2SI has, of course, been subjected to criticism.

Some of the more sophisti-

cated critiques include Denzin (19691929), Huber (1973b), and Zeitlin (1973).
3

For a more detailed discussion of these three realities, see (Schmitt and

Grupp, unpublished).
4

For a consideration of such aspects of the SOP as its history, format,
admin.
istration, coding strategies, coding reliability, assets, validity, and empirical
applications, see (Schmitt and Grupp, unpublished).
5Some may agree with our theoretical defense of the SOP but contend that data
should only be gathered in natural situations (see Douglas, 1970t12). We encourage
cases the inthe study of human interaction by participant observation but in all
dividual's symbolic world should be tapped.
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ELEMENTS OF THE PERPETUATION OF
DEPENDENCY IN A PSYCHIATRIC HALFWAY HOUSE
David R. Maines
Yale University
and
Marilyn A. Markowitz
Upsala College

ABSTRACT
Halfway houses are intended as helping institutions for those who are
attempting to make the transition from institutionalized mental health
In spite of the manifacilities to autonomous living in the community.
fest goal to produce independence for its residents, however, the halfway
In addition to the network
house contributes to patterns of dependency.
nature of mental health care, we identify three dependency-perpetuating
These elements
role commitments, language, and mixed messages.
elements:
are analyzed as both social organizational and social psychological processes, and their implications are discussed.

Our intention in this paper is to identify and examine elements
of a psychiatric halfway house which contribute to the perpetuation
of patterns of dependency for residents who live there. By dependency,
we refer to a passive perspective taken by the person in which decisions
concerning his conduct and control of his life organization are taken
1
because halfway houses,
This examination is significant
over by others.
as part of the therapeutic community oriented to helping persons with
emotional problems, are designed both in format and philosophy to promote
Moreover, halfway
greater autonomy and independence for residents.
houses themselves are becoming increasingly significant settings (Budson,
The decline in the populations of mental hospitals (Schafer et
1973).
al., 1975: 68) along with the general therapeutic shift from an emphasis
on individual pathology to one based on a systems perspective has led to
increases in community based mental health facilities (Gralnick et al.,
Our analysis, therefore, pertains to a critical area in the
1975).
processes in
field of mental health, and focuses on those elements and
2
psychiatric organizations which are counterproductive.
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The Research Setting
A psychiatric halfway house is designed as a temporary residence
for those having experienced some kind of emotional breakdown who are
attempting to make the transition from the structured environment of a
psychiatric hospital or treatment resource to some type of automous
life in the community. 3 White Plains House (WPH), which is the only
halfway house in Westchester County, New York serving both men and women,
is located in a large apartment building in which half of the space
houses nine men and half houses nine women. Each unit contains a living
and dining area, a kitchen, three bedrooms for residents, and is managed
by a live-in resident manager who has his/her own living facilities.
The average age of the residents is about thirty, although slightly
higher for the females. The residents, who stay at WPH from nine to
twelve months, pay fees ranging from $275-336 per month depending upon
ability to pay; and their incomes are derived from savings, earnings,
welfare, Supplementary Security Income (SSI), or some combination of
sources. These fees cover the costs of room and board as well as the
benefits of the program. Basically, the program involves a commitment
to a day time activity, such as attending college, working on a paid or
volunteer basis, or participating in a day hospital program; outside
psychiatric treatment; and attending weekly group and individual counseling sessions at WPH. In addition to the resident managers, the staff
consists of a full time social worker who also is the Director of WPH,
a part time social worker who is the assistant to the Director, a
consulting psychiatrist, and a secretary.
Our data are based primarily on a participant observation
study of one halfway house, WPH, although we have also obtained information regarding the operation of other halfway houses in the region.
These data include observations of interaction between residents and
staff both in everyday life and counseling situations, informal interviews
with staff and residents, and cover a time period of approximately one
year. Although not directly relevant to our concerns in this paper,
the data are supported by portions of a follow-up survey of former WPH
residents.
Theoretical Considerations
As an organization, the psychiatric halfway house can be viewed
both in structural and processual terms. Structurally, it is part of a
network of agencies and treatment resources which variously treat people
with emotional problems as well as act upon them. The analytic imagery
of how such networks impact upon clients is thoroughly described in
Wiseman's (1970) study of how skid row derelicts are processed by
public agencies. The critical point to make concerning this structural
-53-

perspective is that patterns of activity presuppose and intersect with
other patterns of activity which serve to commit persons to certain
lines of action (Gerson, 1976). Processually, the halfway house can
be seen as an organizational context which presents to those in it
certain kinds of situations to which they must respond and as an organizational contingency which structures the relationships between persons
Thus, the
whose careers intersect there (Glaser and Strauss, 1968).
boundaries of the halfway house are defined in terms of interorganizational
relationships while its dynamics are defined in terms of interpersonal
relationships taking place within it.
Clearly, these two views are closely related, and, in fact,
represent in their relationship one of the classical theoretical problems in sociology; namely, the relation between structure and process.
It is a problem involving the interaction between the determinative and
indeterminative phases of social life, which was central in the work of
the early interactionists such as Mead, Dewey, and Park. In their work,
society was conceived as a communication matrix which provided the
structuring contexts for human activity as well as a mechanism for
transforming human conduct. To understand human group life, then, one
must understand communication processes and the social mechanisms
which give them shape and form.
From the standpoint of symbolic interactionism, there is no
social reality independent of communication. It is through such
communication that not only interpersonal relationships but social
Strauss (1959) has emphasized
structures are possible (Maines, 1977).
the importance of language, especially naming, as a means of creating
and maintaining social order in human relationships. He notes that
naming does more than merely indicate; it identifies something as a
social object in relation to something else. It is the meaning of names,
however, rather than the names themselves which give rise to action.
Naming is a directive for action which mobilizes expectations with respect
to the object named. The relationship between communication and
activity, then, is essential for locating the nature of social roles,
which themselves are related to identity (Gross and Stone, 1964). Since
identities place the person in some kind of social context and thus
confer situated meaning on him, roles become those expectations which
are mobilized by announced and situated identities. In interactionist
terms, this conceptualization brings us back to the problem of the
relationship between structure and process, but expressed at the level
of interpersonal relationships. Identities create boundaries. They
locate us in social terms by defining who and what we are, and through
the act of placement, meaning is established which has the effect of
permitting some kinds of behavior while limiting others.
-54-

This conceptual framework has been shown to be quite useful in
the analysis of widely divergent areas (See Maines, 1977; in press).
We also find it eminently useful for understanding the dysfunctional
aspects of the psychiatric halfway house. In presenting our data, we
shall attempt to convey the sense in which communication processes
underly considerations of situated identities, and how these processes
contain elements which inadvertently perpetuate identities in such a way
that patterns of dependency remain ongoing and to a degree enchecked.
Elements of Dependency Perpetuation
One thing that is recognized by network approach to mental
health problems is that more and more public agencies, hospitals, outpatient clinics, rehabilitation centers and other facilities are becoming
involved in any given patient's medical biography (Connery, 1968). The
psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, and clinical psychologist are now joined by
psychiatric nurses, psychiatric social workers, and paraprofessionals
as those working in public and private spheres who have a say in the
patient's diagnosis and treatment. This increasingly complex system of
mental health resources creates a network of dependency in which the
patient comes to routinely rely upon these services. The residents at
WPH, most of whom have or have had some type of psychotic disorder,
reflect this system. All have medical biographies involving institutionalizations, the routine use of prescribed medication, and treatment by a
number of therapists. The residents are used to being bureaucratically
processed, and in a significant sense they have acquired a perspective of
themselves in which they place their own sense of self in a dependent
relationship to therapy-oriented organizations. These biographies also
frequently involve cycles of movement between hospitals, peer, and home
environments, which only broadens the community base of their dependence
on others. Hospitals provide therapy, counseling, and medication; public
assistance programs provide economic support; families sometimes
function to maintain unhealthy dependent relationships; and the association
with friends or acquaintances who also have emotional problems creates
a perpetuating contact system. The pattern of emotional, social, and
medical dependency, therefore, is quite broad based, and operates to
keep the person in the mental health network as one who is seen and who
sees himself as unable to care for himself (Ferguson, 1975: 406).4
It is precisely the function of the psychiatric halfway house
to systematically intervene and attempt to break this cycle of
dependency by removing the family, when appropriate, as a perceived
necessity and by reducing and eventually eliminating the need for therapy,
medication, and public assistance. An orientational booklet given to
all new residents of WPH entitled Handbook for WPH Residence, for
instance, states that:
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The goal of
and to give
desirous of
employment,
or resuming

WPH is to prevent readmission to an institution
constructive assistance to those who are
becoming selfsustaining citizens; finding
enrolling in vocational or academic programs,
responsibilities as homemakers.

The goal, in other words, is to produce autonomous individuals who are
capable bf creating other biographies which do not involve an unhealthy
dependence on family and therapy-oriented relationships. There are
certain processes and elements in the organization of WPH, however, which
inhibit the attainment of that general goal. We have identified three
such elements, some of which intersect with other community resources,
which we will consider under the categories of (1) role commitments,
(2) language, and (3) mixed messages.
Role Commitments. Participants in any organization typically
develop commitments and attachments to their roles within it. The nature
of such commitments involves solidifications of meaning in the person's
interpretation and enactment of role requirements, and may be thought of
as extremely "sticky" insofar as they locate the person in relatively
inflexible identities. For a number of reasons, the person's role
performance can take on an invariant quality, and to the extent that
one attempts to rigidly maintain an organizational identity and its
implied role relationships, counter-productive behavior may result
Several instances of such dysfunctional conduct
(Katz and Kahn, 1966).
were observed both among the residents and staff of WPH. Consider the
following observations made concerning the residents.
S (a female having lived at WPH for ten months) was faced with
having to leave there. She was reluctant to do so because of
what she saw as stressful circumstances facing her in the near
furture. She requested that she be allowed to extend her period
of residence for an additional five months. Her reasons were
considered valid by the staff, and the extension was granted.
In a counseling session about a month later, S requested
still another extension which, if granted, would have resulted
in her staying at WPH for nearly two years. S offered
several reasons, seen by the staff as rationalizations, for
why this second extension would be legitimate. For example,
she felt that moving would be more difficult in the winter,
that apartments would be more available in the summer, and
that her anticipated additional college course work would
produce stress. She also stated that the person she was
expecting to move out with wouldn't be ready until then (this
was interpreted by the counselor as a projection of her own
reluctance to move out).
-56-

Although S may have felt that the previous extension legitimated her second
request, they clearly reflect her desire to maintain her relationship with
WPH. She felt secure and supported in her position there, and variously
commented to one of the staff members that she "feared living independently
of WPH," that she "dreaded the day that she would move out," and that if
she "could live there forever she would." Such instances of self-perpetuating
dependency occur rather frequently. Consider the following.
M (the youngest female resident) raised the issue of her dependency
in a group counseling session by indicating that someone in her day
activity program had labeled her a "dependent."
In a rather helpless and childlike manner, she said to the group, "I don't want to
be dependent. What should I do?" This became the group topic for
that meeting, with other group members asking M for concrete examples
and providing feedback to her. M initiated topics concerning herself
in the next three sessions. In another meeting, for instance, she
began with her dilemma regarding her eligibility for welfare, and
after describing the problem, she looked to the group and said, "I
need to stay here to learn how to be independent. What should I
do?" This same question "What should I do?", was asked (helplessly)
at two subsequent sessions concerning other problems in M's life.
Once again, this observation illustrates how matters of dependency and
dependency perpetuation are built into the residents' dialogue and sense of
self. Furthermore, this dialogue and perpetuation are usually not a part
of the residents' consciousness. It was only after the group leader asked
the group to reflect and comment on what had been happening during the
four previous sessions that M became aware of how she had transformed the
group into a mechanism on which she depended for solutions to her problems.5
These examples illustrate the obdurate quality of dependency as well
as providing some measure of the extent to which intervention on the part
of the psychiatric halfway house is problematic. There exist role commitments among the staff, however, which further serve to foster dependency.
One of the residents was eating in the living room and had dropped
some food crumbs on the floor. She left and didn't clean the floor,
which she knew was her responsibility. The resident manager noticed
the crumbs, and immediately took out the vacuum cleaner and started
to clean the floor. Another resident, observing this, suggested that
the person who had dropped the crumbs should be held responsible,
and that the resident manager should not do the cleaning. The resident
manager responded by saying, "If someone comes in to visit and sees
this mess, who gets the bad name? I do."
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There are several other instances in which resident managers have
taken over the responsibilities of the residents by fulfilling the residents'
obligations. These obligations are explicitly built into the WPH program
as a mechanism through which residents might acquire certain instrumental
skills which would enable them to eventually care for themselves. This
process is undermined through the resident managers performing those tasks
as a means of keeping themselves in good standing with the organization.
This inadvertant support of patterns of dependency occurs also among the
professional staff.
B (the part time social worker at WPH), who also has a private
psychotherapy practice,was asked by a resident who was successfully
leaving the program if she could see B as a private patient after
she left. B consulted with the Director of WPH concerning the
propriety of such a relationship. The Director administratively
vetoed the proposed treatment, and recommended that the resident
either visit B informally at WPH or participate in the only postresident program available which was a task-oriented group in
apartment living.
In many respects, the resident's request represented an embracement of an
autonomous life style. She was able to make a treatment commitment which
would involve her commuting to New York City and paying a fee. She also
brought up the possibility of securing a job in the City. This, indeed,
was a mark of health for the resident, and was interpreted as such by B.
The Director's suggestions were dependency-fostering, since the resident's
contact with B would have taken place at WPH and in terms of WPH policy.
Clearly, the Director's role commitment was in maintaining her position
of power in the organization, and her responses to B were intended to
serve as a mechanism for limiting B's options, which reinforced the power
6
boundaries of the Director's definitions of her role.
To the extent that role commitments result in an ability to adapt
to situational demands, organizational goals become at best secondary in
importance. This is an especially crucial process insofar as role commitments involve elements of social control. In the case of WPH, these
elements feed into ongoing staff identities but at the expense of the
organization's goal to provide skills which would enable residents to
adopt autonomous life styles.
Language. The organization of language is closely related to and
This, of course,
a part of the organization of a community (Hymes, 1974).
is a fundamental approach in socio-linguistics, and it demands that attention
be devoted to how groups talk to and about themselves. One thing that is
clear about the psychiatric halfway house as well as the field of mental
health in general is that there is a pervasive vocabulary and linguistic
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taxonomy in use whose meanings reflect patterns of dependency and in some
respects contribute to the maintenance of dependent relationships. 7 Part
of the dynamics of this process is that organizational labels are used which
place people in classifications which then indicate to the person and to
others how they are to be treated. In our examination of language, we make
distinctions between these kinds of labels in what we refer to as structural
vocabularies and interpersonal vocabularies.
Structural vocabularies refer to conventional terms and labels which
are systematically used by public agencies and mental health facilities as
a classification system which serve to order the array of emotional problems
experienced by people. Given that these vocabularies are systemic in nature,
there are many examples. Consider, for instance, the extent to which the
term "disabled" is used with reference to people with emotional problems.
SSI has "permanently and totally disabled" as one of its eligibility categories
into which those with emotional problems fall; there is "disability" insurance;
and Westchester County issues cards entitling the holder to fare reductions
on public transportation which have printed on them the term "disabled."
This
card must be shown each time in order for the person to receive benefits.
One of the residents of WPH, in addition, had to participate in the Institute
for the Crippled and Disabled in order to maintain her sponsorship by the
Office of Vocational Rehabilitation.
Szasz, of course, has argued that the entire concept of mental illness
is invalid, and that the conventional association of mental illness with
physical illnesses such as "syphilis of the brain or delirious conditions...
in which persons may manifest certain disorders of thinking and behavior"
(1970: 12) is, in fact, dysfunctional for the person with emotional problems.
This applies not only to the term "mental patient" but to "mental hospitals,"
"state institutions," "hostels," and "psychiatric halfway house." 8 What we
are pointing out is that public assistance and mental health resources use a
conventional vocabulary containing implied identities which are imposed
upon their recipients, and that these implied identities can become actual
social identities (Goffman, 1963:
2).
The relevance of these vocabularies
and their implied identities is that in order to receive benefits from these
resources, the person must establish "need" (i.e., dependency), and that once
established, the person becomes part of the dependency-perpetuating system.
Interpersonal vocabularies refer to those terms which enter the dialogue
in the psychiatric halfway house. For the most part, this dialogue is a
carryover from the residents being subjected to structural vocabularies, and
takes on form and meaning in terms of the incorporation of implied identities.
Residents, for example, frequently can repeat the psychiatric diagnostic
categories in which they have been placed. The meaning of these diagnoses
typically are interpreted in terms of personal deficiency and stigmatization
(Goffman, 1963:
7), and serve as a convenient vocabulary of motives legitimizing felt dependency. Reflexively, this vocabulary feeds into ongoing
patterns of dependency.
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The internalization of these dependency-laden identities, however,
should not be seen as inevitable or fixed once and for all. Identities
For certain
not only can but must be negotiated (Glaser and Strauss, 1964).
activities, such as using YMCA or YWCA facilities or shoping at the supermarket, the resident must show a card (a written vocabulary) which establishes
an affiliation with WPH. The card, then, contains an identity. Residents
frequently refuse to engage in these activities, and candidly state that
this refusal represents the rejection of the identity. The critical dimension
of such identity negotiation centers around matters of self-interest. In
order to receive social security benefits, for instance, the residents must
verify residence at WPH, and they willingly admit to the affiliation. It
is also useful to affirm that association when attempting to become part of
a day hospital program or obtaining a volunteer position. In other occasions,
such as applying for a job, renewing a driver's license, or applying for
college admission, the resident will use the street address of WPH rather
than the name. Thus, the resident will differentially announce "WPH"
through manipulating the extent to which he makes public the association of
the term "WPH" with himself.
In addition to these processes, certain terms are built into the
organization of WPH which are dependency-perpetuating. The distinction
between "staff" and "resident," for instance, represents a hierarchy of
control in which residents often routinely defer to staff authority. Even
the term "resident" itself has dependency connotations. Other terms which
have been used to refer to persons utilizing other psychiatric halfway house
facilities include "tenants" and "members."
Interestingly, these terms
also were used in these other halfway houses to refer to the professional
staff, thus attempting to eliminate status and role differences.9 Other
value-laden terms include "group leader" which is used in group sessions
and which undermines the concept and goal of group autonomy (Riehman and
O'Brien, 1973); "house rules," which refers to WPH's expectations of the
residents (this term has seen been replaced with the more egalitarian
concept of "mutual expectations" which implies a sharing of responsibility);
and being "kicked out" of the program for not meeting WPH expectations (this
phrase has since been replaced by the concept of "its your choice" which
more sharply focuses on the nature of the residents' participation and
decision making in the program.
It is important, then to focus on the linguistic nature of mental
health resources simply because the vocabularies used there contain meanings
which are frequently incorporated into the person's identity which contribute to the self-perpetuating patterns of dependency.
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Mixed Messages. A unique feature of the symbolic interactionist
approach to interpersonal relations is that they are seen as taking place
in and through communication processes (Deutscher, 1969-70), and that constructed realities are seen as never fully completed or unambiguous (Glaser
and Strauss, 1964).
Human social action is problematic and thus must be
handled through interpretive processes (Blumer, 1962) in which persons bring
a measure of reality to the interactive situation and then negotiatively
construct whatever degree of consensus exists for them at the time. This
approach has its complement in the field of mental health in the concept of
"mixed messages," which refers to those processes involving different and
contradictory, confusing, or incompatible realities communicated between
two or more persons (Bateson, et al., 1956). The critical nature of mixed
messages is that the incompatible realities put the person in a "double bind"
situation in which an appropriate behavioral response is either difficult
or impossible. An example of a mixed message was observed in an intake
interview in which the applicant and her mother, both living together, were
present. The interviewer asked the mother what her feelings were about the
daughter's living at WPH. The mother responded by saying, "I want R to do
what she feels is best for her. I'll eventually get over the loneliness."
There are multiple contradictory realities communicated in her response,
all of which can be summed up in "go but don't go."
In order to effectively intervene in cycles of dependency, the
psychiatric halfway house must introduce a measure of consistency into the
lives of the residents. One way of accomplishing this consistency is through
effective communication. The fact is, however, that the reverse is
frequently true. There are at least three spheres of activity directly or
indirectly involving the halfway house in which we have observed instances
of mixed messages contributing to inconsistency.
The first sphere is structural in nature insofar as it pertains to
the interaction between public agencies and the person. The following
observation concerning work and welfare illustrates one type of double
bind which can take place.
C, who had a consistent work history, went on welfare during her
hospitalization. After discharge, she was admitted to WPH where
welfare payments covered her fees, and in addition, paid for her
psychiatrist's fees through medicaid. Through OVR sponsorship
(which is functionally related to welfare), she obtained training
as a secretary. Her first position was part time for which welfare
reduced her payments in an amount equal to her salary. C was still
on medicaid at this point. When she obtained a full time position,
however, she was told that she would be dropped by both welfare and
medicaid. This circumstance created a dilemma for her. On the one
hand, if she continued in her full time work, she would be able to
pay WPH fees on her own, but would not be able to afford her
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psychiatrist nor would she have any spending money. On the other,
if she left her position, she could stay on welfare and consequently
would have all these things. C stated that she did not want to
remain on welfare, yet she felt compelled to do so, and did.
This case is consistent with the more detailed description by Levitan et al.
(1972) concerning problems encountered in the welfare system. What we wish
to emphasize, though, is that it raises serious questions with respect to
10
C's successful efforts at obtaining work skills
issues of dependency.
and a full time job were steps toward independence. It was in both her
financial and emotional interests to have that job (see Rothwell and Doniger,
1966, for an analysis generally supporting this kind of interpretation).
This potential independence, however, took the form of an unfulfilled promise.
The structural components of the relation between work and welfare contributed to her leaving the position and retaining the welfare benefits.
In choosing to remain on welfare, she received greater financial reward but
at the expense of losing certain gains acquired in her emotional rehabilitation.
There is a dual aspect to this form of dependency perpetuation: she (1) lost
her financial independence which (2) contributed to a loss of emotional and
social independence. The mixed message coming from welfare, therefore, was
"work but don't work."
The second sphere pertains to WPH policies and their implementation.
All residents are expected to conform to certain universalistic expectations,
some of which were described earlier in this paper. Two of them are: no
drinking at WPH and no smoking in bed. These policies, however, are not
always consistently enforced.
J, a male resident, was well aware of the no drinking rule. He
did drink in his room, though, and left empty bottles there, thus
announcing his violations. The resident manager knew of this, but
did not confront J with the violation. Some time later, one of the
social workers became aware of J's drinking and did confront him.
J's response was that he understood the policy and that he would
stop his drinking at WPH.
This instance of policy violation is not uncommon since some of the residents
routinely smoke in bed. The important point, though, concerns the staff's
responses to the violations rather than the violations per se (Cf. Gralnick
20-23). The resident manager's response to J was inconsistent
et al., 1975:
with known policy, and thus the two messages communicated were "you can't
drink but you can," and similarily in the case of the no smoking regulation,
,.you can't smoke but you can."
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Mixed messages also occur in interpersonal relationships, the
third sphere. The case described earlier concerning the resident manager
cleaning up the food crumbs dropped by a resident illustrates not only
role commitment but also interpersonal mixed messages. She communicated
to the resident "be responsible but don't be responsible." These interpersonal mixed messages occur in many other instances.
One of the particularistic expectations of one of the residents
was that she would consistently hang up her clothes. Because of
her emotional deterioration, some of the staff re-assessed her
capacity to fulfill this requirement, and it was not enforced.
The resident manager, however, was not included in this re-assessment,
and continued to demand that the clothes be hung up.
The mixed message here, "hang up your clothes but don't hang up your clothes,"
was derived from a breakdown in communication among the staff. As with
earlier instances with the no drinking policy, the person is faced with
inconsistency from the staff.
As Foley (1974: 16) has pointed out, mixed messages of the sort
which result in double binds are part of the etiology of schizophrenia.
Moreover, these processes occur initially in the family, viewed by some as
the primary source of many debilitating emotional problems (Bateson et al.,
1956)11 and then are re-enacted in other institutional contexts. The
continued exposure to mixed messages and their multiple realities thus
contributes to the perpetuation of the person's emotional problems which
put him in a dependent position in the first place.
Discussion
In our analysis, we have attempted to take seriously Becker's (1962)
argument that a proper theoretical framework for analyzing aspects of
behavioral malfunctioning is one emphasizing man's capacity for symbolization.
We contend that such a framework is best expressed sociologically through
the symbolic interactionist perspective, which, since its inception in
Pragmatist philosophy, has consistently stressed communication processes
as the key to understanding human conduct. 1 2 The substantive problem we
have addressed concerns processes which directly or indirectly contribute
to patterns of dependency in the halfway house in the face of its manifest
purpose to intervene in cycles of dependency and to produce individuals who
can live autonomously in the community. We have shown that the perpetuation
of dependency involves the elements of role commitment, language, and mixed
messages. The importance of these three elements for the effective operation
of a psychiatric halfway house has been generally discussed by Jansen,
although from the standpoint of the staff.
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The quality of the halfway house program stands or falls on the
caliber of staff members, who need a great deal of support and
supervision if they are to see the issues and maintain a firm and
consistent position, especially when their self-esteem and popularity
are at stake. The exercise of responsibility which the patient has
given up by virtue of his breakdown, is, not unexpectedly, the very
issue over which the main fights well be fought, often by manipulative
acts that corner and threaten staff and make life uncomfortable. The
challenge to the staff is to treat the individual consistently as a
grown-up, with respect for him as a person, and to mobilize the group's
1501).
resources to recognize and resolve its difficulties (Jansen, 1970:
Stanton and Schwartz (1954) have earlier discussed the snowballing effect
that staff incompetence can have, and point out that rather than always
solving patients' problems the staff may in fact add to them. Too many
duties performed for residents by staff members, for instance, decreases
the residents' degree of participation in the program. Thus, the
therapeutic value of that participation is correspondingly reduced.
Our position is that the psychiatric halfway house should be viewed
as an activity system much in the same sense that Sullivan (1954) conceptualized the psychiatric interview. Central to this view is the distinction between mutual activity vs one person acting upon another. The
dimension underlying this distinction is the degree of responsible
participation. By virtue of staff authority and residents' dependency-laden
medical biographies, the halfway house staff have a great deal of control.
They have the option of structuring situations containing a high or low
probability of producing autonomy for residents. Our data suggest that the
staff must be aware of such power differentials, must monitor those power
relations, and ultimately must decentralize a critical portion of the
decision making process. Riehman and O'Brien (1973) have demonstrated the
utility of such power shifts in group sessions in which the group leader
is transformed from a relatively powerful position to one of greater
mutuality. Thus, like the halfway house itself, the group can become its
own independence-producing vehicle, or as Schwartz (1970: 20) says, a "mutual
aid" system.
These processes, of course, are organizational in nature. Implicit
in that organization are matters of communication and transacted meaning.
Power relations find their expression in communication processes in which
identities are established and transformed. But society, as it were, gets
into the halfway house. As we have pointed out, medical biographies are
closely related to the collective histories of mental health networks; and
in these histories, language, expressed as structural vocabularies, helps in
shaping the realities with which the halfway house must deal. The communication
processes involved in the organization of the halfway house, therefore, contain
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contingencies which only further complicate its primary tasks. Some of
these contingencies are largely out of the realm of control, while others are
well within reach. Organizational goals, once established, must be kept
in the interaction if they are to remain viable. This requires effective
communication and an awareness of the identities that are established and
transformed in the interaction. It also requires that persons in responsible
positions be aware of the implications of their choices. Both staff and
residents must understand that some of their choices are contitioned by and
feed into dependency-perpetuating patterns. Such recognition and understanding is necessary if the dependency related, unanticipated consequences
of otherwise goal-oriented action are to be checked. Therefore, as Mead and
Dewey would have argued, it is only through awareness brought about by
effective communication and the responsible mobilization of resources that
the psychiatric halfway house can intervene in and break cycles of dependency.

FOOTNOTES

1.

The concept of dependency is exceedingly complex. Erikson (1968) has
discussed dependency in terms of the development of identities, and
sociologists in general have long recognized the significance of
dependent relationships in matters concerning cooperative human behavior
Fenichel expresses a psycho-analytic perspective of dependency in his
assertion that "All neurotics tend to regress, and whenever one feels
miserable and one's own activities are insufficient, the old longing
for external help appears. Phobics become helpless children again;
masochistic characteristics exhibit their 'helplessness;' they all
want to induce their salvation through a 'magic helper' (1945: 459).
Fenichel characterizes psychosis in a similar manner (1945: 523).
Our
point of view is that dependency is inherent in all life situations,
and that in and of itself it is not necessarily pathological. However,
there are circumstances under which such dependency inhibits the
person's ability to cope with routine, everyday life activities. It
is in this sense of the word that we contend that dependency can become
a pathogenic process.

2.

We do not overlook the fact that psychiatric halfway houses do contain
functional elements in their social organization which contribute to
the health and growth of their residents. Our approach is purely
analytical in nature in which we selectively focus attention on the
dysfunctional aspects.
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3.

Jansen (1970) distinguishes between two types of principles governing
the organization of halfway houses:
the authoritarian form in which
patients are controlled through administrative mechanisms, and the selfgoverning form in which democratic processes lie at the center of control.
WPH contains elements of each of these two endpoints, and, on balance,
probably falls somewhere in between.

4.

This clearly has many implications concerning the social control of medical
care (Clausen, 1959). Haley (1969) vividly expresses the politics of
the psychoanalytic relationship in which the patient, by definition, is
in a "one down" position. Dependency, therefore, can be seen both in
social organizational and interpersonal terms.

5.

It is interesting to note that the group had an investment in M's domination
of the group topic and focus. It allowed them to maintain a passive
relationship in which they became dependent upon M to initiate topics.
They did not have to actively contribute to the group from their own experiences.
This fact underlines the normative status of the passive,
dependent perspective of self adopted by residents.

6.

A policy statement was discovered some time after this incident which
seemed to support the director's decision. The wording of the statement,
however, was highly ambiguous, and could have been interpreted in a way
which would allow B to have taken on the resident as a patient. It is
unclear whether or not the director knew of the existence of this policy
at the time she made her decision, although there is some evidence that
she did not. In a very real sense, though, what she knew at the time
makes little difference, because the governing body of the halfway house
who formulated the policy are themselves implicated in fostering dependencyperpetuating policies. This kind of process is common to organizations.
Manning (1977), for instance, shows that the differential interpretation
of organizational rules pervades a great number of organizations, and
serves largely to allow personnel to justify decisions which "seem"
appropriate to persons holding positions of power.

7.

The importance of vocabulary as an indicator of meaning and a directive
for activity has also been shown by Wieder (1974) who examined processes
of "telling the code" in a halfway house for ex-convicts.

8.

As implied by the term, however, halfway houses are not total institutions.
Thus, the application of Szasz's analysis here depends upon one's perspective.
A resident can be seen as still halfway in a mental health facility or
halfway out. Obviously, there is a corresponding emphasis on being dependent
or independent.
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9.

Glasscote et al (1969: 110-111) describe a democratically governed and
structured mental health program in which language and words were
deliberately selected to refer to various persons and roles in the
program in such a way to represent and emphasize that egalitarian
structure.

10.

To underscore the importance of this point, it should be noted that
welfare can put individuals in a number of different types of binds
which perpetuate dependency. To meet eligibility requirements, for
instance, one must liquidate nearly all assets. One resident at WPH
owned a car, and, in order to meet this requirement, had to sell it.
This created a problem for him because he now had too much money which
kept him ineligible and in addition raised his fees at WPH. It wasn't
until after he had spent all his money and proved total dependency that
he could qualify for benefits. The irony of this situation from our
standpoint lies in the incompatibility between a person having certain
autonomy-bearing resources and the system's insistence on total dependency.
We might add, however, that the welfare system can also be viewed as
a mechanism leading to a form of independence. For those who come from
schizophrenogenic families in which dependency-perpetuation is inherent,
having the option of welfare produces financial circumstances which
might create opportunities for becoming independent from that family.
It might be argued, of course, that this merely represents a trade-off,
but we contend that it probably is the healthier alternative.

11.

The characterization of families as harmful is sometimes political in
nature, since it allows an institution to justify not having to work
with them. Certainly in some cases families can be quite helpful, even
when they continue to bind the patient to them. We are grateful to Harris
Chaiklin for correctly suggesting this observation.

12.

This approach is not unique either to this paper or to sociology. Sullivan
(1953) explicitly defines psychiatry as the field of interpersonal relations.
Much of the sociologically relevant work utilizing an interpersonal process
approach to mental health is reviewed in Clinard (1963: 386-394).
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ABSTRACT
The disposition of suspected instances of child abuse is
accomplished by bureaucratic personnel through their interpretation of the relevancies of their organizational life-world.
these resulted respectiveThree such instances are discussed:
ly in an unmodified interpretation, in a modified interpretation, and in an ambiguous interpretation. Among the bureaucratic relevancies which are discussed are, the elasticity
itself of the rubric of "suspicion", the affluence of the suspected, and the nature of their support network. The reification of instances of suspected abuse is found to be related,
in part, to bureaucratic contingencies which themselves are
connected only tangentially to the behavioral phenomenon under
investigation.

In their recent overview of research into child abuse,
Parks and Collmer (1975) identify three models of analysis:
the psychiatric, the sociological, and the social-situational.
All three proceed as if child "abuse" does exist in instances
then, each mode, in its own way,
which are labelled as such:
tries to account for those conditions which elicit abusive behavior on the part of caretakers. But, in general, studies
which articulate with these models do not consider, in any detail, a problem which is at the heart of child abuse and neglect:
its identification by officials who work within bureaucratic
frameworks. Thus Parke and Collmer (1975:7) note only that the
error rate in abuse-detection is particularly serious; and Light
(1973:571) suggests that rates of error in the detection of
"false positives", where children are considered abused when
this is not the case, will be high.
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I argue here that, where the investigation of suspected
abuse and neglect is located within a bureaucratic organization, this everyday "life-world" (Schutz and Luckmann 1973) of
child welfare is crucial to the comprehension of how instances
of "suspicion" are translated into cases of "abuse" or of
"neglect": for the rendering of such labels is a summation of
interpretation within official contexts.
For this there are three reasons. First, as Blumer (1962:
180) and others have noted, human interaction is mediated by
a process of interpretation, through which one establishes the
apparent meaning of another's behavior (cf. Blum and McHugh
Such interpretations are negotiated
1971; Handelman 1977c).
Moreover,
properties of interpersonal conduct (Scheff 1968).
but in line with the reflexive continuity of a particular
social reality (cf. Mehan and Wood 1975:8-14), interpretations
are not settled unconditionally, once for all, but are subject
to the on-going perceptual adjustments of retrospective interpretation (cf. Wilson 1970:701; McHugh 1968).
Second, plausible interpretations are guided by the refertherefore
encing capacity of a particular social reality:
interpretations are indexical expressions (Garfinkel 1967) of
this reality, and in turn they reify its phenomenal validity.
Put differently, a "life-world" offers schema to its members,
for the interpretation of particular instances (Bittner 1965)
that are perceived as relevant to its concerns, such that the
decision which governs the instance is rendered intelligible
to, and compatible with, this life-world (cf. Silverman and
The meaning attributed to such interpretations is,
Jones 1973).
these
in turn, a function of the relevancies of the life-world:
relevancies are thematic, motivational, and interpretational
The bureaucratic task sets
(Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 186-207).
the problem to be explicated. That is, the theme of child abuse
or neglect is perceived as relevant, legal statutes and official
directives enunciate the relevance of this theme, and the childworker is motivated to investigate instances of "suspected"
abuse or neglect. But, with regard to interpretational relevance, the organizational life-world provides only ambiguous
thus, in this domain2 the
direction (Handelman 1976a, 1977a):
interpretation of "suspicion" is especially problematic.
the relevancy
Third, meaning and context are inseparable:
of an interpretation, which "makes sense" of an instance of
suspicion, has this quality within the contexts of the organizational life-world. But, that meaning which is attributed to an
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interpretation, within a bureaucratic context, must be summated
as an "objective" rendition which any upright member of the
wider society will comprehend, common-sensically. This, of
course, is a prime function of official labels, of which "abuse"
is an example. Thus it must be stressed that the context in
which the meaning of abuse is formulated, is not that of the
suspected household. Instead, this context is located at the
intersection of bureaucratic and household life-worlds, where
the power of definition of the former is more forceful than
that of the latter. In phenomenological terms, the organization has the greater capability to impose its perception of
reality on that of the household's, and so to render the reality
3
of the latter as one which is intelligible to the former.
Therefore, I argue that it is precisely this locus of
intersection which is crucial to any understanding of how
instances of "suspicion" become translated into cases of abuse
As Manning (1971:249) notes, in a different conor neglect.
text, the most problematic qualities of organizational life
are its commonsense grounds. Yet, with regard to the processinterface
ing of child abuse and neglect, the official-client
has received little analytic attention.
I will discuss three reports of suspected abuse-neglect
made to the child-welfare division of the public-welfare
Department of Social Services, which serves St. John's, Newfoundland. In each case, through the prism of the division,
I will bring out those interpretational and contextual contingencies which affected the decisions of the child-workers.
They rendered the first case as an unmodified interpretation of
abuse. In the second, an initial interpretation of "severe
neglect" later was watered down. The third was interpreted as
"not really abuse", but it was treated, in part, as if abuse
had occurred. All three cases were left in the active file; and
the interpretation of each affected its disposition. In each
case, I am concerned here only with its opening phase, until a
disposition was reached, and not with later developments (cf.
Handelman 1976a, 1977a).
An Unmodified Interpretation:

the Yards

Mrs. Yard, a young mother, complained to the police that
her husband beat their six-month old son. The police reported
this to the child-welfare division.
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Frequently the initial definition of "suspicion" is
supplied by an agency other than the division; and its response
Then,
is to assume the "investigative stance" (Zimmerman 1969).
for a case to be dropped speedily, those suspected must clear
themselves completely of suspicion; given the ambiguous boundaries which demarcate abuse and neglect, caretakers are assumed
more to be guilty than innocent. This creates a context in
which the "facts" are interpreted differently than they would
innocent until proven guilty.
be according to the maxim:
The caseworker visited the Yard home. Bruising was readAsked for an explanily visible on the boy's face and legs.
ation, Mr. Yard stated that, some nights before, after
too much", he had played with the child "a
drinking "a little
little too roughly." The child fell from his arms, and was
bruised. But he denied ever striking his son. After this
visit, Mrs. Yard stated that the child had to be removed, because Mr. Yard had been beating him for months, and because
Later he denied her
he had little control over his actions.
accusations.
The following day, the caseworker, her supervisor, and 4
two policemen, removed the child to the children's hospital.
A medical examination found extensive bruising on the face and
on the legs, a deep abrasion on one buttock, pneumonia in the
left lobe, and a greenstick fracture of the shaft of the ulna.
The examining doctor was prepared to write in his report that
these injuries were compatible with a diagnosis of "child
abuse."
This report was most relevant for the division, since the
diagnosis of "compatability" could be read as signifying causeand-effect:
someone made those injuries happen; they were not
Mrs. Yard had accused her husband,
accidental (cf. McHugh 1970).
the only other person who was routinely present in the household. But, if her testimony was accurate, then by her own
admission she had condoned his behavior for a lengthy period
without reporting it. Thus she was negligent, while he was
abusive. If her story was fabricated, then she was lying; and
this would strengthen his denial. Still, by his own admission,
he had treated the child roughly while drunk.
Thus, whether the caseworker accepted either story, both
parents were to be considered unfit on some ground; and given
the diagnosis, both stories could not be rejected completely.
But, according to the relevancies of her life-world, the caseworker was not required to establish the identity of an "abuser."
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During this first phase of the case, she had to decide whether
to request the family court to remove the child from the household. This court's brief for abuse and neglect is phrased in
if evidence exists that something routinely
the passive tense:
unexpectable, and damaging, happened to the child, than a causal
agent need not be identified. For the caseworker, such identification becomes more relevant after an official disposition is
made. Then she switches roles, from that of a punitive agent,
to that of rehabilitating the family. This latter task is eased
if she thinks she knows the identity of the perpetrator. Thus,
until further information became available, the caseworker
that its primary
abided by a major relevancy of the division:
responsibility was to the welfare of the child. Since there
family court to
was evidence of abuse, she petitioned the
5
grant temporary wardship of the child.
In the meantime, the division passed on its evidence to
the provincial Department of Justice. In addition to the medical diagnosis, the police report stated that Mr. Yard had
"Yeah, I beat the
admitted to beating his son, in the words:
This admission was corroborated by Mrs. Yard.
shit out of it."
The Department of Justice brought criminal charges against
Mr. Yard. Prior to the family court hearing on wardship, he
was convicted of assault, fined $500, and placed on probation
for two years. One condition of his probation was an abstention from alcoholic beverages. This lent credence to Mrs.
Yard's portrayal of him as volatile and unpredictable. By the
time of the wardship hearing, the caseworker held to the interpretation that Mr. Yard abused his son, while Mrs. Yard was
negligent in permitting him to do so. At the hearing, the
division was awarded temporary wardship for one year; and the
child was placed in a foster home.
According to the child-workers, this was a clear-cut case:
within their life-world it had much the status of a "normal
Its routine processing was
crimes" construct (Sudnow 1965).
due to a conjunction of factors which were highly relevant to
an authoritative medical
the official identification of abuse:
opinion, an eye-witness who incriminated either her husbana, or
both her husband and herself, and an official trial judgement.
Thus the caseworker could develop a consistent and coherent line
of interpretation which substantiated the organizational lifeworld, without qualification. And her interpretation was borne
out by the favorable decision of the family court.
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A Modified Interpretation:

The Birds

Some months before, the Birds were referred to the Public
Health Service:
its nurse found the Bird home to be filthy,
the children to have lice, and the parents to be heavy
drinkers.
During one visit, she found the nine-year-old
daughter with a badly-bruised eye; and she reported the household to the child-welfare division.
The caseworker discovered that Mrs. Bird was in the
hospital after the eldest son, Jack, aged seventeen, had kicked
her in the stomach.
Then pregnant, she had miscarried.
Jack
was an ex-probationer, with a reputation for violence, according to the corrections division.
The home was in a filthy state:
Mr. Bird was drinking
heavily; the children, and even a doll, had lice; and the house
itself had no indoor water or sanitation facilities. Across
the wall of the children's bedroom was smeared what appeared to
be dried excrement.
Mrs. Bird's mother was helping to run the
household while her
daughter was hospitalized. She organized
a number of female relatives to clean out the house; over
twenty garbage bags of filthy clothing were removed and laundered; dried feces were scraped off walls and floors; and in one
bedroom they found a mound of feces, with sawdust thrown on top.
While Mrs. Bird was still in hospital, the youngest child was
run over and killed by a car near the family home. After Mrs.
Bird's return, the case-worker found her, one day, with a badly
bruised face:
but she would not say who had beaten her. Shortly
after this, Mr. Bird caught Jack stealing the battery from a
neighbor's car, and remonstrated with him:
in reply, Jack
knocked him down, and gave him a severe stomping.
To the caseworker, the household was marked by severe
neglect, and by violent behavior.
These convinced her that
the younger children, aged seven, nine, and twelve, had to be
protected from this destructive environment. Together with two
policemen, she apprehended these children, pending a hearing in
family court, on the division's petition for temporary wardship.
A maxim in the division states that "dirt is not enough" to
obtain temporary wardship.
But in this instance the enormity of
"neglect" and violence convinced the caseworker that an interpretation of "severe neglect" would get wardship.
However,
other contingencies led the division to alter its official
interpretation, to keep this compatible with its life-world.
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Most families in St. John's who are investigated for
abuse and neglect age comparatively poor, and many receive
In comparison to their more affluent
welfare assistance.
compatriots, and given their greater dependence for subsistence on official agencies, they are more vulnerable to official pressures. Therefore, in wardship hearings, it is not
surprising that suspected parents are rarely represented by
legal counsel, in order to protect their civil rights; and only
infrequently are they informed by the division of their right
to legal representation (cf. Handelman 1977a).
By Newfoundland standards, the Birds turned out to be
they had earned many thousands of dollars from land
affluent:
These monies were held in trust, and their lawyer
sales.
allocated sums to them as needed. In the matter of temporary
wardship, which the Birds opposed, their lawyer represented
them. Ordinarily, at such hearings, the division dispensed
with counsel, since it was better able to prepare an authoritative case than were the parents it routinely opposed. But,
since the Birds had counsel, the division requested a postponement to obtain representation from the Department of
Justice.
It became clear that, once the Birds had counsel, the likelihood of obtaining wardship was reduced. While he granted a
postponement, the judge suggested that the children be returned
The caseworker's
home, and to be supervised, "if possible."
"Unless the neglect is apparent, there is not
response was:
much that can be done, especially with regard to wardship."
The division understood that, officially, it had to modify its
interpretation of "severe neglect".
Meanwhile, with the help of Mrs. Bird's mother, the home
was cleaned. On a subsequent visit, the caseworker found Mrs.
Bird scrubbing a new stove. There was new linoleum on the
floor; and the visible rooms were clean. When the caseworker
asked to see another room, "She /Mrs. Bird/ was very defensive.
She said it was a bedroom that wasn't used. We asked to see
I said
it, but she said it wasn't fixed up and didn't use it.
we'd like to see it anyway. We went in and what a mess! There
was feces spread across one wall. It was freezing cold. There
were clothes everywhere." But the Birds said they missed their
children terribly; and Mrs. Bird's mother claimed she was doing
her best to get them to keep the home in better condition.
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When the Department of Justice informed the division that
there was little chance of obtaining wardship, since the Birds
had counsel, and since they could claim to be making a sincere
effort to improve, the supervisor and caseworker capitulated:
they cancelled the hearing. A few days later, they decided to
request a court order for the supervision of the Birds.
When
they were discouraged from doing so, they concluded that there
was no real need for such an order, since the division did have
the de facto right to supervise, where abuse or neglect were
suspected.
Two weeks after their apprehension, the children
were returned.
Reinterpreting her previous determination to
deal firmly with the household, the caseworker said that the
removal of the children had shocked the parents into "straightening up."
There were two major factors in this reinterpretation.
Wardship is intended to serve three functions:
to protect
a child for a period, to punish the offending parents, and to
press for changes in parental behavior and life-style, before
permitting the return of the children.7
These aims are implemented more easily when a coherent and consistent interpretation
is constructed, and when those suspected have few resources with
which to oppose legal action. Such an interpretation was
established; but given the practical contingency of counsel, the
division had to modify its story-line:
to explain to itself why
wardship was not necessary, and why some form of de facto supervision would suffice.
Although it could not modify the evidence
of severe neglect, and of probable abuse, it could search for
evidence of a change in behaviour, which then could be interpreted as a change in parental attitude.
Some improvement in
cleanliness, a new stove, new linoleum, and the supposed shock
of apprehension, served as evidence of this kind.
Moreover, the
invocation of the maxim that "dirt is not enough", threw the onus
of failure to obtain wardship onto the family court.
In turn,
this enabled division personnel to sidestep a conclusion which
was threatening to the organizational life-world:
that its
methods worked best with the vulnerable poor, and less well with
the more-buffered affluent.
Unlike that of affluence, the second factor actually enabled
division personnel to argue that their disposition was correct.
Bittner (1967a, 1976b) and Black (1970) found that policemen
were more prepared not to process altercants or miscreants who
were not suspected of serious crimes, and for whom some person
or social unit in the community was prepared to accept responsibility. Such dispositions were compatible with the police
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In St. John's, child-workers
notion of "keeping the peace".
related, in a parallel manner, to instances of suspected abuse
if the suspected parents had a "support network"
and neglect:
outside of their own household, of persons (usually kinsmen)
who were perceived to be concerned, and who were prepared to
shoulder some responsibility for the household, then the
division was prepared more to rely on supervision, without
wardship.
she
Mrs. Bird's mother was perceived as such a person:
expressed her grave concern for the welfare of her grandchildren; she organized other kinswomen to clean the Bird home;
and she was perceived as responsible, in part, for the physical
improvements in the home. Therefore the division settled for a
story-line in which she already had had a positive influence on
the attitudes of the parents. Thus, the first glimpses of
parental cooperation and rehabilitation were in sight. Although
this interpretation was more ambiguous than its predecessor,
its meaning was more compatible with those contextual contingencies which the case had illuminated within the organizational life-world.
An Ambiguous Interpretation:

the Wills

One evening the police received a call from a landlord,
that his tenants, a young couple named Wills who lived in the
apartment above his, were assaulting their two-month old son.
Two policemen and a welfare officer went to the home. The landlord's wife said that they had heard the Wills fighting. Some
time later, they heard the baby let out two or three terrible
screams, and since than all had been very quiet. The landlord
added that, on several occasions, they had heard the Wills
beating their baby. Upstairs, Mr. Wills was alone with the child.
He denied striking it; but he added that the baby had been
lying on its stomach in its stroller, and had fallen forward onto its head, eliciting the screams heard below. The baby was
taken to the children's hospital.
The examining doctor reported that the child was convulsing,
that he had suffered a linear fracture of the parietal bone,
and that these injuries might have been caused by abuse. But he
noted that there were no bruises or other marks on the child's
body.
The following day, the landlord stated that, actually neither he nor his wife had ever seen the Wills strike their child.
Furthermore, he denied that either of them had told the police

that the child was abused.
But, added his wife, the Wills
therefore,
quarrelled often, and the baby cried a great deal:
"something must be wrong somewhere."
The previous evening the
screams of the baby had frightened her terribly; and she thought
that someone should investigate.
On the other occasions she
had called to Mrs. Wills to stop the crying of the baby.
The Wills denied ever striking their child.
True, he did
cry constantly, but their family doctor had said he was a "cross
They admitted that
child", and that this behavior would pass.
the crying irritated them, particularly because the landlord's
family often complained of it.
Mr. Wills said that his wife
often held their son for long hours during the night, to
quieten him.
He himself was unemployed, and the family subsisted on welfare payments.
The caseworker examined the stroller:
she concluded that
if it had been in the down position, and if the baby had been
lying on it stomach, then he could have slid out, head first.
She stated:
"The way it appears, there is no substantial
evidence that the child has ever been beaten or assaulted, or
that whatever caused the accident was deliberate or the result
of negligence."
But, she noted, the Wills were "inexperienced",
and "immature."
Moreover, they were quite tense because of the
complaints of the landlord's family.
Although she was reluctant to apprehend the child, she did
think the Wills would feel greater pressure, since they now
felt themselves under suspicion.
Therefore they needed both
strict supervision and much support, for their inexperience, and
their
tense relations
with the landlord, could result
in the
future
"neglect" of their
child.
To what extent do bureaucratic agencies create those
antecedent conditions which then provide a mandate for bureaucratic intervention?
The caseworker was convinced that the
injury was accidental.
If the division strictly interpreted
its own function, then this should have ended its scrutiny of
the household.
But the medical report had suggested the
possibility of abuse; relations with the landlord were poor and
the Wills could not move easily to another apartment, since
decent low-income rental housing in St. John's is very scarce.
Therefore this amorphous "tension" had to be watched.
But this
scrutiny itself had made the Wills feel suspect and tense.
Therefore supervision was even more necessary:
but, in turn,
continued scrutiny would increase their tension.
Still, the
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Wills were inexperienced and immature: therefore strict
supervision was necessary, for their own protection. But
what evidence was there for this description?
While her son was in hospital, his mother visited regularly,
and showed much tenderness and affection for him. There was
one arm and hand were
residual neural damage from his fall:
quite spastic. But, later on, Mrs. Wills always kept medical
appointments, and she exercised his arm regularly, as required.
Her child was always spotless, and the apartment clean. Did
the "immaturity" of the Wills stem from their inability to find
another apartment? Or perhaps it derived from their inability
to control their landlord, although they were clearly the
weaker party?
According to the caseworker, their immaturity, the pressure
they lived under, and their lack of a support network of older
kinsmen, could lead to the child's neglect in the future. But
this "pressure" was due in part to the actuality of intervention,
while "immaturity" justified continued supervision, in anticipation of a future state for which there was little evidence in
the present. In effect, having intervened, the division
interpreted the "facts" to justify the creation of conditions
which themselves constituted a mandate for continued intervention.
Within a few short weeks, a total of five agencies were
involved in different aspects of the life of the household:
since Mr. Wills was on welfare, his welfare officer took an
interest; the public health nurse visited to check the baby;
the hospital's social service department keptwatch to make certain the "accident" was not repeated; the child was treated in
the hospital's child development clinic for his spastic arm;
and the division caseworker visited often. In addition, the
Director of Child Welfare suggested that the landlord be asked
to inform the division if the child's care again should be
questionable.
Since the couple lacked a support network, they were enand, alcircled by bureaucratic and professional supports:
though "suspicion" had provided an initial mandate for scrutiny,
intervention itself had created a mandate for its own continuation and expansion. Some months later, the caseworker and her
supervisor suggested to the Director of Child Welfare that this
file be closed, since there was no evidence of anything amiss in
the treatment of the child. He replied that, since this was a

case of "suspected abuse", the caseworker should continue to
supervise.
She understood this to be a self-protective
8
response.
Thus, even when those directly involved in the case agreed
that there was no basis for continued intervention, the 'suspicion" of abuse had lingered and had reified: suspicion, in the
form of an initial complaint, had become translated into the
potential, of the parents, to harm the child in the future.
This product of the case-interpretation "made sense" only n
the context of the life-world of bureaucratic imperatives.
Conclusion
An interpretation which "makes sense", of an instance of
"suspicion", is the negotiated product of the interplay of
bureaucratic and professional relevancies, and of the resources
of those suspected. Thus the foremost concern of the children's
hospital is the condition of the child (the Yards and the
The hospital prefers to err on the side of caution, to
Wills).
invoke "suspicion", and to press for an official investigation.
Senior child welfare officials prefer to keep files active, and
to request continued supervision, on the basis of "suspicion."
So the opening of a file is often a mandate for its continuaStill,
tion, for the "protection" of the division (the Wills).
the family court is concerned often with the rights of those
suspected, and it tends to prefer supervision to wardship (the
Therefore the invocation of "suspicion" is understood
Birds).
differently by involved officials, whose perceptions influence
its interpretation. On the other hand, the affluence of the
suspected (and their hiring of counsel), lessens the probability
of wardship (the Birds); and where those suspected have a support
network, this reduces the likelihood that wardship will be
requested (the Birds).
The caseworker's interpretation has to resolve these often
her solution affects the naming of
contradictory interests:
the case, and its disposition. Where the suspected household
lacks a support network, or if its network is perceived as
irresponsible, then bureaucratic agencies fill this gap (the
But the enclosure of a "suspected" household by
Wills).
officialdom, can amount, reputationally, to a de facto declaration of guilt. Such cases then acquire a form similar to those
in which guilt has been established, but where wardship has not
occurred.
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The ambiguity of the rubric of suspected abuse and neglect
eases the interpretative task of the case-worker, as she steers
her way through bureaucratic and societal contingencies (the
The elasticity of "suspicion" makes relevant to the
Birds).
case-interpretation a wide range and variety of attributes and
behavior (the potential for neglect of the Wills, the income of
the Birds) which become summated as "abuse" and/or "neglect".
In practice, this permits the expansion of an interventionist
mandate to other areas of the family life of those suspected,
and opens a portal to a multiplicity of intervenors (the Wills).
Thus the elasticity of "suspicion" generates the common-sense
grounds for the interpretation of "what is suspected", and for
its summation. This can result in the application of stigmata,
for lengthy durations, on the basis of suspicion, for commonsense reasons which are related only tangentially to the actual
welfare of the child itself. Therefore it is a grave error for
social science to treat such summations as accurate reflections
of the existence, and of the boundaries, of abuse and neglect in
actual family situations.
It is instructive to note briefly the kinds of contributory
factors which generally fall outside the boundaries of relevance,
in instances of suspected abuse and neglect. St. John's has a
severe shortage of housing, in part because land-developers,
construction companies, politicians, and others, tend to work in
concert to maintain a tight housing market. Low-income families
often must make do with over-crowded, substandard, unsanitary,
and unsafe housing in high-density living-areas where family
arguments and guarrels are overheard more easily by neighbors
and landlords.1 0 Within Canada, Newfoundland has a high rate of
unemployment. Many households are driven onto welfare subsistence, which stigmatizes them, which creates official dossiers
about them, and which prepares the ground for the rationale of
bureaucratic intervention. Most fresh and nutritious food is not
grown locally, but is transported from mainland Canada. So its
price generally is prohibitive for low-income households. Factors
they contribute
like the above are economistic and ecological:
to the validation of a wider social system, of which child welfare is a bureaucratic component (if, at times, an unwilling
partner), and from which child welfare receives its organizational form, and its legitimacy. To relate factors, like the
above, to the maintenance of a system which weights both the
reporting and the identification of abuse/neglect against lowincome families, would be to question the phenomenal validity of
the system itself, and hence also that of the life-world of childwelfare.11
-82-

The interpretational approach to the attribution of meaning,
taken in this paper, also questions the validity of the problem
of "false positives" (see also Handelman 1976a, 1977a).
For
example, the case of the Yards was termed "abuse", and it resulted in wardship:
this case could be counted as a true
positive. That of the Birds was termed "neglect". But, should
one count the initial interpretation, or the softened official
version? This case then could be a true positive, but of uncertain degree. That of the Wills apparently is a true negative, which is treated like a de facto true positive:
should
it be counted as a false positive? Only in the case of the
Yards is there a close fit between the name given to an instance and the phenomenon it denotes.
My closing point is directed to practitioners of child
welfare. The "social construction" of reality, which is connoted by an interpretational approach, does not argue that the
phenomenon of child abuse and neglect is simply fictitious.
But, by elevating taken-for-granted features of organizational
work to the level of conscious inspection and introspective
evaluation, it does demand a degree of self-critical awareness
which is often lacking, or which is down-graded, in routine
work (see Handelman 1976b, 1977b; Scott 1970).
Greater cognizance of interpretational processes, at least carries the hope
that practitioners will question common-sense grounds, which
permit the routine rationalization and reification of complex
social phenomena. If, at times, this locates the practitioner
in opposition to other bureaucratic, research, and psychologizing personnel, then this usually would be to the good:
to
succumb to the expeditious common-sense lineaments of a task, is
inevitably to stultify, and to become less capable of recognizing
in others the humanity which we accord to ourselves. Apparently
there is no ultimate way to nullify Heisenberg's Principle of
Uncertainty, but greater insight into the realities which we
reinforce through routine usage may also lead to the questioning
of their validity and applicability.

Notes
1.

Data were collected during the tenure of an ISER postdoctoral
fellowship in anthropology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1973-1974. This paper was written during the tenure
of a Mellon postdoctoral fellowship in anthropology, at the
University of Pittsburgh, 1977-1978. Data were collected
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through observation, discussion, and open-ended interviews.
The names of all protagonists have been changed; and minor
details have been altered to ensure anonymity. The childwelfare division discussed here employed nine caseworkers
and a supervisor, all of whom were college-educated women
with at least some training in social work. I am indebted
to all of them for their helpfulness and cooperation.
2.

For example, the idea of interpretational relevance clarifies
a significant change in the conception of the battered-child
syndrome, from that of "correlation" in the hands of medical
personnel (cf. Silverman 1974) to that of cause-and-effect
in the hands of members of the "helping" professions (cf.
Davoren 1974; Steele and Pollock 1974; Morris and Gould
This ideational transformation is discussed in
1963).
Handelman (1976a, 1977a).

3.

In part, this attitude has given social scientists a formidable mandate to treat the products of investigation into
"suspicion" as objective renditions, and to concentrate instead on caretakers, as if these persons were accurately
depicted as "abusers" by official uses of such labels.
Since such labels are simplified summaries of complex processes, all they denote is that an official interpretation
was arrived at.

4.

The removal of a minor is termed "apprehension"; and a child
may be apprehended for ten days without a court order.
Policemen accompany a caseworker when resistence or violence
are feared. Neither the Newfoundland Child Welfare Act,
1972, nor division directives, suggest how a caseworker is
to identify an abused or neglected child.

5.

disThere are four types of decisions in such hearings:
allowal of the petition, an order for the supervision of the
household, temporary wardship, usually for a period of one
In practice, a court order is
year, or permanent wardship.
not required for supervision, but this may be requested if
the family is recalcitrant.

6.

Of thirty-eight instances of suspected abuse/neglect which I
examined, only two might be said to involve middle-class
one in terms of salaried earnings, and the other
families:
in terms of capital resources.

7.

Elsewhere (Handelman 1976a), I argue that only when childworkers perceive that they are obtaining the "cooperation"
of offending caretakers, can they move from the punitive to
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the rehabilitative phases of a case. The more strongly
parents are pressed, the more likely is it that "cooperation" will begin to feature in their behavior. Temporary
wardship is the strongest of available routine pressures.
8.

In contrast to their own role of concern for the whole
family unit, caseworkers often saw that of senior officials
as self-protective, at times at the expense of clients.
Speaking of one senior official, a caseworker exclaimed:
"We write our reports and he always passes the buck back,
because he never makes any fucking decisions."
The Wills'
caseworker added:
"They always write, 'Continue to supervise, continue to supervise.' What does that mean, 'Has
anyone been bashing you around lately, Johnny?' What it
means is that we're covered in case anything happens. They
can always say that our workers have been following the
case."
See, for example, Handelman (1976a).

9.

Even the Wills' caseworker succumbed, at times, to the
reification of "suspicion". Some months into the case,
she stated:
"She is coping very well with /her son/.
In
fact, she tries so hard and protests so much that she does
not mind at all the work and trouble and never complains,
that I feel sometimes that she has some guilt feelings
about the past."

10.

11.

On occasion, landlords will report "suspicion" of abuse or
neglect to control their tenants or boarders.
In addition,
relatives, neighbors, and acquaintances, will use such
reports to settle scores.
Childworkers admit to their
awareness of such motivations; but since a report is treated
as "objective", the intentions of reporters frequently are
not considered relevant to the investigation, unless a series
of reports from the same source are perceived as unfounded.
Child-workers
responding to
of their work
validity to a
sources.

state that they are only doing their job by
reports of suspicion. Although this aspect
is constituted in this way, it owes its
wider system of unequal access to basic re-
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ABSTRACT
This symbolic interactionist theory examines the structure of relationships between the disabled and the nondisabled through face-to-face
interaction and the formation and participation in organizations which
provide specialized services. Some propositions from Randall Collin's
Conflict Sociology (1975) create a framework for understanding the
behavior of the disabled.
Goffman's concept of career is used to
examine the conditions under which various adaptive strategies are
employed by the disabled to negotiate favorable definitions of self
Finally, a symbolic interactionist
from their social communication.
explanation is outlined to account for the active and interested
involvement of the nonhandicapped with the handicapped in getting the
handicapped to accept their situation.

Persons who acquire a disability find themselves facing more than
just an adjustment to a physical impairment or long-term illness which
prevents them from walking as fast as other people, from riding horses,
They are now regarded by
or holding a job in competitive employment.
others and even by themselves as being "different" and this difference
is considered to be an undesirable one, affecting social interaction
with others in such a way as to create a sense of awkwardness,
embarrassment and confusion.
This problem of maintaining easeful face-to-face interaction
between disabled and conventional members of society results, first,
from the uncertainty produced in such situations as to what kinds of
claims the disabled and the conventional person will make upon each
other. If, for example, there is a young man with a prosthetic leg at
a party, will he ask one of the young women present to dance? In turn,
will one of the young ladies present ask that crippled young man to
dance hoping to compensate for his "natural" shyness?
A second source of confusion and uncertainty remains in
-89-

addition

to that which may arise during such social occasions. Disability is
rarely acquired in a conscious way, via an intentional misapplication
of the recipes or formulaes that constitute the culture of a society.
Moreover, it can hardly be said that the disabled are attempting to
some disdirectly violate the rules for personal gain, to fulfill
respectable desire, or even to change the rules of the game. Rather,
disability is acquired because the culture could not predict a fortuitous or accidental event or the onset of an illness so that it could
be avoided. Thus, those who become disabled do so because they
down by those very
deliberately tried to follow the rules and were let
rules. Acquiring a handicapping condition involves little intentional
choice and can be conceived of as the crystallization of involuntary
deviance into roles now performed by previously voluntary conformists.
Since it is a competent person who now has become disabled the very
rules which define competency are now called into question. Moreover,
since this disabled person is still psychologically competent, he may
start to question these rules since they proved to be unreliable. How
is it that rebellion is a rare adaptation among the disabled?
An important use of questions in theory formation is to focus on
the need to develop an adequate explanation for what might appear to be
Starting with an effort to account for a lack of rebellion
obvious.
among the disabled helps us to see how new definitions of self are
acquired by the disabled person through contact with the nonhandicapped
and with organizations created to provide services to the handicapped.
Goffman's concept of a "moral career," provides a useful way of
sensitizing the observer to factors which influence the individual's
The term moral
emergent definition of the situation and of the self.
career is defined by Goffman as
• . . any social strand of any person's course
The perspective of natural history
through life.
is taken: unique outcomes are neglected in favor
of such changes over time as are basic and common
to the members of a social category, although
occurring independently to each of them (1961: 127).
The concept of career allows the student of social behavior to link the
disabled to institutions which are established to serve them, ongoing
memberships in collectivities, and the reactions of the disabled to
their situation. Strategies for maintaining favorable definitions of
self may be considered as important as finding needed services.
An explicit set of assumptions about human nature and communication
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between human beings will help to show how the new career thrust on to
the handicapped create certain conditions which do not exist for other
people. A formal set of postulates derived from the merging of the
interactionist and conflict perspectives in sociology have been articulated by Randall Collins. Much of the subsequent discussion about the
social construction of disability-as an answer to why the disabled do
not rebel--can be derived from these postulates.
I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

Each individual constructs his own subjective reality.
Individual cognition is constructed from social cormmnications.
Individuals have power over each other's subjective reality
(from I and II).
Each individual attempts to maximize his subjective status to
the degree allowed by the resources available to himself and
others he contacts.
Each individual values highest what he is best at, and attempts
to act it out and communicate it as much as possible.
Each individual seeks social contacts which give him greatest
subjective status, and avoids those in which he has lowest
status (from III, IV and V).
Where individuals' resources differ, social contacts involve
inequalities in power to define subjective reality.
Situations in which differential power is exercised, and
withdrawal is not immediately possible, inplicitly involve
conflict (from IV and VI).
(Collins, 1975: 73).

It follows then, from the last three postulates, that the moral
career of the disabled person is shaped by recurrent social situations
which either reinforce his capacity to rebel or makes rebellion an
In discussing the social construction of disability,
unlikely outcome.
the focus of this paper is on the moral career of the disabled as
developed at the points of contact with the family, community and
agencies devoted to serving the handicapped. At these points of contact,
the determinants of behavior specified in postulate VI can help to
account for the prevention of the emergence of the social conditions
specified in postulate VIII. In effect, by being capable of responding
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to the social communications given off by others through anticipation
of stigma, the disabled individual often avoids conflict. At the same
time he avoids contact with others who are similarly situationed and
therefore a potential source of alternative social communications upon
which to build a new social identity.
THE SOCIAL SELF AND DISABILITY
An important assumption in any discussion of the social construction of disability is the social competency of the disabled. Being a
fully competent member of society includes a recognition of the meaning
of membership and competency. This reflexiveness takes the form of a
sense of what a member must possess, and who is to be allowed to
participate in particular situations (Goffman, 1963: 2). Alternatively,
knowledge of what it means to be a nonmember is part of the general role
of a member. These rules of identity, or constitutive norms of social
life, are acquired relatively early in life. Children will observe out
loud that "the man sitting in the next seat has no arm in his sleeve"
and parents will reward children for being so observant, even when they
admonish them for being overly vocal in public.
Violations of these norms of social identity are events that those
who are disabled have to manage to deal with, particularly in the
company of conventional people who are strangers to the handicapped
person. Every transgression of these norms in the form of a discrediting discrepancy between an actor's virtual (or expected) and
actual identity calls into question the validity of these rules, since
those who cannot sustain competency may still seek to do so (Goffman,
Then, the everyday grounds for judging others and oneself
1963: 5).
are made problematic, since actors are uncertain about the kinds of
claims that might be made by either the discrepant or the conventional
individuals. Thus, such encounters threaten the beliefs of all present
in the culture in two ways: (1) The one to one correspondence of the
social and the natural order--that is, the correspondence between the
way things are anticipated and the way they actually turn-is called
into question; (2) then, if one or both fail to take the discrepancy
from cultural expectations into account in their relationship, then
they call into question the conventional character of that person or
their relationship, suggesting to others a kind of joint or dual
madness.
While disability may be unpredictable, according to the recipes we
use in everyday life, every culture provides a general idea to the
members of society concerning what it must be like to possess such a
handicap and even provides a rank ordering of various impairments.
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This uniformity in response to disability provides a third source of
uncertainty in relations between those with handicaps and the nonhandicapped since the nonhandicapped do not want to reveal to the
handicapped the negative attitudes which they hold toward the
disability. Indeed, the pervasiveness of the cultural conceptions
on disability is so great that even children who were born with
physical disabilities will share these negative values about this
condition (Richardson, et. al., 1961). In social psychological
studies conducted among children with physical disabilities, they
were more likely to choose pictures of children without handicaps as
preferred playmates to those where the identical child was shown in
different pictures to have five separate physical handicaps (Richardson,
et. al., 1961).
The amount of self-deprecation and self-hatred experienced by

those with physical disabilities should not be underestimated as an
important source of keeping them in line, particularly when they were
and in so many ways, still
are, voluntary conformists in society.
Still, there does seem to be one predictable way of responding to this
fate. It can be conceived that there are three ways of adapting to the
stigma of physical disability. Some who bear a stigma attempt to
embrace their role and do not attempt to convey an image of normality,
but seek to make their impairment the central focus of their lives.
Others seek to erase all information about their stigma and seek to
convey the impression of being unsoiled. Finally, others move between
these two extreme points and seek to perform many conventional social
roles with their differentness being occasionally manifested by their

association with others who are also stigmatized. This last adaptation
may be regarded as an effort to "normalize" one's deviance (Davis, 1964)
so that it does not become obtrusive in all social situations but is
taken into account in all ongoing social relationships. Embracement of
the stigma is less likely to occur in the case of physical disability
than in the case of minority group membership because rarely does a
counterculture exist which insists that the stigma is a badge of honor,
rather than a discrediting discrepancy. Accordingly, when revaluation
of the discrepancy is possible, then the use of metaphor to describe
their situation will be borrowed from the language of minorities,
particularly when the stigma is biographical in nature. While homosexuals do claim that being gay is good and one ought to be proud of
one's sexual tastes, those with physical handicaps do not make the
same assertions about their discrepancy. They may seek to get nonhandicapped people to regard them in a more accepting way by insisting
on the use of certain labels for their condition, but the basis of
their problem and their plea for acceptance is still the unintentionally
acquired character of the impairment to their physical functioning.
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Thus, there is a strain toward "normalization" among the disabled since
this is one way of avoiding being regarded as more deviant than they
are now so regarded. Denial and embracement might both be regarded by
others as signs of severe psychological disturbance, perhaps brought
on or precipitated by the acquisition of physical disability, but
something that prevents the person from recognizing either his physical
limitations or his other capacities; from becoming aware of the
obtrusiveness or lack of it produced by the disability when it comes
to social interaction; from neglecting or paying an inordinate amount
of attention to his other responsibilities, i.e., being an employee,
a wife, a father, etc. As conventional members of society, we question
the competency of a person who fails to deal with "reality" or who
denies our theories of the disadvantages to being disabled. The middle
road is regarded as the wisest course because it confirms the culture's
theories about disability:
The general formula is apparent.
The stigmatized
individual is asked to act so as to imply neither
that his burden is heavy nor that bearing it has
made him different from us; at the same time he
must keep himself at that remove from us which
ensures our painlessly being able to confirm
this belief about him. Put differently, he is
advised to reciprocate naturally with an acceptance
of himself and us, an acceptance of him that we have
not quite extended him in the first place (Goffman,
1963: 122).
In following this formula, the disabled person, either consciously
or unwittingly, takes part in a process of restoration of the belief in
those cultural formulae which he followed and which failed him. This
process begins with a recognition and acceptance of the stigma by the
disabled person, promoting the routinization of deviance into what may
be regarded as a "normal appearing round of life" (Birenbaum, 1970)
In so doing, the disabled person not only removes
(Birenbaum, 1971).
uncertainty and strain from his life, but restores his belief and
others' in the cultural formulae. How society handles the problem of
culturally induced psychological strain is made possible by the victimization of someone who was previously regarded as a competent member of
the social order (Garfinkel, 1956) and yet this victimization is
controlled in its intensity and scope so that the stigmatized person
and the normal individual are able to establish new shared meanings,
thereby creating reciprocal models of response between the two parties.
It can be seen that the disabled or handicapped person enters into
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negotiation with conventional persons to acquire needed resources,
including favorable definitions of self. The moral career of the
disabled can encourage acquired differences in personality and role
performance.
Certain kinds of affiliations and agencies devoted to
helping persons so characterized have extensive impact on their lives.
Just as certain relevant others will support voluntary deviance, as in
the case of those who live off crime, there are contacts among those
who are similarly disabled, producing support for certain styles of
Similarly, courts and prisons influence
life and rejecting others.
chances of the criminal while hospitals and
considerably the life
rehabilitation programs have a similar affect on many of the important
career choices made by the disabled.
DISABILITY AND LIFE CHANCES
Disability may be acquired in early childhood, even at birth, and
parental response to a disabled child may be quite different than to a
normal child. Moreover, it is very rare that a parent will have had
any experience at all with disability when the child is born and cannot
Often the
be a very good model of how to adapt to it for the child.
few months after
parents feel very guilty, at least during the first
The
finding out about the child's condition (Birenbaum, 1969).
presence of a handicapped child in the family may lead to a redefinition
of the child as one who is constantly "sick" and requiring a certain
This perspective often has a correlate to
kind of care and attention.
That the child does not require other kinds of social and intelit:
In
lectual stimulation that one would give to a nonhandicapped child.
such cases fewer demands are placed on children with disabilities while
other children in the family are expected to perform at a very unrealInevitably, the
istic level of competence (Richardson, 1969: 1050).
unchanged developmental capacities of the handicapped child remain
Such overoverlooked in order to treat the child as a sick child.
compensating efforts may also involve endless searches for cures or at
As a result the child develops a
least a more favorable diagnosis.
sense of self which may indeed be based on an appropriate response but
to a set of unusual expectations.
Children with physical disabilities will inevitably learn how the
culture evaluates his handicap no matter how protective parents might
be. Self deprecation or low self esteem, as mentioned earlier, seems to
be a common pattern in these cases, exacerbated in those instances when
there are no alternative sources of support or claims of competency
that can be made by the child. A child who is treated as being sick
may never be given the opportunity to prove himself and his impairment
may become the central focus in his life, resulting in an embracement
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of the role, rather than a normalization.
While most physical disability does not involve an actual disfigurement, it alters the person's body sufficiently to present a
discrepancy between what is expected and the actual image the person
Physical appearance seems to be a very important aspect of
presents.
cycle.
It is partimes in the life
face-to-face interaction at all
ticularly important during adolescence as a way of classifying and
rating others and oneself. It is likely, therefore, that toleration
of such differences would be lowest among this age cohort and
consequently, the physically disabled teenager would suffer a substantial reduction in self esteem.
Physical appearance is a basic source of information about others,
encounters between people.
A person with a
particularly during first
disability would then need to have a wide array of social skills available in order to offset the uncertainty and potential derogation during
Even when such a repertoire of social skills existed,
such an encounter.
the tendency among the nonhandicapped to avoid interaction with the
handicapped is very great. Thus, the lack of social skills possessed
by a disabled person may result from a lack of opportunity to develop
them, rather than an unwillingness or an incapacity to do so. Often,
those who seek out contact with the handicapped are social isolates
themselves and hardly make good models for disabled children or

adolescents (Richardson, 1969: 1055).
One adjustment to the presence of disability may be a kind of
overconformity (Merton, 1959) to other rules concerning identity, as
a way of giving the impression to others that one's handicap has not
led to a general neglect of personal appearance. The disabled person
may appear less "interesting" to others or dress in less flamboyant
colors than others as a way of saying that they can uphold some rules
if not all rules of identity. Accordingly, less visible aspects of
identity may also take on a conforming quality. Political and
religious attitudes may be very orthodox, least they frighten away a
potential friend. Overconformity may be an inevitable response of
those who must work so hard to be regarded as acceptable in various
social situations. Like the immigrant who becomes a superpatriot,
the disabled may become supercritical of individual differences, and
in so doing, demonstrate a loyality to a code of demeanor to which few
attention and hardly any live and die by anymore.
pay such strict
Formalization of relationships on the part of the physically disabled
may not only be a way of dealing with uncertainty but also a way of
receiving support for their claims to be treated with respect.
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Bach person with a physical disability also lives a life as a
deviant insofar as he belongs to collectivities made up exclusively of
those who are similarly situationed and to those made up predominately
of nonhandicapped persons. This dual membership among one's own kind
and among the others enables him to lead a "normal appearing round of
life," receiving support from each collectivity for the particular
kinds of claims that he seeks to make in each world. The person who
is successful in this adaptation seeks a careful balance between the
world of the stigmatized and the world of the normal. To some extent
this balance is predicated on the person's participation in the social
organizations and culture of the world of disability. The orderliness
found in this culture creates a useful parallel of conventionality from
which one can convey impressions of managing an intolerable situation,
thereby helping to reduce the now often unpredictable nature of the
conventional social order. Moreover, when accepting the primacy of
conventional social roles, those with stigmas assiduously avoid overinvolvement in the world of the stigmatized thereby minimizing the
extent to which normals will regard them as even more deviant, even in
the presence of other disabled individuals.
It is expected that involvement with others in such organizations
devoted to helping the disabled will be much greater when the disability
is first acquired than it will be at a later point in time. This is due
to the newness of the deviant role now being performed but also because
of the relief from uncertainty provided by organizations of others who
have gone through the same social transformation. Indeed, at this point
there may actually be a deviance "avowal" as a way of dealing with the
problem or uncertainty and also as a way of explaining what has happened
to produce this unexpected and undesired condition (Turner, 1972).
Learning new explanations help to reduce the sense of self-blame when
the discrepency with conventional persons is recognized (Birenbaum,
1969: 379).
Some disabled persons who continue to embrace the deviant
role will become formal leaders of these organizations, leading a life
devoted to getting nonhandicapped persons to be more sympathetic to the
handicapped, to get greater subsidization from the government for
retraining and rehabilitation, etc. By performing such conventional
lobbying activities for such unusual organizations they demonstrate a
"normal appearing round of life" not in spite of their handicap alone,
but also because of it as well. In a personal sense, those who perform
these leadership roles represent a continuous round of impression
management, as they move from embracement to normalization to denial
of the impact of the disability on their competency all in a single day,
all in a single effort to increase the effectiveness of their organizations. Keeping these organizations alive also enables them to keep
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their positions going and their style of adaptation; being identified
as a symbol of disability and adjustment may be a small price to pay
for the larger success of being able to direct such important organizations.
Not all the people who hold the major posts of these organizations
are handicapped themselves. During the past fifteen years, mainly
through the innovative programs of the various branches of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, there has been a vast proliferation of
the fields of rehabilitation and physical medicine. Amid the branches
and institutes of this federal agency, and with the advent of the
Poverty Program and its incorporation under the Office of Economic
Opportunity, there has come into being a vast organizational network
of "caretaker" agencies to perform the social control functions
premise is correct,
associated with disabilities: For if the initial
that voluntary conformists who followed all the recipes were then
rewarded with suffering, disappointment and derogation, then they
remain a potential threat to that culture and a source of discontent
in the society.
A new set of careers is created for those in the areas
of psychology, social work, prosthetics, physical medicine, etc., based
upon the belief that they can help the adjustment and/or rehabilitation
of the various segments of the American population who fall into the
general category of involuntary deviants.
The early 1960's marked a rapid increase in monies available not
only for research but for the development of "pilot" programs in many
areas of disability, including mental illness and mental retardation.
These agencies supported both innovative programs and provided capital
grants to establish new diagnostic clinics, rehabilitation centers,
sheltered workshops for vocational rehabilitation and/or the creation
of permanent opportunities for noncompetitive employment in voluntary
organizations. Many of these programs were modeled after such efforts
for the blind, particularly in the area of vocational rehabilitation
and workshops, which had been established in the 1930's, again with
federal subsidization in the form of exclusive contracts to these
facilities to provide mops and brooms assembled by the blind (Scott,
1969). Similar efforts gained acceptance after World War II as a way
of aiding returning disabled veterans.
Rehabilitation is a process which does not begin and end when the
disabled person has developed some way of managing the problems associated with functioning with a physical handicap or even with its
stigma. Organizations and their agents seek to impose their view of
the particular handicap upon the person who possesses it, ". . .deter-

mining the form which deviance will take" (Scott, 1965: 135).
Organizations and agencies possess a perspective on disability which
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in no small way affects the possible adaptations available for the
handicapped and the extent to which they can lead independent lives.
These agencies carry on the following activities:
First, they specify what personal attributes shall
be called handicaps. Second, they seek to identify
who conforms to their specifications.
Third, they
attempt to gain access to those whom they call
handicapped.
And fourth, they try to get those to
whom they gain access to change their behavior
so as to conform more closely to what the
institutions believe are their potentialities
(Freidson, 1965: 71).
Since many of these agencies provide important services to their
clients and thus make available a great deal in the way of resources,
they are able to get the disabled person to accept a certain definition
of himself, or at least say so in the presence of rehabilitation workers.
Attitudes of the disabled are of central importance in the perspectives
on handicaps held by such workers: For if they are to gain "acceptance"
of the handicap, if not embracement, and continued use of the agency for
services by the disabled person, then they must be certain that they
will not question their fate or be socially disruptive.
The segregated
character of these agencies-the fact that they are specialized by
disability when the help that is sought may have little
to do directly
with their physical impairment-promotes the development of a sense of
performing a deviant role.
In turn, lack of contact with those who are
not handicapped or who have nothing to do with the organized world of
rehabilitation, reinforces this sense of differentness since one is
judged and judges oneself by the company one keeps.
Thus, despite the general recognition in the culture that the
acquisition of physical disability is undesired and that the person who
has one is not responsible for it,
members of the community permit and
encourage the physically disabled person to take on a role built around
the disability, but more importantly, one which is regarded as creating
a spoiled identity for that unlucky person.
One may raise the question
why the lay community permits and encourages these specialized agencies
to promote this discreditation of one who was a voluntary conformist up
to this unfortunate and fortuitous event.
Do they not realize that they
may be next, since they have no recipes to prevent such an undesired
event from occurring?
The process of transformation from a voluntary conformist to an
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involuntary deviant reveals a profound underlying concern, the need for
a continuous restoration of the cultural and social order when threatened by anomalous situations, when things do not go according to the
way they were supposed to be. Conventional actors reaffirm their
belief in the cultural formulae by proferring a stigma which redefines
those discrepant individuals' past and future performances as no longer
accountable to that set of rules. The stigmatized are "removed" from
the conventional social order, and in so doing, the conventional members
re-establish the primacy of such cultural directives as "competent
people will avoid accidents." Disability, in itself, so long as it is
recognized as being outside the conventional social order, does not
threaten the members belief in the cultural formulae. More importantly,
it confirms them as everyday grounds for the judgment of normality;
failure to do so would call into question their own normality. The
reaffirmation of the validity of the cultural order does not end with
conventional members of society. Stigma profferment not only offers
the handicapped a new identification, albeit a deviant one; they accept
it because their belief in the cultural formulae has been threatened too.
CONCLUSION
A rather conservative outcome is suggested by this discussion of
the social construction of disability. Yet the disabled have only
recognized their differentness when they have been able to get others
to recognize their humanity. Their skill in establishing interpersonal
relationships provides an insight into the way we can be, enriching our
understanding of the fluidity of social life and the alterability of
social structure. The need to work to get what people need, despite
the reality of appearances, makes possible the acquisition of human
dignity and the development of a society in which it is fostered and
sustained.
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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the division within symbolic
interactionism today into the Iowa and Chicago Schools.
Taking the position that the differences are potentially
reconcilable, the authors present a study which demonstrates
some methodological extensions of the positivistic Iowa
School in conjunction with some of the insights of Blumer's
phenomenological Chicago School. The research employed a
quasi-experimental design, the aim of which was to investigate
the relationship between cognitive organization of behavior
and conditions of age and educational program. Subjects
were 117 three and four year old children observed
naturalistically in three preschool programs: a Montessori
Class, a Parent-Child Center, and a Day Care Center.
Quantitative and qualitative measures were obtained through
the instrumentation termed the Direct Object Count and by
classifying the acts themselves. Via cross-sectional and
longitudinal analysis significant differences were found on
indices of age and educational program. The overall findings
suggest that race and class are not sufficient to explain
such differences. The authors conclude that a large part
of the behavior of preschool children is determined by the
children themselves who appear quite capable of organizing
their behavior in accordance with the objective and symbolic
conditions with which they are presented.

Both as a theory and a methodology, symbolic interactionism stands second only to structural-functionalism in its
impact on sociologists. Yet, symbolic interactionism is
anything but a unified body of knowledge. There is a common
starting point inthe work of George Herbert Mead during the
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early 1920's. However, since the death of Mead, there has
been a substantial division within the work of symbolic interactionists. Meltzer and Petras (1972) have noted that there
are two distinct schools of symbolic interactionism.
The Chicago School is associated with the perspective of
Herbert Blumer. Bluner (1969) has tended to emphasize the
more subjective and phenomenological aspect of Mead's work.
He sees man as essentially spontaneous, unpredictable and
free. Blumer places a great deal of weight on the importance
of the "I" in formulating behavior, the "I" being impulsive,
almost animalistic. The data gathering techniques of Blumer
are built around observing and understanding behavior rather
than predicting or controlling it.
In contrast, the late
Manford Kuhn founded what has come to be called the Iowa
School of symbolic interactionism.
In contrast to the neoidealist philosophy of Blumer, Kuhn (1964) was much more
methodologically and positivistically oriented. Kuhn believed
that Mead's work and concept had to be operationalized if
they were to have any utility. Kuhn essentially did away with
the implied dialectic between the "I" and "me" by eliminating
the former as unmeasurable. By concentrating on the "me",
Kuhn was attempting to measure the relatively stable aspects
of social behavior.
Thus, the Iowa School of symbolic interactionism has
tended to emphasize the objectivistic, positivistic element
of Mead's work. In keeping with this concern, Kuhn and
McPartland (1972) developed the TST, or Twenty Statements
Test, which is in essence a measure of objective social self.
It assumes that an individual is capable of articulatina
social self and that self is basically a reflection of role
taking behavior. In its simplest form, the TST is a hiqhly
reliable, easily scored testament ot Kuhn's belief in the
measurability of self.
There is no particular unifying methodological orientation
in the Chicago School. In fact, it would appear that adherents
of this orientation are presently drifting into a kind of
phenomenological perspective, as indicated by the recent work
of Goffman (1974), in particular, on Frame Analysis, and
Cicourel (1974) on Cognitive Sociology.
It is the contention of this paper that symbolic interactionism, in particular the symbolic interactionism employed
in a kind of social welfare context, must push forward on
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charting the objective and measurable aspects of the social
environment. We feel that the kind of thinking that lead to
the development of the Twenty Statement Test can profitably
be extended to developmental aspects of childhood. However,
we also feel that the attempt to objectify should take into
account some of Blumer's contentions about the nature of the
symbolic act and the importance of language.
In particular, we propose some specific methodological
extensions of the Iowa School approach into the realm of the
symbolic environment of the child. This extension will be
facilitated by also incorporating some of the insights of
Herbert Blumer and the Chicago School. This methodology
involves an application of the Meadian distinction between
"play" and "game" and between significant and non-significant
symbols. We assume that classes of social acts can be
meaningfully charted and objectively measured.
Symbolic interactionism has until recently had little to
say about child development. It has essentially left this
area to developmental psychology and the corresponding emphasis
on intra-psychic change. Perhaps the reason for this failure
has been its inability to develop a parallel to the TST for
categorizing the social acts of children.
We believe such an instrument is now available. The rest
of this paper will illustrate how the use of two tools, the
Direct Object Count and second-order acts, can be utilized in
understanding the manner in which children interact with and
impose meaning on their social environment. We will report on
a research effort by one of the authors (Malon, 1975) which we
think demonstrates that greater specificity of concepts can be
achieved and objective measurement obtained without detracting
from the richness of Meadian theory. We hope that it will also
illustrate that it is possible to draw from the best of both
schools of symbolic interactionism in designing research which
has methodological and practical significance for a given
social problem area.
THE STUDY
The research involved the use of a quasi-experimental
design without random assignment of subjects to comparison
groups. Its purpose was to study the ways in which preschool
children organize their behavior. The subjects were 117
three and four year old children observed in the Fall of 1972,
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Spring of 1973 and again in the Spring of 1974. The subjects
were enrolled in three different types of preschool programs:
45 in a Montessori Class, 27 in a Parent-Child Center, and 45
in a Day Care Center. The children in the Montessori Class
(MC) were white and had parents relatively high in income and
education, while the children in the Parent-Child Center (PCC)
and Day Care Center (DC) were black and had oarents relatively
low in income and education. The educational programs also
differed in terms of the amount of learning structure and the
number of instructional objects present, with the MC having
the greatest amount of each. On the other hand, the PCC and
DC programs provided a greater amount of time in playful
interaction with people and play objects than did the Montessori Class. The MC and PCC subjects were observed at all
three time periods. The DC children could only be observed
at times 2 and 3.
The aim of the study was to investigate the relationship
between cognitive organization of behavior and two indices of
the conditions under which the behavior was organized: age
and educational program.
The research was guided by Mead's (1970: 77) dynamic
conception of human behavior in terms of acts which generate
objects and take on meaning during the process of interaction
with other persons and things. The concept of the organization of behavior was employed to capture the interplay of acts
generating objects. A person's behavior is viewed as organized
to the extent that it has meaning, the meaning being generated
by the culturally defined objects with which a person interacts.
More specifically, this focus on the interactional field
leads us to define the organization of behavior as the observable effect of information processing (Bruner, et al., 1971;
Miller, 1969). This can be measured empirically by the
qualitative and quantitative coding of the act, and this was
done in two ways: through an instrumentation termed the
Direct Object Count (DOC) and by classifying the acts
themselves.
INSTRUMENTATION
As a method of coding and measuring the amount of
information in the act, the Direct Object Count was developed
by Thomas McPartland and first introduced by Dobrofsky (1971)
and Kweskin (1971). The method consisted of counting every
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object indicated or referred to in each complete act of a
subject during a sample period, usually about 15 minutes.
This coding method is based on the logical assumption that
when children incorporate a growing number of objects or
attributes of objects in their acts, their behavior is
correspondingly more organized. This incorporation involves
the totality of the immediate physical and social environment.
Thus, the child constitutes the effective field of his action
by whatever he attends to, in whatever way he attends to it.
One example should help to clarify the counting procedure
where more complex acts are involved. The following is a
partial recording of a five year old subject's act which
ended up as an eighty four object act:
Child goes to bench, takes paste from box, asks
!?a ' "Where's the paper?"
(boy points to paper);
aes paper, circle pattern, oval pattern, scissors,
and brush; sets them on floor; gets up quickly and
runs to encil box, takes pencil and returns; places
pattern on paper, with pencil draws around pattern
. . . takes lid off paste jar, puts paste on brush,
brushes paste on back of paper, sticks oval paper
to background paper . .
The above act is one containing a number of sequences or
"nodes," all of which make up one large act. The final objectcount is an accurate measure of the act's complexity because
it represents the continuous, unbroken and uninterrupted
action in which all of the nodes are related to the end of the
act. A less complex version of the above act would be the
example of a child, who, after the second or third sequence,
joins a group of children playing with blocks. His lower
object-count could be taken as an accurate direct measure of
the lesser complexity of his act.
In the research of Dobrofsky and Kweskin and later by
Endress (1972), the DOC had been shown to discriminate between
the levels of behavioral organization of children up to
two years and of mentally retarded children. It was found
that the ability to implicate objects in acts grows with the
development of syntactical speech and to some extent with
age.
The second coding method involved the classification of
acts. The major classification entails the distinction
between what we term first-order and second-order acts. In
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setting forth this classification, we were guided by Vygotsky's
(1962: 116) observation that it is the lack of distance from
immediate experience which is the factor which accounts for
the peculiarities of child thought. Thus, a first-order act
is defined as one in which the child organizes his behavior by
acting with direct reference to objects. That is, the
concrete objects act as stimuli which evoke responses that
refer directly to the objects. A second-order act, on the
other hand, is by definition an act containing indirect
reference to objects. It should be clear that the symbol,
the heart of symbolic interactionism, is the mechanism for
indirect reference. The facility to act with indirect
reference to objects means that the child supplies an organization which the objects alone do not have. For example, the
child building a tower out of blocks is in charge of the blocks
and, therefore, farther removed from immediate experience than
another child who simply stacks the blocks with no indication
of some larger end-in-view. This notion of first and secondorder acts was influenced by Blumer's (1969: 9) distinction
between non-symbolic and symbolic acts.
Six categories of second-order acts were devised, each
characterized by some form of indirect reference to objects:
1) acts containing non-verbal indirect reference, 2) acts
containing verbal indirect reference, 3) acts organized by
use of verbal indirect reference, 4) acts in which intent is
signalled verbally, 5) joint acts, and 6) acts of role-play.
The second-order acts are defined as follows:
Non-verbal indirect reference is defined as that
feature of an act whereby the child leaves the
situation in which he is working at an act and
moves to a different place or a different person
to get an object which is used to facilitate the
ongoing act. e.g., Tina leaves work table, walks
to bench to retrieve jar of paste; returns to table
and applies paste to back of paper.
An act containing verbal indirect reference is
defined as an act in which the objects or attributes of objects verbally referred to are not
immediately present in the act. Verbal here
means syntactical utterance (more than one
English word in a recognizable English sentence).
e.g., Peering into an empty jar, Antoine says,
"That's where they put flies."
-107-

An act organized by verbal indirect reference is
an act containing a syntactical utterance which
refers to the motor act which follows. e.g.,
Tony blurts out while sitting at table, "We gonna
eat."
An act in which intent is signalled verbally is an
act preceded by a syntactical utterance which
consists of a self-reference followed by a statement
of intent to perform the act. e.g., After asserting,
"I'm making a tower," Jackie begins to stack blocks.
A joint act is an interdependent act in which the
child's behavior complements or is complemented by
another's behavior. e.g., Joey lifts cup toward
Jane who makes pouring motion with coffee pot.
An act of role-play is defined as an act in which
an identifiable pattern of role behavior can be
observed, and although one or more objects
associated with the role behavior are actually not
present, the child behaves as if they are present.
e.g., Lisa "feeds" doll with empty nursing bottle.
Data collection for the research involved the direct
observation and written recordig of each child's acts during
a fifteen-minute sample period.
Such "passive participant
observation," (Schwartz and Schwartz, 1955) although timeconsuming and costly, satisfies Blumer's (1969: 46) preferences
for the kind of investigation which "preserves the natural,
ongoing character of the empirical world."
We think it also
the intimate relation
empirical fact. This
measurement procedure

achieves what Blumer (1969: 177) terms
between the scientific concept and
kind of relationship, in which a
is logically derived from the theory

1It was not possible to obtain a formal, quantitative
measure of reliability in coding the observed acts. However,
during the trial period of observer training and during the
research observations, the observer had the opportunity to
periodically check his coding with an outside consultant and
judge. Dr. Thomas McPartland, who was largely instrumental
in developing or proposing most of the coding procedures,
served as consultant and judge.
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being tested, meets the criteria for construct validity
(Selltiz, 1959).
RESULTS
Direct Object Count. As a quantitative, objective
measure, the Direct Object Count (DOC) proved productive. The
DOC was found to discriminate between behavioral acts of
children from 33 to 63 months of age. Cross-sectional analysis
indicated that increases in the organization of behavior, as
measured by the DOC, occurred concomitantly with increases in
age. The Spearman rank order correlation coefficients between
age and the DOC in each of the three programs are as follows:
for Montessori children, .61; for Parent-Child, .64, and for
Day Care, .74.
Further analysis showed that this relationship
was not confounded by length of time in the program.
An attempt was also made to detect program effects as
measured by the DOC. It was expected that, since the
Montessori program placed greater stress upon exposure to
teacher instruction and instructional objects than did the
Parent-Child and Day Care programs, increases in the organization of behavior would be greater for MC than for PCC and DC
children. The findings tended to bear out that expectation.
While controlling for the effect of age by matching subjects
across programs, the Montessori children had significantly
higher object-counts than children in 2 the other two centers
during the early observation periods.
Interestingly, it was found that the assumption of the
compensatory education programs was accurate, namely, that
children from low-income, low-education families would enter
the programs at a disadvantage relative to children from highincome, high-education families. The MC children entered
their program with significantly higher object-counts and
simply maintained their advantage through the duration of the
program. However, for the PCC subjects, the differences
toward the middle (p = .27) and end (p = .09) of the program
year were no longer statistically significant. The DC

children, on the other hand, did not improve significantly
in relation to the ,!C children, although they did improve
2

Analysis of 26 matched subjects at Time 2 with the
Friedman two-way analysis of variance resulted in x 2 r=10.23
and p = .01.
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sufficiently to demonstrate a non-significant difference in
relation to the PCC children. 3 The most extreme difference
was that between the MC and DC subjects at time 2; in Table
1., that comparison is displayed along with time 3 data.
TABLE 1.

DIFFERENCES ON DOC BETWEEN MATCHED PAIRS
OF MC AND DC SUBJECTS AT TIMES 2 AND 3

Signsd

Time 2

+b
0

26
2

14
0

-

5 (p = .0002)

5 (p = .032)

MC

Time 3

asign Test
bMC is the point of comparison; thus, the values for the
DC subjects are obtained by applying the opposite sign to the
tabled values.
The above findings present an interesting challenge to
interactionist theory in trying to account for the observed
differences between children in the three programs. Since
there were initial differences, race and social class remain
plausible, competing explanations. However, the fact that the
differences did not remain constant over the brief span of
six or even three months suggests that race and class are not
the major bases for explaining the differences.
We would suggest that the most obvious explanation
involves the very process of interaction which links the children to the physical and social objects within each program.
Because there were differences between the programs in the
degree to which they stressed instruction and instructional
objects as opposed to play and play objects, these differences
appeared to elicit differences in behavior organization. The
Parent-Child subjects increased their object-counts midway
through the program year because of improvements in the level
of instruction and the increased availability of instructional
objects. While the Day Care Center made some such improvements,
it still preserved the high level of play activity, high
emphasis on sociability, and heavy expression of affect.
3

The Sign Test for differences between PCC and DC:

at

Time 2 with N = 20, p = .012; at Time 3 with N = 17, p = .50.
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It should be emphasized that the above between-grouos
analysis was not longitudinal, since it proved difficult to
observe the same matched nairs at each oint in time. However,
it was possible to obtain some longitudinal data within each
educational program, although most of the N's were small.
Table 2. shows whether the object-counts of subjects in each
center increased (+) or decreased (-) over observation
periods.
TABLE 2.

CHANGES IN THE DOC OVER THREE
OBSERVATION PERIODS IN EACH
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM
Observation Period
Time 1-3
Time 2-3

Center

Signa

Time 1-2

MC

+
0
+
0

7
1
4 (p = .27)
6
0

+

6

PCC

DC

(p =

.61)

0

5
1
2 (p = .23)
8

19
2
15 (p= .31)
6

1
5

1
7 (p =
18

(p

=

.29)

7
11

(p =

.50)

.13)

aSign Test
bDay Care subjects were not observed at Time 1.
Table 2. is a longitudinal presentation of the DOC over
time by type of center. The key comparisons are those between
Time 1 and Time 3 for MC and PCC and between Time 2 and Time 3
for DC. The data indicates a clear trend for the DOC to
increase in all three centers. One has to be cautious about
the findings in that the changes over time are not statistically
significant; the non-significance of the results being primarily
a function of the small number of cases in each center
available for longitudinal analysis. The trend in this data
does, however, support the contention that these programs can
effectively increase the DOC. Age alone could not account for
the sharp increase in the DOC in all centers in that only
six months elapsed between the Time 1 and Time 3 measures.
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Second-Order Acts. In our research, the second-order act
did not evidence the same discriminatory power as the Direct
Object Count. It was discovered that children performed
second-order acts at all age levels and that the frequency of
such acts did not increase with age. Only two of the six
second-order acts varied significantly with age. However, we
discovered that the second-order act may have some utility if
viewed as a qualitative measure.
Viewed thusly, this approach of classifying acts resulted
in two qualitative findings which we could not have gotten
from the more objective DOC. Younger children were found
significantly less likely (p = .02) to signal their intent
verbally than older children, with most of the variance
accounted for by the Montessori children. This finding would
lead us to conclude that in speech communities like the
Montessori Center, the tendency to signal intent verbally
comes later rather than earlier. The other finding was that
older children were significantly less likely (p = .004) to
perform an act of role-play than younger children. This adds
support to Mead's contention that the child progresses from
a "play" stage to a "game" stage. Through the pretending
involved in role-playing, the child mimics others until he
is able to perform without mimicking.
The second-order categories were also useful in detecting
differences in the behavior of children both within and between
the three programs. Coding and observing the children's acts
told us something about how the child's preschool world was
organized. It goes beyond a simple objective count of objects
and attempts to capture some of the qualities of the act. While
not as clear-cut in its interpretation as the DOC, it provides
some of the "richness" of everyday life. In this case, the
data suggests something about not only how the children
organized their behavior, but also about the ways in which the
programs themselves were organized.
Table 3., represents in summary form the changes within
each center over the three- and six-month observation periods
on performance of the second-order acts. It should be clarified
that in the "before-after" analysis, subjects were only included
who could be observed at both time periods, so the N's range
from 8 to 36.
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TABLE

3.

CHANGES

IT: PEPFOR"!MCE

OF SECOND-ORDFR

ACTS ACROSS OBSERVATION; PERIODS.
Act

Center

Observation Perioda
Time 1-2
Tire 1-3
Time 2-3

Non-Verbal
Indirect Reference

MC
PCC
DC

Decrease*
Increase
b

Increase
No Change

Increase*
Decrease
Increase

Verbal
Indirect Reference

MC
PCC
DC

Decrease
Decrease

Increase
Increase

Increase
Increase
Decrease

Organized by
Verbal Indirect
Reference

MC
PCC
DC

Increase
Decrease

Increase
Increase*

Increase
Increase*
Increase

Signals Intent
Verbally

MC
PCC
DC

Increase
Decrease

Increase
No Change

Increase
Increase
Increase

Joint Act

MC
PCC
DC

Decrease
Increase

Decrease
Increase*

Increase
Increase*
Increase

Role-Play

MC
PCC
DC

Decrease
Decrease*

Increase
Increase

No Change
Increase*
Decrease

Change is significant beyong .05 level.
aNs are as follows: Time 1-2:
Time 2-3:
MC = 36, PCC = 27, DC = 36.

MC = 12, PCC = 12;

bDay Care subjects were not observed at Time 1.
In the Montessori Center, children tended to show a consistently varied repertoire of acts through the duration of the
program. On only one category was there significant change
toward the end of the program year, namely, in performance of
acts with non-verbal indirect reference (p = .025).
It seems
noteworthy that increases in this non-verbal second-order
behavior did not coincide with any decrease in the amount of
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verbal indirect reference and it clearly appeared to result from
the concerted effort by the teacher and assistants to gradually
encourage completion of assigned tasks and experimentation with
instructional objects. Furthermore, the consistently minimal
amount of expressed affect and role-play along with a moderate
amount of joint acts, in combination with the above findinag,
suggests a pattern of predominantly task-oriented behavior.
The DC children showed a pattern of activities somewhat
different from that of the MC children, as the acts of the
former were not as varied, especially in the program's
beginning. By the end of the program year, however, there was
a significant increase in the kinds of second-order acts performed (p = .005).
Nevertheless, the DC children demonstrated
consistently high amounts of certain acts across time periods acts with verbal indirect reference, acts organized by verbal
indirect reference, joint acts, and acts expressing affect.
The tendency to signal intent verbally was minimal, and nonverbal indirect reference was almost non-existent. This
pattern of activity seemed to follow logically from proarari
conditions which emphasized sociability, play, vocabulary, and
group-centered and age-segregated instruction.
Of the three educational programs, the Parent-Child
Center showed the greatest amount of change. By the last
part of the program, the children showed significant increases
in the number and kinds of second-order acts (p = .02 and
.005), acts organized by verbal indirect reference (p = .008),
joint acts (p = .04), and acts of role-play (p = .05).
While
these children were more likely to be selected for the program
because of their need for compensatory education than Day Care
children, we cannot say with any certainty that the dramatic
change was evidence of the children's initial level of need.
In reality, the program itself was in somewhat of a "disadvantaged" state initially and only in the last three months
underwent a reorganization resulting in more space, more
staffing, and more play and instructional objects.
In actuality, over time the activities of the PCC children
came to resemble those of the DC children. As in the case of
the latter, the former's acts became more varied, more verbal,
4A non-second-order
category termed expression of affect
was included to note possible differences in the overt expression
of emotions such as anger, joy or irritation.
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and more sociable, with few acts of non-verbal indirect
reference and the sicxnalling of intention verbally. The
program conditions were sufficiently similar to those of the
Day Care Center to account for this pattern of behavioral
organization.
Difference within the separate programs obviously give
rise to differences between the programs. The brief description of the latter should sharpen our appreciation of the
discrimrinatory potential of the second-order acts as qualitative
categories. Table 4. gives a crude summary of the children's
performance of second-order acts in each of the three time
periods.
First of all, midway through the school year, the MC
children were performing significantly more second-order acts
than PCC children (p = .05) and more kinds of second-order
acts than DC and PCC children (p = .025 and .05).
Also, the
MC children were significantly more likely to perform an act of
non-verbal indirect reference and to signal their intent
verbally than were children in the other centers (p = .001).
By the end of the program year, there were no longer
differences in the number or variety of second-order acts.
However, DC and PCC children had not erased the differences
in performance of non-verbal indirect reference and in the
signalling of intent verbally. These two types of acts clearly
appeared to follow from the Montessori program's emphasis on
individually accountable behavior reinforced by the pattern in
which children consistently reported to an adult on completion
of assigned tasks. We do not know whether the greater
expression of the pronoun "we" rather than "I" among the DC
and PCC children is an indication of a "restricted" language
code (Bernstein, 1969) with its source in the social structure
of the intimate community of others. We do know, however,
that there was no observable structural condition such as was
present in the Montessori program which could encourage the
children to verbally signal their individual intentions.
Finally, in keeping with its emphasis on play and sociability, at midway through the program the DC children were
5

The data in Table 4. is cross-sectional and not intended

to be interpreted as longitudinal.
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TABLE 4.

SUMMARY OF SECOND-ORDER ACTS PERFORMED
AT THREE OBSERVATION PERIODS.

Center

Act

Observation Perioda
Time 3
Time 2
Time 1
Highb
Moderate

Non-Verbal
Indirect Reference

Moderate
Moderate
Low

High
Moderate
Low

High
High

High
High
High

High
High
High

c

Verbal
Indirect Reference
Organized by
Verbal Indirect
Reference

MC
PCC
DC

Moderate
Low

High
Low
High

High
High
High

Signals
Intent Verbally

MC
PCC
DC

Low
Low

High
Low
Low

High
Moderate
Moderate

Joint Act

MC
PCC
DC

Moderate
Low

High
Moderate
High

High
High
High

Low
Moderate

Low
Low
Moderate

Low
High
Low

Role-Play

aN's are as follows: Time 1:
MC = 12, PCC = 12; Time 2:
MC = 36, PCC = 18,
MC = 45, PCC = 27, DC = 4 5; Time 3:
DC = 36.
High - score is
bTable values are defined as follows:
above the median for sample group; Moderate - score is between
the first quartile and the median; Low - score is at or below
the first quartile.
cDay Care subjects were not observed at Time 1.
significantly more likely than both MC and
a joint act (p = .01), an act of role-play
Toward the end
express affect (p = .001).
DC group no longer surpassed the PCC qroup
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PCC groups to perform
(p = .05), and to
of the proaram, the
in performance of

joint acts and acts or role-play, although they continued to
significantly out-perform both groups in the expression of
affect (p = .01) and the MC group in joint acts (u = .025).
Interestingly, the Parent-Child children had by then come to
out-perform the other two groups in acts of role-play, having
become accustomed to new surroundings, new classmates, and a
larger assortment of familiar objects.
CONCLUSIONS
Methodological. In keeping with a symbolic interactionist
orientation, the research findings tend to demonstrate, on the
one hand, the power of objective events to affect the behavior
of preschool children, and on the other, the power of the
children themselves to organize their own behavior, thereby
giving meaning to it. In this orientation, we have not lost
sight of either of the key issues in the social psychology
of human action, the person acting on his physical and social
environment and being influenced by the objective conditions
in his environment. Thus, we would conclude with Blumer
(1969: 11) that to understand our preschool subjects, we had
"to identify their world of objects," and with Mead (1970: 70),
we had to identify the "programs of action" under which the
children would generate the objects of their own action. And
finally, we would agree with Kuhn that one can measure such
phenomena.
The methodology employed here has been pragmatic and
straightforward. We believe the concepts have "logically clear
and meaningful referents," and that the operational tools are
sufficiently naturalistic to allow for direct interpretations
and programmatic remedies (Blumer, 1969).
In a study of child
development, this methodological orientation allows us to
treat the middle ground between the mentalistic denotation
of the concept intelligence and the other extreme of environmental determinism. In this endeavor, we are guided by Mead's
(1970: 39) injunction, "to state the intelligence of the
individual in terms which will enable us to see how that
intelligence is exercised, and how it may be improved."
Our measures of cognitive development, the Direct Object
Count and the second-order acts placed us in direct touch with
the child's physical and social world. We found that the DOC
correlated highly with age (33 months to 63 months) yet also
varied with type of preschool program. The second-order acts,
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as indicators of certain qualities inherent within the act,
provided us with a description of how children organized their
behavior within the three educational centers.
Program. In attempting to assess the differential effects
of three types of preschool programs, it was discovered that the
programs did make a difference and that the differences were
greatest for the black, low-income children attending the
Parent-Child and Day Care Centers. In spite of initial
differences, three major trends were noted over the brief
spans of three and six months: (1) the behavior of all
three groups became more organized; (2) the groups became
developmentally more alike; and (3) certain differences between
groups persisted, coinciding with program differences.
While social class or other background factors could have
accounted for the initial differences between groups, clearly
their possible effects are not linear and constant, since they
diminished over time. To the contrary, the above trends
suggest that once the child enters the confines of the
preschool setting, the school rather than the home appears to
make the major difference in his cognitive development.
From another perspective, the finding of initial differences
does not allow programmers in compensatory education to rest on
the assumption that "disadvantaged" children require special
treatment to compensate for their developmental deficits.
True, it has been found that low-income persons learn best by
doing; that is, through motor expression (Riessman, 1964).
However, we saw no evidence that the low-income children in
our study required special treatment. In fact, children in
all three centers learned by doing. This is not surprising;
it simply follows logically from the age-related learning needs
of these children.
However, in observing program conditions, our impression
was that the PCC and DC programmers tried so hard to overcome
the children's presumed learning deficits that they unwittingly
underestimated the real capabilities of their low-income
subjects. An overemphasis on motor expression through play and
group sociability as well as a too generalized stress on
vocabulary had the effect of not fully challenging the
children's capability for behavior which is task-centered and
personally and syntactically accountable. Thus, the differences
which persisted between the MC, PCC and DC children on the DOC
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and certain second-order acts relate directly to program
capability rather than to differences in learning capability
between the groups.
The MC children persisted in showing higher objectcounts and a pattern of second-order acts which included high
amounts of non-verbal indirect reference and signalling of
intent verbally. This pattern of behavior related directly
to program conditions which encouraged individual, taskcentered effort and personal accountability through individual
and group instruction and heavy use of instructional objects.
Children in the MC program, no less than children in the PCC
and DC programs, simply demonstrated the capability of adapting
effectively to the kind of preschool program presented to
them.
We do not suggest that Montessori education is superior to
that of a Parent-Child or Day Care Center. We simply suggest
that the developmental outcomes obtained by the Montessori
program in our study can be achieved in other preschool
programs to the extent that programmers value them. They can
be achieved by simply varying the conditions which relate to
what we called the Direct Object Count and second-order acts.
Because the second-order acts have an internal logic which
makes them naturalistic and situation-based, changes in the ts
relate to changes in the social situations, that is, in the
program conditions. If programmers in the Parent-Child and
Day Care Centers were to choose outcomes similar to those
of the Montessori Class, we believe that the persistent
differences found between children in the three centers
could be eliminated entirely by the following changes in
program conditions:
(1) more exposure to a variety of
instructional objects; (2) less emphasis on group-centeredness
with consequently more emphasis on individual performance;
(3) more emphasis on syntactical accountability; and (4)
provision of more social objects through mixing children of
different ages and through more adult direction and assistance.
These recommendations are straightforward suggestions for
enlivening the interactional field of the child. Out of the
resulting increase in program organization should come an
increase in the child's own behavioral organization. In
Meadian fashion Asbell (1972: 156) has captured this conclusion
as he suggests:
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It may be better to
find out what makes
eagerness to learn,
curiosity, and then
almost any measure,

forget about intelligence and
each child excercise his inborn
feed his individual style of
watch his intelligence, by
expand.
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THE "SIGNIFICANT OTHER" IN MARITAL AND FAMILY THERAPY*
Nathan Hurvitz
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ABSTRACT
The significant other (SO) is derived from the social behaviorism of G. H. Mead which is comparable to contemporary cognitive
behaviorism. The SO is defined as an analytical concept by examining
interaction in social acts; it includes attributes associated with
the family member's role-reciprocity, meanings, affect, self-concept
and modeling; and it is associated with concepts such as transformation, attribution and social interchange. The process by which
the therapist becomes an SO to the family members individually and
jointly, and how he or she utilizes transformation, attribution and
social interchange are outlined.

The "significant other" (SO) has become an important concept in
marital and family therapy that conceives of the family as a social
system. This phrase, which was introduced into psychiatric, psychological and sociological literature by Sullivan (1940, 1953a, 1953b,
1954), is derived from Mead (1934) and Cooley (1902).
Sullivan's concept of the SO appears to refer to those whom the
individual utilizes to form his or her self-concept, primarily the
mother. Thus the individual's self-evaluation is based on the
"reflected appraisals" of others, or on his or her perception of
others' evaluation of him or her. Subsequent sociological investigators noted that this concept did not describe all the possible
attributes of the SO, particularly those in which they had a theoretical interest. Consequently Gerth and Mills (1953), Shibutani (1955)
and others proposed additional attributes. Their work culminated in
the contribution of Kuhn (1964) and his concept of the "orientational
other" which had four general attributes and became the basis for
investigations that refined the sociological value of this concept.
Clinicians utilize the concept of an SO informally in somewhat
*This is a revised version of a paper with the same title presented
at the annual meeting of the American Association of Marriage and
Family Counselors in San Francisco, CA, September, 1977.
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comparable ways to refer to someone who is important to the person in
therapy--although one refers to the dog as a SO (Bikales, 1975).
However, clinicians have not attempted to define the SO and develop
it into an analytical instrument and utilize it for assessment and
treatment in clinical practice. Such an effort is past due and an
attempt is made here to initiate such an activity to further develop
the symbolic interactionist perspective of marital and family therapy
(Hurvitz, 1967, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1975).
A. The Interaction Processes and the Significant Other
In accord with Mead's social behaviorism, understanding people
in interaction requires an examination of the social act, one in which
the actors take account of each other. A social act implies the
actual or symbolic presence of another with whom each individual engages in mutual adjustment (Mead, 1938). Under certain conditions
the other becomes a significant other.
The Interaction Processes
Observation of social acts in the natural and clinical settings
suggests the operation of the following processes between individuals:
1. The behavior required to effect a particular plan associated
with the individual's values and goals. The behavior, which may not
be associated with values and goals in an immediate sense, appears in
the complementarity of the actors' role-performances and role-expectations based on their statuses. The individuals interact on the
basis of "dialectical reciprocity," that is, reciprocity is not equal
and/or opposite in cost, duration, amount, etc., but is based on the
meaning of their interaction or their definition of the situation to
maintain or to achieve justice, balance, equity, etc. The actors
enable and constrain each other's behavior by the contingencies of
reinforcement, the rewards and punishments, they present to each
other. Their interaction usually occurs in customary, repetitive
situations, and occasionally in unique situations.
2. The development of common meanings by assuming the perspective of the other through primarily verbal communication. The learned
meanings then mediate the continuing learning process and are simultaneously modified by it. The meaning of people, processes, events
and things for the individual is revealed in the way he or she behaves
and in the feelings he or she displays toward them (Blumer, 1969).
Behavior is organized into social acts when one individual's meaning
evokes the desired meaning in another. Behavior is therefore a
function of the meaning of the situation to each actor. The fact that
the interactors impute and infer the same meaning to a message does
not necessarily mean they will cooperate in their continuing interaction.

3. The affect or feelings displayed with and toward the behavior demonstrated in their role-relationship. When role-performances
and role-expectations are complementary, role-hierarchies are similar,
and role-reciprocity occurs voluntarily and regularly, the actors
achieve positive meanings. They therefore have affirmative feelings
about themselves and the other, and acceptance, comfort and ease
ensue. If these conditions do not exist, negative feelings about
themselves and the other, and rejection, discomfort, and stress ensue.
The affect can be strong or weak, positive or negative; it can change
from strong to weak, from weak to strong, and from positive to negative and negative to positive.
4. The effort to present oneself in such a way as to attempt to
maintain or achieve desired self-esteem which each expects the other
to perceive and support. Each actor has a self-concept and a concept
of the other. In addition, each actor's concept of the other is
mediated by his or her own self-concept and the way he or she presents
himself or herself in different situations (Goffman, 1959). Whether
or not the actors share the same perception and interpretation of their
own and the other's self-concept is an important determinant of their
definition of the situation.
5. Their modeling activities in which one or both imitate
and/or serve as a model for the other during some periods of their
relationship and some phases of their interaction in the social act.
Such modeling may be an aware or unaware activity. Modeling or imitation is a basic form of social learning, and is the way language,
role-behavior, values and goals, ideas and ideals, affect and expressive behaviors, etc., are learned.
The Attributes of the Significant Other
These processes occur in the interaction between individuals in
a social act. Thus the attributes of the SO can be outlined as
follows: the SO is someone who:
1. Participates in functional role-reciprocity with an other
based on their statuses;
2. Holds meanings which are or become important to the other,
whose meanings are or become important to the individual;
3. Has affective or expressive significance for and/or an
affective relationship with the other, who has affective or expressive
significance for and/or an affective relationship with the individual;
4. Participates in forming and modifying the other's self-concept; and attempts to maintain or achieve desired self-esteem;
5. Serves as a model for the other by his or her behavior,
thoughts and feelings, and/or utilizes the other as a model.
These attributes of the SO are comparable to those outlined by
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Kuhn (1964). However, Kuhn did not report the reciprocity that exists
between SOs, several of the attributes he proposed are the same but
expressed in different ways, one is a general statement that includes
a similar attribute, and other attributes suggested here are omitted
by Kuhn.
Becoming a Significant Other
Individuals become SOs to each other when they display most of
the attributes most of the time in their interaction, and the attributes associated with meanings, affect, modeling and self-concept
become more important than the attribute associated with role-reciprocity. They develop the type of role-relationship that enables them to
make and fulfill plans associated with their values and goals which
are derived from and are the basis for common meanings. These are the
source of similar perceptions and interpretations of themselves and
others; thus they profess the same reality. And if and when dialectical reciprocity is disturbed, they redefine and reconstruct their
reality in the same way. Since the family members maintain role-reciprocity and hold the same meanings, they offer each other mutual
reinforcements that foster their affective relationship and commitment.
This relationship sustains and enhances their self-concepts and each
regards the other as a desirable model for himself or herself and/or
others.
B. Transformation, Attribution and Social Interchange
We have examined the processes that occur in social acts and
derived from these the attributes of the SO. Each of these attributes
is exercised differentially according to the type of activity, relationship, etc., of the SOs. Each individual interacts with the other
according to his or her own unique meanings and according to his or
her distinctive stance and style. The individual's meanings are
formed in a process of continued learning, and are evidenced in the
processes of transformation, attribution, social interchange, and
others.
Transformation, attribution and social interchange are not
associated with any particular theoretical orientation in social
psychology; they can be utilized in the symbolic interactionist
approach. Transformation, attribution and social interchange are ways
of interpreting and explaining how the actors take account of each
other in social acts. These activities are based on the individual's
cognitive ability to communicate with himself or herself. As such it
is particularly appropriate to apply these concepts to the interaction
of SOs as defined in this paper.
The processes of transformation, attribution and social interchange occur with SOs and others who are not SOs. Those who are not
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SOs participate in the processes partially, intermittently and inconsistently, and the other does not expect that the relationship will be
different. Those who have become SOs are SOs because the individuals
involved initiated and maintained their relationship by participating
in the processes fully, regularly and consistently, and expecting
each other to continue to do so.
Transformation implies fulfilling a commitment to continuing a
relationship; attribution requires empathetic role-taking that enables each SO to better read the other; and social interchange requires effort to maintain reciprocity, equity, justice, balance, etc.
Those individuals who meet and do not care to exert the effort to
overcome the social inertia that prevents them from undertaking
transformation and symbiotic attribution and from engaging in reciprocity, equity, justice, balance, etc., do not become SOs to each
other.
The concepts of transformation, attribution and social interchange are related by their significance as ways to perceive and
evaluate the SOs' interaction and relationships. These concepts are
integrated by the fact that a slip, lapse, misunderstanding, etc., in
social interchange causing a denial of reciprocity, of equity or
justice, may be attributed to evil intent, to an oversight, to
misinformation, etc. The individual may or may not respond to each
attribution by transformation.
Transformation
Transformation is associated with the individual's "presentation
of self" (Goffman, 1959); it is the fulfillment of a "deficit" of one
attribute of the SO by offering a "surplus" of another attribute as
these appear in the family members' interaction. Informally the
process is called "making it up to him (her)" when one family member
."fails" another one in some way. That is, if a breakdown in rolereciprocity prevents one family member, for instance the husband-andfather, from performing his roles so as to fulfill the wife-andmother's role-expectations, the spouses can maintain their relationship because the husband-and-father offers a "surplus" of affection
or he attempts to raise the wife-and-mother's self-esteem by enhancing her self-concept. Transformation enables effective and
satisfying family interaction to occur despite disturbances in their
dialectical reciprocity. Transformation to maintain reciprocity
between dyad members required to effect a particular plan and/or the
values and goals with which it is associated is accomplished by
mutual modification of various combinations and permutations of
behavior, meanings and feelings.
The concept of transformation is also applicable to the demonstration of power in the family. Whereas the husband-and-father
customarily has power over the wife-and-mother because he earns the
livelihood and controls the family income, the wife-and-mother may
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exercise her power by derogating his sexual performance even though
she participates in intercourse; and she may also exercise her power
by withholding expressions of affection or by declaring her changed
perception of him. And whereas the parents have power over their
children, the children may demonstrate their power by rejecting their
parents' values and goals and by choosing non-parental adults as
models.
Attribution Theory
Interaction also proceeds on the basis of the SOs' attribution
of motives and intent to themselves and to the other. Theories of
attribution are concerned with concepts and notions about how people
explain their own and the others' behavior, thoughts and feelings
(Heider, 1958; Bem, 1972; McCall, 1970; Kelley, 1973) and thereby
construct reality for themselves (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Some
attempt to explain how a human, as a "naive scientist," ascribes
causes to particular actions, events, processes, etc. They attempt
to explain how the individual's understanding of personal and societal
motivation and causes of behavior, thoughts and feelings are applied
in specific situations to enable him or her to interact effectively
with others (Ellis, 1962). They also attempt to explain how individuals form hypotheses about the people, things, places, processes,
etc., with which and in which they are involved, and how the individual's hypotheses affect his or her behavior, thoughts and feelings
in subsequent similar situations.
The present approach to attribution theory is related to the
individual's self-perception and to his or her self-concept. It is
also identified with the way he or she evaluates his or her own
qualities, characteristics, etc., in relation to the different situations in which he or she has interacted with others and the different
others with whom he or she has interacted in these situations. And it
is also identified with the way the individual's self-perceptions
determine his or her continuing behavior, thoughts and feelings, including his or her locus of control (Rotter, 1954). Attribution
theories recognize that there are non-scientific and personal modes of
perceiving and interpreting reality in interaction. These include
concepts of primacy and recency. That is, in some instances that
which was done first explains current behavior; and in other situations that which was done most recently explains current behavior.
Other aspects of attribution are associated with situational or
psychological explanations of behavior. Ordinarily an individual uses
situational factors to explain his or her own behavior, thoughts and
feelings, and psychological constructs to explain the other's behavior,
thoughts and feelings.

Social Interchange
Social interchange theories have their roots in behaviorism and
are related to the experimental analysis of behavior and to concepts
of reinforcement. The findings of psychologists and sociologists
utilizing social interchange theories were made in field and laboratory experiments (Burgess & Bushnell, 1969; Chadwick-Jones, 1976;
Hamblin & Kunkel, 1977). These theories are also related to concepts
of cognitive behaviorism. The central elements of these theories that
are pertinent here are those that declare that the causes of the
interactors' behavior are to be found in their interaction itself.
One of the first concepts a child learns is fairness. When he
or she can recognize and complain, "That's not fair!" in his or her
interaction with others, the child has assumed distinctly human
concerns and qualities. Family members desire fairness in their
interaction and it is the basis upon which they often determine
whether a problem or conflict exists.
The issue of fairness between SOs is related to issues of power,
threats and promises. Power, in studies of marital and family interaction, is customarily regarded as the ability of one person, Jack,
to make another person, Jill, do what Jack wants Jill to do, or to
prevent Jill from doing what Jack does not want Jill to do. However,
there is a tipping point in the exercise of power. If Jack exerts
power upon Jill to do X, Jill may leave the relationship and in this
way demonstrate her power over Jack. It is a common situation in
marital therapy for a husband who has exerted his power over his wife
in various ways for a long time to come to the therapist and request
him or her to get back his wife who finally left him precisely because
he exercised his power over her--until she decided she had enough and
left him.
Social interchange, which is defined differently by various
social psychologists, embodies the concept that interaction between
members of a social system involves mutual and reciprocal role-performances and role-expectations, rights and duties, privileges and
obligations, rewards and costs, etc. It also embodies the concept
that the SOs must benefit in some way from their interaction in order
to maintain their relationship or the one who loses will leave it and
destroy it. In each instance something in the form of material
things, behavior, thoughts or feelings is given in return for something in the form of material things, behavior, thoughts or feelings
that has been received.
A norm of social interchange guides the give and take of interaction in general and is applied to specific situations to determine
whether the particular exchange is "fair." The norm of interchange
is based on many different elements that are called into play in
various situations. Two elements that are called into play often are
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transformation based on the definition of the situation and social
exchange. Social interchange includes such concepts as the norm of
reciprocity, distributive justice, equity, balance, and social
exchange. Following are brief explanations of these concepts:
a. The norm of reciprocity "makes two interrelated, minimal
demands: (1) people should help those who have helped them, and (2)
people should not injure those who have helped them" (Gouldner, 1960,
p. 171).
b. Distributive justice proposes that rewards and costs which
are evaluated according to material goods or services or abstract
principles are presumed to be proportional. That is, the greater the
rewards the greater the costs or effort. When an individual evaluates
his or her own cost-reward balance as equal to the other's cost-reward
balance, a state of equity exists. If the cost-reward balances are
not equal, the individual who believes he or she has been taken advantage of will attempt to re-establish the balance. The concept of
justice comes into play when the SOs recognize the injustice in the
imbalance, and attempt to distribute justice equally on the basis of
each member's rewards and costs (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Homans, 1961).
c. Balance theory states that people learn to believe that
badness causes unhappiness and is punished; and goodness causes
happiness and is rewarded. SOs therefore may expect that their interaction will be guided by goodness which will be rewarded and thereby
cause mutual happiness. Such balance is justice (Heider, 1958).
d. Social exchange proposes that interpersonal behavior is
oriented to ends that can be achieved only by relationship with and
through interaction with others, and the individual attempts to adapt
particular means to achieve agreed upon ends (Blau, 1964).
Each of these theories or concepts of social interchange is
somewhat different from each of the others; however, their differences
are not significant in the clinical approach and setting. What is
important is the general concept of social interchange which enables
the therapist to assess behavior and interaction in such a way that
something can be done to change it.
Other Concepts
Other concepts and principles of social psychology that can be
applied in the clinical setting to understand and change the relationship and interaction between SOs include the following: relative
deprivation, level of aspiration, status consistency and inconsistency, anticipatory socialization, cognitive dissonance, vigilance
hypothesis, congruity, and similar concepts that have an interactional aspect.
A recent contribution to an understanding of interpersonal
interaction and the manner in which individuals display "cognitive
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recognition" of the other is described by the concept "opening encounters" by Schiffrin (1977, p. 679). Another recent contribution is
the concept of "aligning actions" introduced by Stokes and Hewitt to
describe "largely verbal efforts to restore or assure meaningful
interaction in the face of problematic situations of one kind or
another" (1976, p. 838). Aligning actions, according to Stokes and
Hewitt, are reported in:
A substantial body of literature (that) has been developed
within the symbolic interactionist tradition that focuses upon
various tactics, ploys, methods, procedures and techniques found
in social interaction under those circumstances where some feature of a situation is problematic. Mills' (1940) concept of
motive talk, Scott and Lyman's (1968) discussion of accounts,
Hewitt and Hall's (1973) and Hall and Hewitt's (1970) quasi-theorists, and Hewitt and Stokes' (1975) disclaimers are among the
contributions to this literature. In addition, some of Goffman's
work (1959; 1967; 1971) addresses itself to a similar set of
issues, and McHugh's (1968) analysis of the concepts of the
definition of the situation is pertinent to the question of how
people deal with problematic occurrences (1976, p. 838. Italics
in original).
The SOs' interaction is associated with types of situations which
facilitate or constrain the individuals to behave in characteristic
ways and to display appropriate associated feelings. Thus, understanding the SOs' interaction also requires an analysis of situations.
Progress is being made in developing ways to analyze situations which
may also be applicable in the clinical setting (Frederickson, 1972;
Krause, 1970; Siporin, 1972).
This analysis of the SO is identified with cognitive behavior
modification methods since it recognizes the importance of learning
the family members' meanings in order to change their behavior,
thoughts and feelings which is done by cognitive restructuring or
cognitive relabeling. This analysis also suggests the importance of
each family member in forming, directing, etc., his or her own behavior,
thoughts and feelings, and that of his or her SOs as well. Thus, each
family member can be taught to function as a therapist for himself or
herself and for his or her SOs, an activity to which the professional
therapist introduces him or her and which the professional therapist
guides.
C.

The Therapist Becomes a Significant Other
In the clinical setting the therapist sees spouses and family
members who are SOs who once may have had the type of role-reciprocity
that enabled them to make and fulfill plans. Now they no longer share
common meanings, they do not have similar perceptions and
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interpretations of themselves and others, and they do not profess the
same reality. When their dialectical reciprocity is disturbed they do
not redefine and reconstruct their reality in the same way. Since
they do not hold the same meanings and do not offer each other mutual
reinforcements their affective relationship disintegrates. The disintegration of their affective relationship undermines their self-concepts and each rejects the other as a model for himself or herself
and/or others.
Some family members whose relationship changed from affirmative
to negative want to re-establish their affirmative relationship. They
want to modify each interaction process because failure to maintain an
affirmative relationship denies the individual's value as an object of
affection and as a model, which undermines his or her self-concept.
This condition not only has a negative effect on the SOs but it also
has considerable negative public attention and interest.
These family members come to us for help. How does the concept
of the SOs presented here assist us to help them? It can be applied to
assess, explain and change the family members' interaction according to
concepts and constructs of transformation, attribution, social interchange, and others, so that each one can change his or her own and his
or her SO's behavior, thoughts and feelings. It can also be applied to
indicate how the therapist becomes and functions as an SO in his or
her relationship with the family members.
The therapist becomes an SO to each family member as an individual and to all the family members as a group by joining the family
members' interaction in each aspect of the interaction processes to
facilitate the development of all the processes. Every individual has
the potential for becoming an SO to every other individual with whom
he or she interacts. The waitress and diner, the soldier and enemy
civilian, teacher and student, physician and patient, employer and
secretary, clergyperson and congregation member, salesperson and customer, caseworker and client--each may participate in interaction which
may lead to their becoming SOs. It is the therapist's awareness of
this possibility and the knowledge that this relationship can be used
constructively that makes the experience of the therapist and client
different from the other potential SO relationships. The therapist's
awareness that he or she can be a more effective helper by becoming an
SO motivates him or her to foster the development of this relationship.
The Therapist and Role-Reciprocity
The therapist's potential for becoming an SO is found in factors
that pre-exist his or her contact with the families who come to him or
her for help. One of these is community recognition of the therapist
as a professional with certain privileges and responsibilities. These
are based on and determined by his or her professional training,
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license or certificate to practice, membership in professional and
academic associations, compliance with the ethical code of his or
her profession, and participation as an informed professional in
community activities and events that are related to his or her field
of competence.
Other factors that pre-exist the relationship with his or her
clients are the therapist's listing in the telephone book, the
neighborhood and building in which his or her office is located, his
or her reputation in the community, and his or her referral sources.
The preferred referral source is the therapist's national and international reputation; the next most preferred referral source is a
satisfied client; and the next most preferred referral source is a
physician, clergyman, attorney, or other professional, who refers his
or her own patient, parishioner or client to the therapist while the
patient, parishioner or client is sitting in his or her office. Also
desirable are referrals from the county psychological, medical,
marriage counselors', social workers', etc., organizations that maintain a referral service, or from a college or university. These
sources do not know the therapist personally, and his or her name may
be one of two or three given to the caller. The therapist is least
likely to become an SO prior to his or her face-to-face contact with
the family members if they found his or her name in the Yellow Pages
of the telephone book.
The therapist's becoming an SO is facilitated by the appropriate
setting in which he or she offers his or her services. The therapist's office should state that it is the workplace of a competent
professional, and also foster comfort and relaxation. Diplomas and
licenses help reassure the family members that they have come to
someone who has the required credentials. Carpeting, drapes, pictures,
lights, furniture, etc., should have quality, but the therapist
should be able to work with a family without becoming disabled with
fear that a child will vomit, urinate, or defecate on his precious
material objects. The therapist's professional library of books and
journals often inspire awe in a layperson.
The family members' initial contact with the therapist is made
on the basis of his or her status as an expert. The therapist's
status, and the family members as persons who require his or her
services, becomes the basis for his or her role-reciprocity with the
family members, individually and jointly. The therapist informs the
family members what they will do, what they will talk about, and how
they will talk about it. He or she tells them his or her procedures
and what he or she expects from them. By his or her differential
interest in the information, behavior, thoughts and feelings the
family members report and display, he or she reinforces them to
produce that which he or she regards as important. He or she also
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tells them what to expect from him or her when he or she defines his
or her procedures, and when he or she tells them what he or she
regards as relevant. For instance, when the therapist requests permission to tape the therapy session or when he or she tells the
family members, "I'll keep confidential whatever information you
share with me," he or she defines their role-reciprocity.
The therapist and family members enable and constrain each
other's behavior by their questions and answers and by their exchanges which the therapist examines with the family members. The
family members learn that the therapist's response to anger, tears,
requests for help, etc., is not always the same as their friends'
responses. When he or she does not respond to the family members in
the accustomed, socially defined way, they do not know how to behave
in the therapy situation. The therapist uses this ambiguity of the
therapy situation to guide the family members in an examination of
their behavior, thoughts and feelings in a way they may never have
experienced before.
Even though some of these situations are unpleasant the family
members perceive that they are potentially helpful. This interaction
also shapes the behavior of the family members, they learn the processes utilized by the therapist, and a particular kind of role-relationship is established. Their continuing interaction creates social
acts which have the potential for recreating the participants in these
social acts.
The therapist projects unconditional positive regard (Rogers,
1957) which has been likened to the quality of a succoring parent and
good friend. The therapist's unconditional positive regard and his
or her "understanding" of the family members is therefore a positive
reinforcer which encourages the family members to offer more information and feedback. Unconditional positive regard is a reinforcer
because people who have demonstrated such a relationship in the past
gained the desired behavior, thoughts and feelings from the individual. When the therapist projects unconditional positive regard he or
she fosters the likelihood that the family member will display desired
behavior, thoughts and feelings. At the same time the therapist must
be aware that his or her solicitous concern and interest may reinforce
the particular behavior he or she is responding to and must guard
against this likelihood.
It cannot be assumed that a relationship marked by unconditional
positive regard, non-possessive warmth, accurate empathy, emotional
congruence, genuineness, and similar qualities is by itself sufficient
to bring about needed changes in behavior, thoughts and feelings.
Change is brought about by effort and trial. The emotional environment
created by the therapist encourages effort and trial in four ways: the
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family member (a) perceives the therapist as someone who is competent
to help and who is committed to the family members, therefore his or
her suggestions to attempt change are more readily accepted than
similar suggestions by others; (b) accepts the therapist's explanations, interpretations and hypotheses because they "make sense"; (c)
recognizes the value of the planned program of change activities the
therapist outlines for each individual and for the family as a whole;
and (d) begins to regard himself or herself as someone who has the
right, the desire, and the capability to live more effectively and
satisfyingly than he or she does.
The Therapist and the Family Members' Meanings
While the family members enact their role-reciprocity the other
attributes of the SO also develop, although not at the same rate.
Perhaps the first additional attribute is the therapist's and family
member's assumption of each other's meanings through taking the role
of the other as the therapist engages the family members individually
and jointly in reflective, analytical and directive discussion. The
ability to assume the other's meanings is an aspect of the therapist's
and the family members' membership in the same society and the fact
that they share a common culture.
The therapist attempts to perceive each family member's meanings
and he or she assists each family member to perceive every other
family member's meanings. The therapist asks "What does his behavior
mean to you?" "What do you think his behavior means to him?" "What
do you think he thinks his behavior means to you?" Each family member
is requested to explain his or her interpretation of each SO's behavior, thoughts and feelings which is checked against the SO's own
statement of its meaning to him or her. Such offerings of perceptions
of others' meanings and the others' feedback exposes misperceptions,
misinterpretations and limitations of communication. Determining the
others' meanings and learning how to communicate about them enables
the family members to develop effective and satisfying interaction--if
this is their therapy goal.
The family members disclose information about themselves, about
each other, and about their relationships. The therapist organizes
and interprets this information differently from the way the family
members perceived and interpreted it. His or her interpretation,
using social psychological constructs, is different in two ways:
(a) it does not threaten or disparage anyone; and (b) it makes sense
in a way that enables the individual to do something about it. It
thereby facilitates treatment activities that offer the family members
ways to develop effective and satisfying interaction. When the family
members understand the therapist's definition of their situation and
act on it, the family members individually and collectively notice
desirable changes.
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The Therapist and the Affective Relationship
The therapist's ability to empathetically assume each family
member's perspective in the family interaction fosters his or her
affective or expressive significance for and/or an affective relationship with each family member. The family members come to the
therapist during a crisis when anxious and dependent feelings
associated with earlier crises may be evoked and because of their
inability to solve their problems and conflicts.
When the therapist attempts to be helpful, a condition is
created in which one or more family members develop the same kind of
feelings toward him or her that they felt toward others who helped
them solve problems or resolve conflicts in earlier crises when they
felt dependent. They regard him or her as a succoring parent, a
helpful teacher, and a supportive friend. They ascribe qualities to
him or her which he or she may not have but which are associated with
a succoring, helpful, supportive person in a crisis situation.
The family members who disclosed their feelings of anxiety and
dependency to parents and other significant adults were given support
and comfort. When they come to a therapist who creates the relationship which encourages them to disclose their present feelings of
anxiety to him or her, he or she also gives them support and comfort.
Therefore the same feelings they had toward the parents and others are
aroused and projected on the therapist. The disclosure of feelings
not ordinarily shared in social relationships creates a unique situation. As the members recognize their feelings toward the therapist
and identify them with their early socialization by their parents and
SOs, they also identify the therapist as an SO who can help them in
their continuing socialization. This phenomenon can be explained on
the basis of the learning principle of generalization.
When the family members recognize that the therapist cares about
them, they in turn care about him or her. They express this care in
various ways. They give him or her affirming feedback to let him or
her know they are aware he or she cares about them, that he or she
wants to help them and that they are being helped. They express
their appreciation for the fact that their family situation is
changing in a way they desire by telling him or her they thought about
him or her or about something he or she said during the week, coming
to appointments as scheduled, paying their bill, sending holiday cards,
bringing him or her clippings they believe will be of interest to him
or her, etc., and in other direct and indirect ways.
The family members ask the therapist questions about himself or
herself and about his or her family. They ask whether he or she is
married and has children; and when he or she replies that he or she
is married and that he or she has children, they may say that his wife
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is a fortunate woman or her husband is a fortunate man to be married
to such a sensitive and intelligent man or woman, and his or her
children are fortunate to have such an informed and understanding
father or mother. When the therapist tells them that he or she also
has limitations that his or her family members must bear, they find it
difficult to believe.
Many qualities, characteristics, capabilities, traits, etc., are
considered necessary or desirable for the effective therapist; however, many therapists do not have them. The fact that the family
members ascribe qualities, etc., to the therapist that he or she
obviously does not have suggests that if the therapist is helpful the
family members regard him or her as having the qualities they associate with a helping person. That is, the family members develop a
definition of the situation in which they ascribe a particular meaning
to the therapist's activities; and it is the definition of the therapeutic relationship and not the therapist's characteristics that cause
the family members to ascribe the desirable qualities to him or her.
In this way the family members assume the therapist's values whether
or not he or she informs them about his or her values or attempts to
prosletyze the family members.
The Therapist and the Family Members' Self-Concepts
The experiences that lead most family members to seek therapy
have caused anxiety, depression and demoralization. Since earlier SOs
may have told them how incapable and worthless they are, they know
their limitations and failings, and may have come to believe the
others' most disparaging evaluation of them--fostering a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The therapist challenges this situation. He or she emphasizes
the individual's strengths and competence, and indicates that he or
she has potentials he or she has not fulfilled because of his or her
specific life circumstances. The therapist tells each family member
who needs such support that he or she is much better informed about
"most people" and the family member's comparative ability than the
family member himself or herself, and he or she knows that the family
member is not unintelligent or incompetent. What is true is that he
or she has come to tell himself or herself that he or she is unintelligent, incompetent, etc., and to believe this is so. And by
believing it, he or she has come to act according to this belief.
The therapist helps each family member to develop a concept of
himself or herself as an effective person because his or her selffeelings enter into his or her evaluation of his or her will, desire,
and capability to change. His or her self-feelings enter into his or
her self-concept as a victim or scapegoat to whom things happen instead
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of as an initiator and changer of his or her interaction and relationship with others. This self-concept then becomes associated with a
philosophy of the world and existence, with his or her locus of
control, by which the family member rationalizes his or her plight
and resigns himself or herself to it--or attempts to assert himself or
herself in the world and in relation to others.
The therapist informs the family member that he or she does not
have to regard himself or herself and live the way he or she does. He
or she encourages him or her to offer hypotheses about family interaction based on "What is the other doing or not doing that causes
family problems and conflicts?" as well as hypotheses based on "What
am I doing or not doing that causes family problems and conflicts?"
The therapist supports the member as a competent individual who has
the ability to be self-directing, etc., but he or she also offers
specific types of assistance that enable the member to exercise his or
her ability. He or she compliments a desirable activity, he or she
corrects pronunciation in the protected therapy setting so the family
member will feel freer to use the words outside the therapy setting,
he or she suggests readings and may supply appropriate information.
The therapist also supports the family members as competent people
by behaving toward them as though they are, treating them the way he
or she would like to be treated in a comparable situation, and he or
she guides and instructs their joint and reciprocal behavior change
efforts and activities.
The Therapist as a Model
The family members who accept and respond to the therapist's
efforts to help them achieve their asserted goal begin to imitate the
therapist's behavior or the way they believe the therapist would
behave in a particular situation. The therapist behaves in a certain
way with the family members and explains why he or she does so. He or
she states what he or she thinks is the meaning of the family members'
behavior toward him or her and toward each other. The way the therapist behaves toward the family members becomes the way they behave
toward each other, and he or she thereby becomes a model and social
reinforcer.
The therapist serves as a model by being an interested and
empathetic listener, by describing and explaining what the family
members' behavior, thoughts and feelings toward each other and toward
him or her mean to him or her, by role-playing situations with one or
more of them, and by sharing information about himself or herself. He
or she discusses his or her philosophy of the world and existence,
shares his or her gratification with the family members' achievements,
and accepts the family members' criticism without becoming defensive
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or retaliating. The therapist's openness and self-disclosure of
experiences that caused him or her to have shame and guilt feelings
models behavior for the family members to emulate. In doing so they
may gain greater acceptance of the therapist as an SO. The therapist's behavior may enable family members to reveal the guilty secret
that may prevent them from undertaking self-enhancing behavior,
thoughts and feelings and thereby develop a more positive self-concept.
The Therapist and the Concepts of Transformation, Attribution
and Social Interchange
If the SOs do not spontaneously practice transformation the
therapist investigates the basis for their attribution and social
interchange and whether they agree it is "fair." In addition, the
therapist involves each family member in efforts to modify, as required, the behavior, thoughts and/or feelings of every other family
member; and in this process each family member necessarily changes
his or her own. Although the family members customarily attempt to
change their own and the other's behavior, that is their role-performances, since such changes in behavior can be observed and recorded,
this process also involves changing meanings, affect, and their
self-concept.
Many behavior change efforts are undertaken on a quid pro quo
basis in which the spouse (for instance) who wants the other to
demonstrate affection to him or her is advised to demonstrate it to
the other and to reward him or her in some way when he or she does so
(Stuart, 1969; Rappaport & Harrell, 1972). In clinical practice the
concept of transformation, applied to the concept of justice or
equity, suggests that it is not necessary to change the same attribute
of the SO, e.g. behavior, in return for modification of one's own and
the SO's behavior. That is, the wife who wants to gain expressions of
affection from her husband does not have to do so by demonstrating
affection toward him. She may attempt to enhance his self-concept,
she may assume certain pertinent meanings, or she may perform her
marital roles differently in order to gain the affect she desires.
The therapist attempts to modify, as required, each attribute of
the SO of each family member directly. He or she examines how each
member attributes motives about his or her own and about the others'
behavior, thoughts and feelings. He or she also investigates the
family members' interaction hypotheses as part of their problem-solving efforts. He or she rejects terminal hypotheses which interpret
behavior, meanings or feelings so each individual who participates in
the interaction does not understand his or her own and the other's
behavior, meanings or feelings in their interaction in such a way that
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something can be done to change their relationship. Instead he or she
applies instrumental hypotheses which explain behavior, meanings or
feelings so each individual who participates in the interaction can
understand his or her and the other's behavior, meanings or feelings
in their exchanges in such a way that something can be done to change
their relationship (Hurvitz, 1970).
In a way that was unknown when the concept of interaction hypotheses was proposed, it is now apparent that this concept is related
to attribution theory. As Kelley states, attribution theory is about
how people "answer questions beginning with 'why?'" (1973, p. 107).
The importance of such a perspective is that instead of the therapist
offering--read imposing--his or her insights or interpretations upon
the client, the client offers his or her perceptions of the interaction and the situation within which it occurs. By doing so the
client reveals his or her perception of the world and reality, his or
her locus of control, self-concept and other "meanings." And by doing
so he or she informs the therapist what kinds of cognitive and behavior
modifications are required to enable him or her to interact in an
effective and satisfying way with his or her 50.
The therapist assists the family members to examine their interaction on the basis of reciprocity, justice, balance, social exchange.
To do so the therapist asks each family member involved in a particular problem or conflict situation: What happened according to your
perception: What did the SO say or do that disturbed you; what did
you say or do that may have disturbed the SO; what did you say or do
in response to the SO's disturbing statement or behavior? The therapist also asks: What happened according to the SO's perception:
what does the SO think you said or did that disturbed him or her; what
does the SO think he or she said or did that may have disturbed you;
what did the SO say or do in response to what he or she thought was
your disturbing statement or behavior? The therapist also asks: How
do you account for what happened: why do you think the SO said or
did the thing that disturbed you; why do you think the SO responded
as he or she did to what he or she thought was your disturbing
statement or behavior? The therapist also asks: How do you think the
SO accounts for what happened: what do you think the SO thinks is the
reason you said or did what he or she believes disturbed him or her;
what do you think the SO thinks caused you to respond to what you
thought was his or her disturbing statement or behavior as you did?
These questions do not have to be asked in precisely this form; however, it is often necessary to secure the information elicited by these
questions. When the information is secured the spouses and family
members can determine whether fairness exists in their relationship
and whether they want to do something about it.
Once the therapist has inducted the family members into the
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appropriate role-relationship with him or her, the role-relationship
becomes the basis for the therapist's and the family members' joint
participation in the interaction processes. When the therapist and
the family members interact, the other attributes of the SO also
develop and the therapist participates in transformation. Concepts of
attribution and social interchange are also applied to the relationship between the therapist and the family members just as the therapist applies them to the relationship between the family members.
The Therapist's Interaction as an SO
The fact that the therapist becomes an SO means that the family
members recognize that the therapist, whatever sterling qualities he
or she has or presumes he or she has, is a human being with his or her
own limitations. He or she will not perceive everything that occurs
about him or her during his or her sessions with the spouses or family
members; and he or she will not interpret correctly everything he or
she perceives. He or she may not catch the nuances of an aside, the
significance of a glance between the family members, the meaning of a
child's request to go to the toilet when he or she asks to go, etc.
There are times when he or she will start a sentence on the wrong foot
and find it in his or her mouth, and have to start the sentence over
again. There may be momentary confusion when the therapist uses the
wrong word, calls a family member by the wrong name, makes a funny
comment that the family members do not find amusing, etc. Such confusion does not mean that their therapist cannot help the family
members.
Just as they accept each other in their own families, the family
members accept the therapist's limitations benignly when things are
going well. However, when the reasons that the family members resist
therapy appear to be validated by something the therapist says or does,
the reciprocity between the therapist and one or more family members is
disturbed, and the limitations are no longer accepted benignly. Nevertheless the therapist's limitations are evidence of his or her common
humanity with the family members which he or she expects them to
accept just as he or she accepts their limitations. The therapist must
recognize and help the family members to recognize that he or she
cannot supply all the needs of each and every family member. However,
he or she will exert himself or herself on their behalf to help them
achieve their asserted therapy goal.
Conclusion
The SO, defined informally in the past, can be utilized to understand, evaluate and modify the interaction of family members in the
clinical setting. The SO, defined as an analytical concept by
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examining interaction in social acts, is associated with the social
behaviorism of Mead, which is comparable to contemporary cognitive
behaviorism. The concept of the SO is associated with such additional
concepts as transformation, attribution, social interchange, and
aligning actions. These describe various ways in which SOs interact
and modify each other's behavior, thoughts and feelings. These
concepts, principles and actions describe behavior on a "horizontal"
plane, and explain and interpret behavior on the basis of the SOs'
interaction itself. Such a view supercedes the attempts to modify an
SO's behavior, thoughts and feelings by "vertical" or "depth" exploration to seek putative unconscious sources or heavenly causes of their
behavior. The horizontal understanding of behavior is applied by the
therapist to the family members' interaction as SOs, and to his or
her interaction as an SO with the family members individually and
collectively to help them achieve their asserted therapy goal.
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